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IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCES 
THE ROLE OF MEMORY, NARRATIVE, AND HISTORY 
IN PERSONAL IDENTITY 
Yumi ISHIGE 
ABSTRACT 
The main issue of this thesis is to analyse what kind of concept we have of 'personal 
identity. ' 
The concept of personal identity is basically examined in relation to memory in this 
thesis. 
, 
Recalling memory is supposed to make an intelligible account between 
experiences. It gives meaning to what is remembered in accordance with the context of 
that person's life. This work is compared to a narrative understanding of memory. Ile 
unity of a person over time, which relates to the unity of personal identity, assumed to 
be formed through making this narrative account (Chapter one and the first half of 
Chapter two). 
However, there arises the question of whether all of our experiences can be managed by 
the narrative account. Two issues are examined at this point: The insufficiency of that 
narrative approach (die latter half of Chapter two) and the historical transformation of 
tile concept of personal identity (Chapter three). The transformation is specifically 
studied with influences of the media through time. The particularities of tile modem 
period of time are specifically considered as the age from which the study of personal 
identity has developed. 
Today, however, the credibility of the modem concept of personal identity seems to be 
in doubt. This doubt is summarised in the term 'postmodem., The characteristics of and 
the discontinuity between the modem and the postmodern are described in Chapter four. 
Finally Chapter five investigates the particularities of the concept of identity in the 
postmodern age 
I conclude that the modem concept of personal identity has been effective in organising 
society, but it has arrived during a time at which its boundary needs to be reconsidered. 
Differences of a person, which are not identified within the narrative consistency of a 
life, are a key-term in this thought. 
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2005 
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INTRODUCTION 
The two main issues of this thesis are shown in the title. One is the matter of Identity. 
Although this word can suggest various meanings such as a logical connection between 
A and X or the sameness of an object at different times, I focus on its reference to the 
temporal continuity of a person, namely, the issue of personal identity. Within that topic, 
I consider the method by which we grasp ourselves as relatively continuous and 
coherent existences through time. The other matter to consider is Differences. They are 
assumed to be elements that deviate from that coherence. We tend to give an order to 
our experiences through which a consistent relation is made, but I propose that there are 
some things that cannot be settled in this manner. They are aberrations from the 
organisation of identity, and I call them differences. I shall add more explanation to this 
term later in the Introduction. I will examine the work of these two different concepts on 
fonning ourselves in this thesis. 
The issue of personal identity is first considered in the relation to memory. To 
present my conclusion in advance, I determine that our concept of personal identity 
consists of memory that arises when we grasp our experiences from a certain 
perspective. It is the method by which we understand the past by ourselves, and how to 
remember experiences will be discussed. In this survey, I specifically pay attention to 
the work of making experiences unified within the framework of a person. it is the act 
' 
of giving an intelligible elucidation of memory in accordance with the context of other 
memories. Ibis is the topic in the first half of this thesis, in which I will develop this 
view in connection to identity, memory, and narrative. Then, I will reconsider the 
validity of that assumption, and take notice of the fragmented aspect of identity in the 
latter half of the thesis. 
If we bear one point in mind, it will help to catch the tenor of our discussion. It 
is that a person thus described is presupposed to be an existence that can undertake an 
action as his or her own, and this presupposition is inseparable from the ideal of a 
person arising from the modem age. I broadly define the modem period as from the 
seventeenth century onward, originating in Western culture-' A prominent characteristic 
of that ideal is the awareness of human reason. Charles Taylor counts the following as 
facets of nascent modem individualism and modem identity: 'self-responsible 
independence, ' 'recognized particularity' of the inner self, and 'personal commitment, ' 
in which one's will is thought to be one's own, and only one person can give consent to 
a commitment. 2 On these modem ideals, a person is described as a rational agent, 
responsible for his or her own actions, and able to gather the threads of his or her life 
story in undertaking the actions. My basic presumption about the above described agent 
as a subject of my discussion, is that of an adult who has more or less common sense of 
belonging within a community. 
This type of understanding of individuals has been discussed in the context of 
personal idcntity by, for example, Alasdair Maclntyre, and Paul RicoeUr. 3 Their 
particularity is to treat the issue of identity by the use of narrative. The continuity of a 
This notion will be specified further in chapters three and four. 
2 Taylor (1989, p. 185). 
3 MacIntyre (1984), Ricoeur (1981). 
2 
person in their view resides in the ability to give a congruous account of episodes 
through life. Even if there is a great gap between description A (e. g., a wealthy noble) 
and description B (a miserable mendicant), they would be thought of as descriptions of 
the same person as long as a reasonable explanation of the connection (the occurrence 
of revolution and the fall of the aristocracy) between the two can be given. This is 
defined as a narrative understanding of life which puts episodes in the context of long- 
term intentions, through which the episode is provided with an adequate meaning. This 
relation between episodes forms the framework of our concept of personal identity as a 
particular person and none other. I will pursue the issue of identity in line with this 
narrative approach, by which memory is reconstructed and a comprehensible view of 
the past is offered 
That is a basic understanding of a person as a unitary existence over time 
presented in this thesis, but I also ask if it enough for studying the matter of identity. I 
suggest that there are occasions on which we find inconsistency in ourselves. They, at 
least at that moment, cannot be settled by the consistency of that person's understanding 
of him/herself, and I regard such moments as the generation of differences. They can 
appear in various ways in our lives. For instance, I see their symbolic cases in episodes 
recounted by Ernest Mach, and Sigmund Freud. Mach describes his incident: One night, 
he got into an omnibus 'just as another man appeared at the other end. "What a shabby 
pedagogue that is, that has just entered, " thought I. It was myself: opposite me hung a 
large mirror., The physiognomy of my class, accordingly, was better known to me than 
my own. ' The man who was in the mirror appeared as a stranger to him. He 
immediately realised his mistake, but it must have given him a strong impression to let 
3 
him cite the experience in his writing. 4 Interestingly, Mach-in-the-miffor is accepted as 
an unpleasant man by him. That is why Sigmund Freud is attracted by Mach's episode 
and cites it in his article on the 'uncanny'. 
Freud also mentions the case of his own adventure: He was in a ivagon-fit 
compartment when the door of the washing-cabinet was opened by violent swing and 
'an elderly gentleman in a dressing-gown and a travelling cap came in. ' He thought this 
man had come into his compartment by mistake. However, he soon realised that 'the 
intruder was nothing but my own reflection in the looking-glass on the open door. 5 I 
mention these episodes in order to denote what I regard as differences: There are 
occasions on which we find 'others' in ourselves, and it may be an uncomfortable 
experience for us. Something which is different, strange, or unfamiliar to us is often 
accompanied by a feeling of insecurity, because they may have the potential to throw a 
peace made by identity into disorder. The disturbance of coherence is a characteristic of 
differences, and Mach and Freud's episodes intimate this aspect. I interpret this idea of 
disturbance as a heterodoxy to the modem ideal of a person as a consistent and unified 
existence. Tlis leads to discussion of the minimum of the modem concept of personal 
identity. 
Though not as strongly as in Mach's episode, we also experience meeting our own 
image in daily life. The media are influential methods for propagating this experience 
6 by which we are often shown 'ourselves' in recorded infortnation. When we face the 
4Mach also adduces another of his own misunderstandings of himself. He Saw a young 
man whose face was'very displeasing and repulsive to me. 'Then, he realised that it 
was his own face reflected by mirrors in a shop (1914,4n). 
5 Freud depicts the uncanny as 'something which is secretly familiar [heimlich- 
heimisch], which has undergone repression and then returned from it'(1985, p. 368). 
61 use the term themedia'to mean methods that store, send, and exchange 
information between people. Any method of human expression is treated as the media 
4 
media, we might feel alienation from the person who is interrelated with the media. 
Besides, it is the age in which a huge variety of images are dispersed by the 
development of technology. Not all information in the media gives rise to a sense of 
estrangement of selves from ourselves, but it presents the possibility of finding 
differences in our sense of identity. I see that as a reason why the matter of differences 
is specifically observed in this period more than before. 
I assume that if our concept of personal identity is reconsidered due to such 
external influences, it can lead to the question of whether that concept is a universal idea 
throughout history, or if it arose in a particular culture and era. I take the side of the 
second view, and insist that this concept is a modem discovery in Western culture. For a 
confirmation of this point, I will follow its temporal changes along with transitions in 
the methods of communication, which focus on in chapter three. Moreover, in the last 
two chapters, the decline of the concept of personal identity, which is supposed to occur 
in accordance with the fall of the modem ideal, is discussed in the context of the 
postmodern. In order to clarify the notion of the postmodern, I mainly refer to Jean- 
Frangois Lyotard's discussion in which the conflict between the modem and the 
postmodem is keenly analysed. This is expected to disclose distrust of modem ideas and 
the diffusion of our concept of identity today. On this view, it is not supposed that either 
identity or differences is generated from the collapse of the other, but that both are 
necessary to form the concept of a person. However, the modem discussion seems not 
to pay enough attention to the aspect of differences, and I want to consider this problem 
in the context of the postmodern. 
Before we tackle the problem of personal identity in the body of tile thesis, I 
in this thesis. 
5 
should make clear five points in this discussion. First, I shall explain more the idea of 
differences that has been mentioned above. This term is sometimes used in postmodem 
arguments with specific meanings, but I do not use it in accordance with a particular 
philosopher. For instance, this term often advocates how Jacques Deffida uses it. He 
makes the term 'difference' from 'diffdrer' in order to argue the domination of 
logocentrism, in which speech is thought to represent interior and writing is exterior. 
Derrida however criticises this confrontation between speech and writing but asserts 
that it is a play between interiority and exteriority and none of them has a priority to 
another. 7 In Gilles Deleuze's discussion, difference is compared to identification, and he 
tries to annul the distinction between the origin and the replica. 8 
Although I am influenced by discussions that are seen in postmodern literature, I 
do not restrict the use of differences only in that manner, neither in the relation to 
logocentrism nor the differences that may appear in repetition like Deleuze proposes. 
The aim to employ the term is not to analYSe its use in specific texts, but to examine 
insufficiency of the concept of identity - if there are any. For the issue of identity, I 
employ the conception of 'narrative, ' which makes a comprehensible story through 
locating one's own experiences in the context of that person's life. Thus, it is a sort of 
system that possesses order. The systernhowever, holds a shortage that it cannot present 
something that strays from the order. I call it differences from the identification of 
things, and discuss how they appear in the concept of personal identity. 
Second, the identity that I will discuss is the identity of human beings. Since my 
7 For more arguments, see Derrida (1974). 
87hat identity not be first, that it exist as a principle but as a second principle, as a 
principle become; that it revolve around the Different: such would be the nature of a 
Copernican revolution which opens up the possibility of difference having its own 
concept, rather than being maintained under the domination of a concept in general 
already understood as identical' (Deleuze, 1994, p. 4 1). 
6 
96 topic is personal' identity, I omit the study of the identity of things, animals, or artificial 
intelligence. This may give the impression that the identity of those is constructed 
differently from personal identity, but we need further discussion to analyse this 
problem, so I will not mention it further. 9 Some philosophers present arguments about 
the identity of things, and I will cite them if the need arises, for example, Joseph 
Butler's tree-problem and John Perry's instance of a baseball game. As long as the 
argument contributes to research into personal identity, there is no reason not to take it 
up for discussion. Nonetheless, I should first confirm the point that the general interest 
in this work is the identity of persons, not that of other things. 10 
Third, our discussion deploys the point that we grasp our continuity by ourselves, 
so its concem is the method by which we organise a life story from our own perspective. 
For this reason, our discussion is mostly conducted ftom the first person's viewpoint. 
There are occasions on which I examine the third person's viewpoint, but I principally 
seek the way that we know ourselves as the agents of our own actions. " For that reason, 
I use the expression 'the concept of personal identity' in my discussion. 
Fourth, I elucidate the reason that I occasionally use the expression the 'concept' 
of personal identity. When we deal with our understanding of personal identity, or 
consider its transformation, the subject of the discussion is that concept, which means 
how we understand the matter of 'personal identity'. In addition, in the case of its 
9 For a summary of views on the identity of animals, see, e. g., Noonan (2003, pp. 196, 
213). 
10 More precisely, the subject of our discussion is the identity of adults, especially in 
post-industrial society. The identity of children might be different from that of adults, 
and some cognitive science investigates the development of the self in childhood. It is 
interesting to consider children's sense of identity, but it is too big an issue to treat in 
this thesis. Therefore, that point is not included in my discussion. 
11 There is an opinion that even though a story is told from a particular personýs 
viewpoint, we still must make a distinction between 'internal perspectiveand 'external 
perspective' (Peter Goldie, 2003). 
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transfonnation, we do not ask if 'personal identity' changes (I cannot really understand 
what would be meant by that question), but rather if the concept that we have of 
personal identity changes. The sub ect, of the above question is the transfonnability of j 
our account of what personal identity is for us, so that concept is the target of research. 
T'hus far this does not hit the same point that is argued by the traditional study of 
personal identity in philosophical literature. The latter study usually asks criteria of a 
continuity of a person over time, and a number of arguments develop concerning this 
subject. This type of investigation seeks an absolute solution by which the identification 
of a person at a different time is explained. However, my interest is more inclined to the 
method by which we make an understandable connection between our own experiences 
from the present perspective. 
Scholars who are specifically interested in the relation between personal identity 
and the narrative account sometimes indicate this difference. For instance, Marya 
Schechtman stresses the necessity to make a distinction between what she calls the 
'reidentification question' and the 'characterization question. ' The former corresponds 
to the criteria-arguments of personal identity, and the later relates to the conditions of 
which 'beliefs, values, desires, and other psychological features make someone the 
person she is., 12 The latter subject in her discussion is somehow concerned with the 
narrative account in this thesis. This issue will be discussed in chapter two. 
Fifth, I will mention the sense of individuality, especially in chapter three, but its 
use does not refer to so-called individualism. I shall explain this point here. Although 
individualism holds diverse meanings in its use, its political and social philosophy is 
usually depicted as the opposition to the idea that locates the whole in tile superior 
12 Schechtman (1996, pp. 
8 
position to an individual. An agent in that individualism is counted as the primary unit 
of society, so society is the accumulation of individuals but not something that 
transcends that accumulation. This thought thus stresses the priority of individual's 
status to that of a group of people such as families, communities, or society to which an 
individual is attached. In philosophical literature, for instance, methodological 
individualism maintains the notion that social developments can be regarded as a 
collection of individuals' actions and decisions. It therefore implies that a large clump, 
such as societies or nations, can be reduced to small constituent elements, namely 
individuals. it is true that there are various theories that belong to a sort of individualism, 
but we do not have enough space to analyse them. To mention the point shall be enough 
for our discussion that the main idea of individualism is that an individual is the factor 
that founds the collective, but not the reverse. 13 
Compare individualism and individuality, I use the latter term as the 
consciousness of independence from circumstances to which the person belongs. This 
independence does not indicate that an individual is superior to the whole, though 
neither does treat the individual as the result of the whole. I will not enter the sort of 
discussion that asks whether an individual or the whole holds superiority to another. 1, 
however, use the tenn as the consciousness by which we objectively grasp ourselves 
somehow keeping distance from social iriftences, and by which we see ourselves as an 
independent agent of our own actions. As one of its instances, the development of 
human rationality can be counted as starting with the expansion of Enlightenment from 
the beginning of the modem period. Enlightenment is characterised by the reliance on 
rationality, the evolution of humanity, and freedom from authority, and those features 
13 For more information, for example, see Watkins (1957), Elster (1989), Udehn (2001). 
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have a relation to the awareness of independence. For example, a positive self-image 
that is cultivated by Enlightenment can be depicted thus: the image 'is of a civilization 
founded on scientific knowledge of the world and rational knowledge of value, which 
places the highest premium on individual human life and freedom. ' 14 1 employ 
'individuality' as such awareness of one's own independence and singularity that are 
supposed to be necessary for the advent of the concept of personal identity. 15 This 
notion of individuality is used without relying upon the context of individualism in 
particular studies, but suggests the awareness of inner-sclf as an individual compared 
with the collective sense of belonging within a community. 
It may be objected that the above question is not quite a philosophical issue, 
because philosophers often pursue theories that can be applied to multiple situations 
beyond local conditions. In the study of personal identity, this frequently takes the form 
of an investigation into the criterion by which all human beings under any circumstance 
can be proved to be continuous existences through time. The inquiry into a permanent 
theory is an important task for philosophy, but I insist that it is also important to 
ascertain the flexible aspects of the concept of identity. In our case, it is the question of 
whether or not our concept of personal identity is temporally limited, whether or not it 
is transfon-nable dependent upon external factors. My opinion is that the concept of 
personal identity can alter in accordance with socio-cultural conditions, and I will 
examine this flexibility of our concept of identity in this thesis. It is valuable to study 
external influences in order to acknowledge what presuppositions we have in the study 
of personal identity. Therefore, I insist that research into this concept's mutable side can 
14 Cahoone (2003, p. 9). 
15 For more discussion of Enlightenment, see Chapter three. 
10 
provide a contribution to the philosophical discussion of this issue as well as to the 
traditional criteria-arguments of personal identity. 
Main Topics in Each Chapter 
I will discuss the role of memory in relation to personal identity in chapter one. I 
assume that when we recall our own experiences, we grasp them from the present 
standpoint. At that time, we have a certain understanding of the past, and I indicate that 
the framework of personal identity is generated by this work. Our concept of personal 
identity is thus described as a clump of remembering that is produced from a particular 
16 
perspective. In addition, it is my view in this thesis that remembered events are not the 
events as they just happened, but their meanings and/or structures are reconstructed 
according to the present perspective. Our understanding of the past changes if our later 
experiences give an enough infon-nation to re-interpret the meaning of some events, so 
to recall memory is to revise experiences for the sake of making a coherent relation 
between them. Our past is not a collection of fixed events, but can be recombined 
corresponding to an interpretation. I call the process of making an intelligible account of 
experiences the 'reconstruction of memory'. 17 
Memory plays an important part in this understanding of personal identity. 
Nevertheless, I should caution that I do not participate in the discussion of the 
psychological criterion well-known in the study of personal identity. That study relates 
16 Charles Taylor discusses this point in relation to morality (1989, p. 27). 
17 The idea that the past is reconstructed is examined particularly in psychology, e. g., 
Neimeyer and Metzler (1994). 
11 
to the question of what the continuity of a person consists in, and in the case of memory, 
it is condensed to what description we can give of the psychological continuity and/or 
connectedness of a person over time as the criterion of personal idcntity. 18 Although the 
criteria-arguments are common in this subject, I will not undertake this type of 
investigation. It is not our concern to determine the necessary and sufficient conditions 
for the continuity of a person, but I ask from what operation we form the concept of 
personal identity. A concise answer is memory, because the question of personal identity 
presupposes time distance in which at least one of the existences is only found in 
memory. If we did not remember anything, we, to begin with, would not be able to 
develop the concept of personal identity, and I would like to consider this work of 
memory. I will consider those issues in the first half of chapter one, and then cite some 
instances of the reconstruction of memory and examine their characteristics. 
The relation between a narrative approach and the concept of personal identity is a 
main topic in chapter two. The narrative approach is employed in order to examine the 
organisation of the reconstruction of memory. If experiences were always randomly 
connected with each other, we would not be able to make any sense of the past owing to 
the impossibility of understanding the relation between them, and consequently would 
not be able to form personal identity. Complete chaos is beyond our comprehension, and 
we tend to put memory in a form from which we can take its meaning. Hence, the 
reconstruction of memory must have order in its formation as long as it makes an 
intelligible account. This account of memory presents two issues. First, we infer that the 
structure of the reconstructed memory can be compared with the narrative form, which 
gives a meaning to an event in the context of life. The necessity of the narrative form 
18 For example, see Nozick (1981), Shoemaker (1970). 
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and its connection to identity arc stressed in the work of Maclntyre, who states that the 
unity of an individual is 'a unity of a narrative embodied in a single life. '19 Actions 
become comprehensible when they are located in a proper context, and the narrative 
form is used to provide that context. 
I presume that there are two standards according to which experiences are 
ordered in the narrative form. 20 One is concerned with time, since the act of recaffing 
experiences must contain a sense of time. Experiences are, nevertheless, not only 
constructed in temporal order, but they can be organised by a different standard. I 
propose a causal relation as another standard in which the connection between at least 
two events is made in the relation of cause and effect. This use of 'causal relation' may 
sound inadequate, since causality is usually understood as regularity that event A and B 
are in causal relation if A is inunediately followed by B and like kinds of events of A 
and B are always followed by the similar manner. 21 Thus, there can be a criticism that if 
I introduce the causal relation into the order of the narrative form, any experiences 
would be automatically arranged, so there is no room for human intention in actions. I 
insist that this problem results from the different notions of causality between 
philosophical literature and narrative theory, and I will discuss this issue in 2.5. The 
narrative account of a person is thus the work by which an intelligible explanation 
between events is produced with the reference to one's own life-story. 
Second, although the narrative understanding of experiences serves to form the 
unity of personal identity, I wonder if there is a minimum to this understanding when 
dealing with our experiences. I will focus on this question through observation of 
19 MacIntyre (1984 P. 218). 
20 MacIntyre (1984 p. 208), Ricoeur (1984, p. 53), Wollheim (1980). 
21 For instance, John Stuart Mill's defines causation as 'the antecedent, or the 
concurrence of antecedents, on which [a given phenomenon] is invariably and 
unconditionally consequent. '(1874, p. 245). 
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experiences that seem to escape the consistency of the narrative form. We first look at 
psychological instances that cannot be expressed in the existing form of narrative. I also 
mention Lyotard's discussion of narrative in which he argues that there are elements that 
cannot be located in the organisation of society. He calls these 'residues, ' which do not 
belong to the unity of life but slip through. 22 1 interpret residues as factors that reveal the 
minimum of the narrative approach for organising experience, because their very 
existence indicates that there are some things that cannot be explained by that approach. 
This view will finally bring about the discrediting of the idea that individuals are unified 
bcings. 
In chapter three, we will consider if the concept of identity is historically 
transfonnable. If the necessity of the unity of a person, which is the basis of the 
narrative approach to the concept of personal identity, is doubtful, it is worth 
considering the background against which the ideal has been fostered. Since if it is 
grounded in particular socio-cultural conditions in a certain age, it might reach the point 
at which its adequacy should be reconsidered. We will thus consider the period from 
which the study of personal identity arose, and the period before and after that. I count 
the media as methods of keeping and exchanging knowledge in a society, and assume 
that changes in these methods must have an influence on what concept people have of a 
person, society, and knowledge at a particular time. As Friedrich Kittler states in his 
research into modem media, 'Media determine our situations, which - in spite or 
because of it - deserves a description, ' so examining the influence of the media will be 
22 Similar to the case of differences, 'residue'is also used in several meanings in 
postmodern thought. Although some uses seem to influence each other, I here focus on 
Lyotard's use of this term. For another discussion, for instance, see Lacaes idea of the 
residue in relation to desire (2001, 'The Freudian Thing). 
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help us to contemplate what concept people have had of the identity of a person. 23 1 
divide media history into four parts; the medium of oral, the medium of writing, the 
medium of printing, and electric and/or electronic media, and consider the concept of 
'identity' in the era of each medium. 
The following is an outline of media history and its relation to identity. In the 
media of oral and writing, although there were indications of personal identity, people 
could not become aware of this issue by themselves. The distance between people and 
their conununity, was too close to generate the awareness of the inner-self through 
which a sense of independence and self-consciousness is established. Therefore, I define 
the age in which the first discussions of personal identity appeared as in the late 
seventeenth century, especially from the time of the publication of the work of John 
Locke. In this period, people were encouraged to acquire a sense of individuality, which 
is powerfully represented by the spirit of the Enlightenment. The medium of printing is 
thought to have been helpful in expanding that sense. The concept of personal identity 
has developed on this foundation, so it is essentially rooted in what people regarded as 
the conditions of a person from the modem era onwards. 
This modem idea certainly laid the groundwork for the development of current 
Western societies, nevertheless, their credibility has started to be doubted in the age of 
electric and/or electronic media. I call that period the 'postmodern, ' but the term needs 
to be defined. Hence, I will devote chapter four to examining the characteristics of the 
postmodem, and discuss particularities of the concept of identity today in chapter five. I 
use 'postmodern' as a general term that represents socio-cultural conditions somehow 
beyond the scope of the modem, roughly starting from the latter half of the twentieth 
23 Kittler (1999, p. xxxix). 
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century. I examine the characteristics of the postmodern mostly using Lyotard's ideas, 
because the relation between narrative, technology, and the concept of a person is 
eagerly analysed in his thought. 
In Lyotard's idea, his term &meta-naffatives' is compared with the modem, and 
'little narratives' are the postmodcrn. Their comparison is also found in his use of the 
narrative (which refers to the modem) and phrases (the postmodem). The narrative 
understanding of personal identity is studied in chapter three, so I shall discuss the work 
of phrases in relation to the concept of personal identity in this chapter. A person on the 
postmodem understanding tends to be reduced to transient actions at a particular 
moment rather than regarded as an agency that undertakes the whole life story. I surmise 
that this postmodem understanding of a person is comparable to Lyotard's notion of the 
linkage of phrases. In his opinion, every action can be described as a phrase, and how to 
link to another phrase. This is a great concern for us. I contrast phrases, which are short 
and temporal expressions of experiences, to narrative, which is a comparatively unified 
and structured story, in order to depict today's features of a person. 
In addition, Lyotard also mentions the status of general knowledge in comparison 
with the modem and the postmodern, and I define that type of knowledge as classics 
and feature its particularities. Those ideas, the postmodem, the modem, and the classics, 
are first examined in the context of periodical events, but Lyotard stresses them as 
different movements of thought as well. We finally analyse them in the context of the 
non-chronological order, and seek their differences in their own legitimacy. The main 
topics in chapter four are twofold; one is the conflict between the modem and the 
postmodem, and the other is doubt about the concept of a person and identity as a 
unified existence. 
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In the final chapter, I deal with electronic media as an example of persons as more 
dissolved and multiple, in the present era. Today people interact with each other through 
highly computerised media in which they usually do not know others' conditions in the 
actual world. This invisibility and the abstract relation are supposed to promote the 
differences of a person more than before. In this new technology, people are often 
described as spaces to which messages are sent and forwarded again. This kind of view 
is specifically found in recent studies including works by Roland Barthes, Gilles 
Deleuze, Jacque Deffida, and Lyotard. I pick up their notion of a person and try to put 
across their thoughts on the point of identity and differences. In relation to the concept 
of identity in the postmodern age, we also ask what the significant problem would be if 
the modem concept of personal identity collapses. This is converted into the enquiry 
into whether we can understand responsibility for others without using that concept. 
Derek Parfit's construal of personal identity will be suggestive in deliberating this 
problem, though again, I will not enter into the traditional debate over the investigation 
of the criteria of personal identity. 
I conclude that the concept of personal identity is not an absolutely universal idea 
through all spatio-temporal conditions, but it is rather a periodical notion that arose in 
early modem times in Western traditions. According to the decline of the modem, the 
concept of personal identity also faces dissolution. The modem understanding of a 
person was once effective in maintaining society, but it may have arrived at its 
limitation and we have already met the need to reconsider its credibility. The target of 
our criticism is so to speak the modem concept of personal identity, in which a person is 
regarded as an existence that manages life stages with reason and intelligence. I'llis 
view is cast into doubt by the postmodern, in which the integration of a person becomes 
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weak, but differences, which escape from the consistency of the unity of narrative, act 
in a more lively way. 
I undertake to depict the matter of identity and differences of a person from 
several angles concerned with the reconstruction of memory, narrative, media history, 
and the postmodem. 'Personal identity' is a curious word. It already includes questions 
as to what a person, identity, and personal identity is. We will consider these problems 
specifically from the side of personal identity, and the advent of that concept and its 
collapse are sought in this thesis. 
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Chapter I 
MEMORY 
The Reconstruction ofMemory and Personal Identity 
1.1 Without Memory, No Personal Identity 
One evening a boy of five years had already lain down on his bed. His father came to 
say good night and meanwhile told of the death of his cousin. The cousin was a grown 
man who had a distant relationship to the little boy. His father explained the cause, 
which was a heart attack, and answered his questions with details. At that time the boy 
had not fully understood the explanation and the meaning of the comparatively unusual 
attitude of his father, but later lie thought that the picture of his room and bed must have 
been engraved in his mind on that evening. He remembered them when lie was in his 
adulthood, when he knew the real name of cousin's illness, which was syphilis. 
This episode comes from Walter Benjamin's memory of his childhood in Berlin. 
Ilie interesting point in this story is that the memory of his room and bed was assumed 
not really to have had any impact on the evening concerned but they were stored in his 
mind. They were vividly recalled later, when he learned the actual cause of his cousin's 
death and why his father had hidden it from the little boy. Whilst Benjamin did not 
know of his father's deception, lie may not have had any special impression of his 
cousin's death, but that episode became a distinctive memory when he knew the exact 
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name of the illness. 
We can see two steps in Benjamin's episode. One is when he first heard the news 
in his childhood, and the other is when he recalled his memory of the evening with a 
new understanding . of the event. Although the boy did not take in much of the meaning 
of his father's explanation, he memorised his room and bed that evening in 'the way you 
observe with great precision a place when you feel dimly that you'll later have to search 
for something you've forgotten there'. 24 That memory was recalled later and his room 
and bed were given a special significance at that later time, not at the time when 
Benjamin, in his room, had only vaguely felt something strange. The first episode is 
given significance by the later experience and its meaning is modified by the impact of 
remembering. This is the reason why I quote this episode here. It depicts the way in 
which our memory is affected by our new understanding and reconstructed from the 
present point *of view. Since, if Benjamin did not know the cause of the death, his 
memory of that night would not be worth writing about for him. 
There are two assumptions in this chapter. First, I propose the idea that the work 
of remembering is a fundamental condition for forming our concept of personal identity. 
No past means no personal identity: If we did not remember anything, to begin with the 
continuity of a person over time would not become a question, because that notion 
could not be one we were conscious of. Remembering the past is essential to this point. 
Any question about personal identity, particularly based on the first person's viewpoint, 
begins from the premise that we possess the past to some degree. 
Second, it is assumed that whilst remembering is the method by which we grasp 
our past, what we evoke are not events that were once perceived, but events which are 
24 Benjamin (2002, p. 635). 
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recalled later, possibly with some modification. In general, people tend to believe that 
the past is a collection of fixed events which are recalled exactly as they were. However, 
as Benjamin's case indicates, I assume that the past is always influenced by the later 
understanding. 25 We may add more information to an event that was not known when it 
happened, or a change in our thought may give a new interpretation to an event, so the 
remembrance can be transformed by the way we see things. The past is not static but 
dynamic, and this is the basic view of memory in this thesis. 26 We shall call the act 
which revises past events from a particular person's perspective the 'reconstruction of 
memory, ' and pursue the relation between that act and the concept of personal identity. 
A brief view of this chapter is as follows: we will first consider the issue of 
perspective that we have when our remembering is recalled. It is an assumption that 
memory is not recalled from an absolutely neutral position but recalled from a specific 
view of that person at that time. In that section of perspective (1.2. ), 1 propose my basic 
understanding of a rclation between memory and the concept of personal identity. 
However, the view is not on the side of traditional discussion of personal identity, and 
we will see those differences next. 
Indeed, this point should be made clear before starting a discussion of memory, or 
otherwise it may lead to unnecessary confusion. Thus, I shall give an account of this 
25 There is an opinion that memory, or at least some types of memory, is recalled 
without reconstruction (e. g., Ehrenberg, Barnard, and Scriven, 1998, Bettman, 1979). 
In addition, in psychology, flashback memory is defined as memory which is'very hard 
to restructure' (Robinson, 1995, p. 207). Although I do not deny the existence of that 
type of memory, I do not deal with it here. On the types of memory which are treated in 
this thesis, see Section five of this chapter. 
26 From a neuroscientific perspective, Gerald M. Edelman's 'Theory of Neuronal Group 
Selection'is suggestive of this point: 'Recall is not stereotypic. Under the influence of 
continually changing contexts it changes, as the structure and dynamics of the neural 
populations involved in the original categorization also change. '(1992, p. 102). See also, 
Bartlett (1932). 
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view here. Philosophical arguments concerning personal identity often discuss the 
investigation of the criterion in which personal idcntity consists. There arc various 
discussions in this area, and according to this tradition, it may be expected that I will 
talk about the psychological criterion of personal identity. However, that type of 
discussion is not my intention, or at least, not a discussion that seeks the criterion of 
personal identity. I ought to offer a reason for this avoidanqe. In order to explain, it is 
necessary to mention that I regard personal identity as the framework of experiences 
that is organised from a person's perspective. Having elucidated this view, I will briefly 
outline the traditional arguments about personal identity, and compare them to my view 
for the sake of examining the differences between them. 
After we have confirmed that point, we will move tp an analysis of memory in 
which its role and types are determined. Our basic view is that the framework of 
personal identity is formed through the reconstruction of memory, so our understanding 
of experiences is not fixed but more transfortnable. In the latter half of this chapter, I 
will cite examples of this notion, and demonstrate the method by which the 
reconstruction of memory works to form our concept of personal identity. The necessity 
of memory and the transformability of that memory are thus main targets in our 
discussion hereafter. 
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1.2. The Matter of Perspective 
The traditional discussions of personal identity can be condensed into a question about 
the continuity of a person over time. In other words, philosophers have sought the 
criterion by which person PI at time ti and person P2 at time t2 can be counted as the 
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same person. The interesting point in this question is that we compare two possibly 
identical subjects in order to examine the continuity of a person, so we assume that the 
subjects may contain some differences that cannot be fully identical. 28 
How can more or less different subjects be identical with each other? I will 
consider this problem by means of the idea of understanding the past from one's own 
perspective. First, we shall examine the way in which the traditional study of personal 
identity deals with this matter, and then move to the issue of perspective. The discussion 
of differences between the identity of a person and the identity of things will be an 
adcquatc way into this topic. 
The strictest theory of the sameness of things is proposed by Joseph Butler in his 
criticism of Locke's opinion. That is presented by the example of a tree at different 
times: Tree X2 fifty years ago and tree Xi at present neither show the same appearance 
nor possess the same particles, so in what sense can we say they are the same tree? 
Butler's conclusion is that 'in a strict and philosophical manner of speech, no man, no 
being, no mode of being, nor any thing, can'be the same with that, with which it hath 
27For example, Noonan summarises this issue: 'The problem of personal identity over) 
time is the problem of giving an account of the logically necessary and sufficient 
conditions for a person identified at one time being the same person as a person 
identified at another'(2003, p. 2). 
28 ItmayevokeaHumeanviewinwhichthe 
unity of a person is reduced to a bundle of 
perceptions. A revised and recent version of the Humean view is found in Derek Parfit's 
discussion of personal identity that will be mentioned in chapter five. 
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indeed nothing the same. 29 An absolutely same thing does not have any 'identical' 
object, because it exists only at one moment in three dimensions, so apart from at that 
moment there is nothing to be identical with it (though whether or not we can grasp 'the 
moment' is another issue). Butler uses this tree-problem to argue that personal identity 
includes the identity of substance that is somewhat inscrutable in Lockean terms. 
This problem is partly explained by Thomas Reid. He makes a distinction between 
the identity of a person and the identity of a thing, and determines that the latter variety 
is not 'perfect' identity but that we for the convenience of speech call it identity: 
Identity of things can allow subjects to include a great change, and 'the changes which 
in common language are made consistent with identity differ from those that are thought 
to destroy it, not in kind, but in number and degree. It has no fixed nature when applied 
to bodies'. 30 Things can change in kind but not in number and degree, and if we 
introduced this definition of identity, differences of a thing would be explained as 
changes in its kind within a pennissible range. 31 
Up to now, Reid's discussion designates a promising direction for the view 
presented in this thesis, but he asserts that the identity of a person is perfect identity, so 
6wherever it is real, it admits of no degrees; and it is impossible that a person should be 
in part the same, and in part different; because a person is a monad, and is not divisible 
into parts. 32 It is clear that the unity of a person cannot be dispersed in his thought, and 
this is also what Butler concludes; personal identity is beyond the succession of 
materials. Reid can explain the changes of things by the inclusion of changes in the 
concept of identity, but he refuses to include change in the concept of personal identity. 
29 Butler (1975, p. 101). 
30 Reid (2002, pp. 266-267). 
31 For a similar view of the identity of things, see Swinburne (1984). 
32 Ibid., 
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Personal identity in this view is indivisible, and 'personal identity is somehow more real 
or genuine than the identity of other things, ' as Noonan puts it in his study of Butler, 
Reid, and Shoemaker. 33 1 part from Butler and Reid when they start analysing personal 
identity. I do not take the position that personal identity is an immaculate and invariable 
existence. I insist that its concept can admit changes. I search for the ground of my 
insistence in the matter of perspective. 
When we look back over our past, we grasp our experiences from the current 
understanding. This makes a relation between them, and I suppose this is the time at 
which the framework of personal identity is formed. The experiences are not identical 
with each other, but they are elements that form our concept of personal identity through 
making that network. To recall memories is to make a certain connection between them, 
and different aspects of temporally distant subjects are resolved in this act. This notion 
will be made more understandable if we refer to the 'unity relation' suggested by John 
Perry, which also deals with the problem of personal identity in relation to experiences. 
To explain the 'unity relation, ' Perry uses an instance of a man who does not know 
the rules of baseball at all. If the man went to a ground in which several games are 
simultaneously being played, he may not be able to distinguish which event belongs to 
which game, or even how many games are being played on the ground. He might think 
that to hit a ball and to tread on the base are different events in different games, or that 
events in three games are a set of plays in one game. However, if he learns the 
conditions of a baseball game, he would know which event belongs to which game, and 
would say 'this action and that action are events which happened in the same game. ' 
This relation, in which two or more events are categorised in the same framework, is 
33 Noonan (2003, p. 63). 
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called the 'unity relation'. Therefore, although baseball events belonging to one game 
are mostly dissimilar to each other (throwing a ball, hitting a ball, running to a base, 
changing the position from batting to fielding), they are regarded as in the unity relation 
in the same game. 
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Perry applies the unity relation to the study of personal identity. He supposes that 
a theory of personal identity is answering the questions; what relation is obtained 
between simultaneous person-events (and person-stages) that are events (and stages) 
belonging to the same person? 35 According to him, the answer is the unity relation; if 
and only if the person to whom event/stage A belongs is the same person as the person 
to whom event/stage B belongs, A has the unity relation to B. A and B are not identical 
but the unity relation obtains between them in the framework of a person, in a 'personal 
history' Perry says. For instance, a newly-married man, we shall call him P, and a 
widower, P', are not identical in their status, but if the unity relation can be made 
between P and P in one's personal history, P and P are regarded as the same person. 
Furthermore, the unity relation cannot obtain between that person's personal history and 
events in it. The events of A and B are elements that form the framework of P's personal 
identity, but they are not the same as the framework itself. Thus on this theory, even if A 
and B were not exactly the same, identity of a subject would be able to be kept. 
Perry pays attention to the relation between elements belonging to a person, and 
differences between elements are supposed to be settled in the framework of identity. 
He makes an interesting suggestion concerning the study of personal identity. I adopt his 
34Perry describes the unity relation thus, T [event] has R [relation] to F [eventl if and 
only if the game in which E is an event is the same baseball game as the game in which 
Fis an event. I shall call R the unity relation for baseball games'(1975, p. 9). 
35A person-stage is defined as a set containing all and only those person-events which 
belong to a given person at a given time (Ibid., pp. 9- 11). 
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thought except for one point, which is the matter of perspective. In his theory, each 
event is dealt with non-perspectively, or in his words, events can be described 
'tenselessly'. This term, 'tenseless, ' is used in Perry's criticism of Butler's tree-probleni 
that we saw above. Perry re-describes Butler's tree-problem, suggesting that both trees 
36 'have "tenselessly" the property of being large in 1972, and of being small in 1920'. 
In the history of the tree, the tree has these tenseless properties, and nothing is lost or 
gained in terms of the properties on this view. Thus, the small tree and the tall tree can 
be identical with each other. 
This seems to be a persuasive explanation of the identification of events, but I 
wonder from which point of view this relation is formed. Our discussion concentrates 
upon the issue of personal identity, so we will replace this tree problem with a human 
case. A woman who is now seventy was once six-years-old, and in Perry's opinion, the 
old woman and the girl must have tenselessly the property of being six-years-old and of 
being seventy-years-old. However, I would insist that the relation between the old 
woman and the girl only arises when these subjects are compared from one perspective. 
When I recall my past, this I stands at a peculiar position and the past is evoked from 
this position. In the example of the little girl and the old woman, we can compare the 
time when she is six-years-old and the time when she is seventy-years-old, because the 
wornan survives until the age of seventy. 
From the first person perspective, the position in which she is seventy must be 
considered distinctive, because from the little girl's point of view, the perspective of 
being seventy cannot be obtained but only from that of the old woman. The girl may 
dimly imagine her old age, but the girl's framework cannot be the same as that produced 
36 Ibid., p. 23. 
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later by the old woman. Even though she has the property of being a little girl and being 
an old woman, the perspective that includes both conditions would not be possessed 
until she becomes seventy. 
Thus, the view in which both ages are included is not tenseless but only belongs to 
the later perspective. As a matter of physical properties, a little girl may genetically 
possess the possibility of being the old lady, but it is only one possibility (for example, 
she might die in an accident before being seventy). Moreover, as a matter of the network 
of experiences, the understanding of the six-year-old girl can change, for instance, 
between her twenties and her seventies. The young woman may think that her childhood 
was miserable because of the lack of her mother's love, and that she was a thin and 
drawn child. Later, she finds that her mother actually loved her very much, but that 
there was misunderstanding between them. In her seventies, she may think she was 
brought up in a good environment, and that she was not awfully skinny but just 
undersized for her age. The account of one's life stages is thus transformable, dependent 
upon the position at which we locate the perspective. 
To tell a life story is to reconstruct past experiences from one person's perspective, 
and this perspective is crucial for personal identity. The concept of personal identity in 
this notion is fluid depending upon the construction of events at one time, so it is not a 
concept that exists apart from one's own personal history but rather a concept that is 
generated from the interaction between experiences and the network of experiences. 
Therefore, I insist that personal identity is not a fixed concept but is always under 
construction, and due to this understanding I do not side with Butler and Reid. I regard 
personal identity not as monadic but as that which arises when events are grasped from 
one's own perspective. In addition, an absolutely neutral position is not obtained in a 
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personal history for we always occupy a specific position in our lives. From this 
viewpoint, the framework of personal identity is also thought not to be tcnseless. 
This is the basic view of personal identity in this thesis. I try to describe the 
method by which we can, by ourselves, give an explanation to our own continuity over 
time. That explanation covers experiences at different times, so the work of memory is 
inseparable ftom this concept. Does this view appear to be a sort of psychological 
criterion of personal identity? My opinion is that it is not. We shall refer to criteria- 
arguments in the study of personal identity, and consider the dissimilarity between these 
arguments and ours. 
1.3. Three accounts of the Criterion of Personal Identity 
I should make clear that the issue which will be focused upon in this thesis does not 
assume the psychological criterion of personal identity, much less the physical criterion. 
In order to confirm this point, we shall first observe typical issues in criteria-arguments 
in philosophy, and compare those to the view of personal identity in this thesis. I 
understand that criteria-arguments with regards to personal identity start with John 
Locke's discussion, so we will mention theories which arose after the late seventeenth 
century and will not include pioneering works in this discussion. 37 
There are representatively three criteria of personal identity in the philosophical 
literature. They are the so-called physical criterion, psychological criterion, and value 
37 1 mention the rise of the modern discussion of personal identity in chapter three. 
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theory. These are also divided into a number of branch theories and puzzle cases. On the 
physical criterion, the identity of a person is thought to be attributed to physical 
continuity. The bodily criterion is one of the accounts in which it is suggested that the 
continuity of our bodies is a necessary and sufficient condition for explaining in what 
personal identity consists. This may appeal to our ordinary understanding of personal 
identity, but even if we were to lose part of our body, it would not mean that we lose our 
personal identity. If the amputation of a leg does not affect our concept of personal 
identity, how is the body concerned with the continuity of a person? In a thought 
experiment, the bodily criterion is, for example, questioned in this way; if person Xs 
brain is exchanged for person B's, which one we shall call A, Ns body with B's brain or 
B's body with Ns brain? 38 Most modem philosophers appear to accept that we should 
regard a person who has B's body with Ns brain as A, and Ns body with B's brain as B. 
The continuity of the body is not looked upon as essential for personal identity, and so 
the bodily criterion is rejected. This rejection, nonetheless, introduces an argument for 
another physical criterion, which is the brain criterion; can we can regard the continuity 
of a brain as the criterion of personal identity? 
Our brain seems to occupy a special position for our understanding of a person. 
We feel that the brain is not exchangeable, because our personality is supposed to rely 
on it. There are accounts which support the brain criterion as at least a necessary 
condition of personal identity, 39 but philosophers have produced a number of puzzle 
cases against these accounts: Our brain has a left hemisphere and a right hemisphere 
which are connected with a bundle of fibres. However, division of the corpus callosurn, 
38 This is a simplified version of Sydney Shoemaker's discussion of personal identity, 
the Brown/Brownson problem (1963, pp. 23-24). 
39 Bernard Williams (1970), Nagel (197 1). 
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cutting of the brain fibres, is used as a treatment for epileptics. In an experiment, some 
patients whose fibres were cut behaved as if they had different consciousnesses in each 
hemisphere; 'each hemisphere seems to have its own separate and private 
sensations ... its own separate chain of memories that are rendered inaccessible to the 
recall processes of the other. ' 40 This case may imply that both hemispheres are not 
always necessary for our subsistence, so consequently, some researchers argue that the 
continuity of the whole brain is not a necessary and sufficient condition of personal 
identity. 
Further, although this problem can be re-described as to which part of the brain is 
necessary for personal identity, we still face puzzle cases. If one's brain is divided into 
two pieces and put in different bodies, what kind of relationship will there be between 
the original person and the later persons? If all infonnation was extracted from A and 
B's brains and their brains were wiped of all memory, and then Ns information was 
placed in B's brain and Bs information was in Ns brain, the continuity of the brain 
would be broken off but information would be kept .41 If these thought experiments are 
worth considering, we would need to rethink the validity of the brain criterion in 
accordance with these puzzles. 
The latter example, in which personal information would be kept even though the 
brain's continuity was broken, also relates to another account, which is the 
psychological criterion. On this theory the continuity of psychological factors is 
examined to see whether it can be the necessary and sufficient condition of the 
continuity of a person. The role of memory is discussed most in this account. A simple 
40 Sperry (1968, p. 724). 
41 Bernard Williams (1970). 
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version of the memory criterion is that the continuity of person Pi and P2 at different 
times can be confirmed if and only if Pi possesses memory which is had by P2. This 
type of discussion began with Locke and various counterargumcnts and revised versions 
of Locke's theory have arisen. One popular counterargument is that because we cannot 
remember every experience which we have had, the continuity of all memory is 
impossible. Imagine that person Pi has a memory of experience X, and person P2 has 
memory of experience X and Y, and person P3 has memory of experience Y and Z. PI 
and P2 remember the experience X and P2 and P3 remember the experience Y, so these 
two pairs can be identical, but Pi and P3 are not. Accordingly, Pt and P2 are regarded as 
the same person and P2 and P3 are also the same, but Pt and P3 are not. 42 
As a solution to this problem, a distinction between psychological continuity and 
psychological connectedness is introduced. Psychological connectedness is the direct 
connection of memories between temporally distant subjects, and psychological 
continuity is the overlapping chains of direct memories. We do not need to remember 
everything that happened before in this version. P2 at t2 and Pi at ti can be regarded as 
the same person if and only if P2 at t2 is linked by continuity of memory to Pi at U. " 
Questions about this account have, as for the other criteria, arisen. One such question 
arises from the fission case . 
The fission case demonstrates the possibility that two or more subsequent persons 
might have a psychological relation to one original person. The divided brain case 
which I mentioned above is an example of this kind of account. Another puzzle case is, 
for example, described thus: If the whole physical data of a person is copied and 
42 See Thomas Reid's Brave Officer Paradox (2002, pp. 262-266). 
43 Noonan (2003, pp. 9-10). 
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reproduced, which one would have the right claim to be the original, one of them, both 
of them, or none of them? A number of interpretations of the fission case are discussed 
in considerations of the psychological criterion, but I will not enumerate them here. 44 
Instead, we will turn to another account which analyses this issue from a different angle 
from that of the physical and psychological criterion. This is the third account of 
personal identity, so-called value theory. 
Value theory is concerned with personal identity's significance for us, with our 
survival, ethics, and welfare. 45 It is a recent movement in the study of personal identity, 
developed mainly by Derek Parfit. He propagates his radical conclusion that personal 
identity is not what matters to survival. Basically, we presuppose that the continuity of 
our own existence and welfare is the most urgent matter for us. Parfit denies this. He 
insists that the continuity of our own existence is not important, but that the existence of 
those people who have psychological links to us in the future is weighty for us. After 
our death, nobody will be us, and no chain of direct experiences as we have now will 
exist, but 'some of these future experiences may be related to my present experiences in 
a less direct way. ' I will not have any direct relation to anyone after my death, but I will 
have various relationships to others. My death will not destroy all sorts of relationship 
to others in the future, but is the destruction of such relationships. I'llus, my death is 
, 46 described: 'there will be no one living who will be me. The value theory indicates the 
advantage of changing our view of personal identity not as an essentially necessary 
44 As the paper that comprehensively discusses the fission case, I cite Parfit's Reasons 
and Persons, especially Part Three (1984). 
45 What I have called'value theory'is also called some other name, for example, the 
Determinacy Thesis (Noonan, 2003, p. 17). Whatever its name, the discussion of 
personal identity concerned with its value for our survival I call the value theory in 
this thesis. 
4G Parfit (1984, p. 281). 
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concept for our existence. Although there are arguments both for and against Parfit's 
opinion, it is certain that a new type of discussion is introduced by value theory. 47 
Additionally, it is true that philosophical considerations of personal identity are 
not only reduced to those three patterns but are researched from various angles. In logic, 
it is concerned with the status of 'is'; the conditions on which a thing can be described 
'A is X. In some political theory, it is dealt with as the problem of how we are taught to 
identify ourselves with images that are established in the existing social system. 
Although I do not directly debate these aspects of identity, their purport can be linked to 
our discussion to some extent. For instance, Gillian Howie focuses upon the intersection 
between representation, and identity, and examines its meaning in terms of three 
functions of identity; the logical principle of simple identity; its role within judgement; 
and its epistemological function. 48 This approach treats the matter of identity more 
inclusively than the discussion in this thesis, but this intersection does relate to the issue 
discussed jere. We will later search for the point at which the narrative approach to the 
concept of personal identity reaches its limits. In Howie's argument this limit is 
described as the 'insufficiency, or inadequacy, of any given identification'. This 
suggests the idea that 'the object will not be in an identical relationship with its 
conceptq. 49 That implies that things may not be fully identified with their 
representation, so that the work of identification is to some extent insufficient. I will 
also focus on this point, particularly in chapter five, but it is too early to discuss the 
47NVe will consider the role of morality in Parfit's discussion in chapter five as well. 
48More precisely, Howie defines these three functions as; 'it's formal function as the 
logical principle of simple identity; its role within judgement (which is the subject's 
attempt to identify what a thing, identical to itself, is); and finally an epistemological 
function, where by the identification of a thing occurs but only through its concept' (2003, p. 168). 
49Howie (2003, p. 168). 
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matter here, so we shall omit this issue at present. 
We have briefly reviewed the kind of issues that are discussed in the study of 
personal identity. It seeks the necessary and sufficient conditions by which the 
continuity of a person over time is logically determined. The first two criterion, the 
physical and psychological, are concerned with the formulation of such conditions, and 
value theory presents questions about the relevance of investigating the criterion. I 
appreciate the achievement of these studies, but I do not attempt to answer the criteria- 
problem of personal identity: I do not ask what personal identity necessarily and 
sufficiently consists in, but ask from what operation our concept of personal identity 
arises. A concise answer is memory, because the study of personal identity presupposes 
time distance, and we need memory to examine subjects at different periods of time. In 
not intending to be involved in criteria-arguments and stressing the work of memory, 
my position is close to Richard Wollheim's: 'Mental connectedness is indicative of 
personal identity because it is creative of it. '50 It is creative, because experiences are re- 
understood by the operation of reconstruction. 
We need to remember the past in order to form the framework of personal identity, 
and I would like to discuss this remembrance. This notion of memory is probably a 
minimum condition required in order to produce the framework of personal identity. In 
an extreme case, if we only remember anything occurring within thirty seconds, the 
notion of our continuity would not be the same as the one that we possess. The criteria- 
arguments are, that is to say, the further study that defines the necessary and sufficient 
conditions of personal identity. I deal with remembrance as the work of recalling and 
50 Wollheim (1980, p. 305). However, when Wollheim insists on the necessity of the 
unity of a person for forming personal identity, we need to reconsider that necessity. We 
will return to this topic in the latter half of chapter two onward. 
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reconstructing one's own experience according to the network of other experiences, and 
this notion does not fit into the place of memory in the psychological criterion. There, 
memory is one of the psychological factors that is inspected to see if it can be the 
criterion of personal identity. Hcnce, the work of remembering and to explain this 
remembrance does not really become a question in that study, but they are the concerns 
of our discussion. I consider the method by which we describe ourselves in accordance 
with our memory, but how to describe oneself is usually not the great issue of traditional 
psychological criteria-arguments. 51 
The meaning of 'memory' is thus not the same in the criteria- arguments and the 
discussion in this thesis. I do not place memory on the same level as other psychological 
factors such as will, desire, and aim, but look upon it as basic in order to give any 
account of the continuity of a person. For this reason, I deny the view that this 
discussion belongs with the psychological criteria-arguments, and the physical criteria- 
arguments are also rejected in the same manner. The value theory attacks the necessity 
of personal identity for our survival, so it is also not suitable for the consideration of the 
reconstruction of memory. I do not claim that personal identity does not matter, at least 
in the present argument. I will consider the minimum of the concept of personal identity 
in the latter half of this thesis, and that discussion might bear some similarity to value 
theory. I will not therefore attempt I to refute that view, but I stress again that our 
discussion does not belong with the criteria-arguments. 
In this difference between the concept of personal identity and the criteria- 
51 There may be a counterargument that although I presuppose the work of 
remembering, children need tolearn'the use of the past tense, so the sense of the past 
is not naturally established but the result of education. It may lead to an interesting 
point, but as I mentioned in Introduction, I do not intend to argue the identity of 
children, so I shall leave this issue to further study. 
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arguments, the former might seem to refer to a sort of personhood, which is, simply to 
say, a manner of viewing oneself, to some extent, as a unitary person. It will be helpful 
to consider what kind of relation we can find of the sense of personhood to the concept 
of personal identity, so we examine this point in the end of this section. Personhood 
holds various characteristics in its use such as the matter of agency, of rationality, of 
emotion, of self-consciousness, and so on. I use this term as the sense through which a 
person establishes a feeling of who he or she is, especially as a continuous being over 
time. Schechtman describes this type of personhood thus: 'Thinking of oneself as 
persisting through time and of the different temporal parts of one's existence as being 
mutually influential is a minimal requirement of the state we call personhood. ' 52 This 
sense may appear to show similarity to the concept of personal identity as a way to 
understand the existence of one's self, but I do not intend to include one with the other. I 
propose three conceptions here; the criteria-arguments of personal identity, the concept 
of personal identity, and the sense of personhood. We shall next see the distinction 
between them, and clarify the characteristics of the concept of personal identity further. 
In the three terms, the difference between the criteria-arguments and the sense of 
personhood is obvious. As we have seen here, the former asks the question of what are 
the sufficient and enough conditions to make a person at time2 the same one as a person 
at timel, but the latter does not ask such criteria-problems. It is however the sense by 
which a person realises as that person through life. The study which asks sufficient and 
enough conditions is usually not the issue for that sense, but circumstances by which the 
person is surrounded, and particularities of the sense in specific circumstances (e. g., 
52 Schechtman (1996, p. 102). 
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society, culture, under oppressive situations, and so on), are more discussed. 53 This 
interference of external factors can be a fundamental distinction between that sense and 
the criteria-arguments. 
Then, in the case of the concept of personal identity, we have just observed its 
difference from the criteria-arguments in the above section. I shall stress the point again 
that the study of personal idcntity alrcady holds the conception of a person in its basis. I 
assume that if the conception were permanent in any spatio-temporal condition, the 
concept of personal identity would not become a question. Nonetheless, it is my 
insistence that the conception is not stabilised between exceedingly different conditions. 
For instance, Taylor refers to a possibly different view of a person between a Homeric 
description and ours: A hero in the Homeric world seems to behave with the 'greatest 
heights of action' as well as making 'some of his great mistakes. ' His behaviour may 
appear to be in confusion in today's sense as a single agent, but 'contrary to our modem 
intuitions, this doesn't seem to lessen the merit or demerit attached to the agent. 154 IiiS 
sublimity and insanity are convincing characters as a great hero who is chosen by a god 
in a Homeric sense even though we may see the hero's follies as his blemish. I cite that 
as an example that a general view, shows that what a person should be, is transformable 
between greatly different situations. This inclusion of the changes, by which the 
understanding of a person may alter, is a characteristic of the concept of personal 
identity compared to the criteria-arguments. 
53 The following opinion that is made by Bernards Williams can be interpreted as an 
indication of this sense of personhood: '[Hluman beings have an inconstant mental 
constitution that needs to be steadied by society and interaction with other people. 
Different people, and people in different circumstances, are steadied by these forces to 
a greater or lesser degree'(2002, p. 191). 
54'To the modern, this fragmentation, and the seeming confusion about merit anc, 
responsibility, are very puzzling' (118). 
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The above mentioned features of the concept of personal identity might seem to 
overlap with the sense of personhood, so we consider their distinction now. I determine 
that having the sense of personhood means obtaining a particular understanding of one's 
self, and this sense is largely cultivated in accordance with the circumstances, of the 
common sense of belonging within a community. Namely, since the sense of 
personhood is a sort of practical sense, people who live in those circumstances do not 
suspect its legitimacy. On the contrary to that sense, what I propose by the concept of 
personal identity is a question about such unconditional belief of the understanding of a 
person. One of my aims is to investigate particularities of the concept of personal 
identity in different situations, so the legitimacy of the sense of personhood is 
questioned in that study. This doubt of presumption that people have of their existence 
in society is a distinctive point between the concept of personal identity and the sense of 
personhood. 
To mention the plan in this thesis in advance, we will deal with historical 
transformations of the concept of personal identity from chapter three onwards. That 
transfonnation is supposed to be influenced by the way in which people understand 
their existence at that time, in other words, what type of personhood they hold. In this 
manner, the concept of personal identity and the sense of personbood are somehow 
interactive, and I will use the term, the sense of personhood, when I refer to a common 
understanding of a person. However, I should make clear the point that the main issue in 
this thesis is conditions and transformations of the concept of personal identity, and that 
concept is not reduced to the sense of personhood. 
If this insistence, that criteria-arguments are not the exact issue in this thesis, is 
acceptable, we shall move to the consideration of the reconstruction of memorY. I'lle 
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work of memory is crucial for this topic, so I first cmphasise the relation between the 
work of memory and personal identity, and clarify the types of memory that we deal 
with. Then, we will examine the way that the reconstruction of memory is performed in 
order to form the framework of personal identity. 
1.4. Our Use of Memory Concerned with Personal Identity 
As I pointed out before, in the study of personal identity we compare subjects at 
different times in order to consider their identity. In this comparison, at least one of the 
subjects is in the past (or in the imagined future), because things which exist at the same 
time in different places are not physically the same. I believe that the moment at which 
we perceive something and the moment that we envisage the past do not involve the 
same operation. Thus, the things which are not experienced at the moment must be 
recalled from our memory. 
The work of memory, by which things that we do not face at present are recalled, 
has been considered by a number of philosophers from several angles. 55 Bertrand 
Russell also pays attention to the impossibility of having past and present sensations at 
once: 'How, then, are we to find any way of comparing the present image and the past 
sensation? ... We think we can know that they are alike or different, but we cannot bring 
them together in one experience and compare them. ' Even though we can think of 
features of subjects in the past and at present, it does not mean that the subjects are 
55 E. g., William James (1890), Bergson (1911), Ryle (1949). 
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presented now, but we have to use our memory. Russell concludes, 'everything 
constituting a memory-belief is happening noiv, not in that past time to which the belief 
is said to refer'. 56 This recollection of memory is often discussed in psychology as well, 
for example, Reiser, Black, and Kalamarides write, 'Remembering an experience 
involves reunderstanding that experience'. 57 These views advocate the idea that to recall 
the past is to re-interpret experiences ftom the present position. It happens 'now, ' and 
we do not bring forward the shadow of the past by remembering but always re-describe 
it in accordance with the latest understanding of our livcs. 58 
For the relation between memory and personal identity, I cite two instances in 
which people have lost their memory but seem to keep personal identity. Oliver Sacks 
discusses his patient, Jimmy, who suffers amnesia and cannot remember recent events: 
'whatever was said or shown or done to him was apt to be forgotten in a few seconds' 
time. 59 jiMMY is a forty-nine-year-old, but his memory stopped at nineteen, and he 
could not keep his memory thereafter. Additionally, the film, Memento, though fictional, 
treats the same problem of memory-loss. 60 In each instance, although they do not 
possess constant memory, they appear not to doubt who they are, but feel that something 
is strange in their circumstances. These cases offer much to consider, but here I note 
only that they do not lose their entire memory but that there is a point from which they 
56 Russell (1951, p. 159). 
57Reiser, Black, and Kalamarides (1986, p. 119). For more discussions in psychology, 
see Jenkins (1979, pp. 429-446), Tulving (1983), Brewer (1986). 
58 The sense of time has been a crucial issue from classical discussions of memory. Thus, 
for instance, Augustine depicts time and memory thus: 'there are three times; 'a 
present of things past, a present of things present, and a present of things future' 
(1995). 
59 Sacks (1986, P. 25). 
650 After the hero had an accident, he could preserve his memory only for ten minutes, 
though his memory until before the accident was intact. Every morning he does not 
know where he is, and after running for more than ten minutes he starts wondering 
why he must run (Afemento, 2000). 
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lose their memory. Tberefore, they can manage a language, have common sense, and 
can communicate with others. They do not lack memory from the beginning of life, so 
even though their personal identity is somehow kept in those conditions, it does not 
count against this discussion. However, if their amnesia encroaches on every memory, I 
assume that they will not be able to manage their concept of personal identity through 
time. 
In addition, as regards keeping infonnation, I should indicate that the past is not 
only stored in our memory but there are a number of methods by which we refer to it. 
The oldest method is oral communication. Through talking to others, we refresh our 
remembering, correct our misunderstanding, or obtain new information which we did 
not know before. Expressions that refer to remembering are common ('Do you 
remember...?, ' 'I might have told this before, but... '), and we renew our memory in 
such daily conversation. Other methods are recorded media such as writing, pictures, 
photographs, tape and video tape recording, web sites, and so on. These media are 
popular today, and we repeatedly stimulate our memory through contact with them. 
In this consideration, we should keep in mind that the use of recorded media is a 
historically new movement for ordinary people. Although it is certain that pictures and 
other artistic works were used for recording people's images, those who could use the 
media were limited to the higher classes for a long time. Writing was relatively widely 
utilised by a larger number of people earlier than most other media. We can, for instance, 
sketch a brief profile of an ordinary man in the eighteenth century by referring to his 
correspondence; he was a man who lived in France, was a bourgeois merchant, loved 
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reading, and was an ardent admirer of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. 61 Nonetheless, writing 
was not frequently used for describing private lives until literacy obtained prevalence 
and writing tools were easily acquired. Personal things were recorded in the media only 
at special opportunities throughout history. Thus, the media have not been a receptacle 
for storing personal information for a long time. 
However, the situation of recorded information has dramatically changed today. 
It may now be difficult to find people who have never made records in any medium in 
so-called post-industrial societies. In the case of photographs, the use of this medium 
has gradually increased since around the middle of the nineteenth century. 62 A number 
of media, which people once needed special skills to operate, can be used by amateur 
people easily and cheaply in this century. We now live in a computerised society in 
which a variety of personal information is recorded second-by-second, as we use our 
credit cards, mobile phone, passport, and access the Internet. We are flooded with 
images made by the media more than ever before. 
In this regard, the reconsideration of the work of the media may suggest 
interesting issues for our discussion. That will be the main topic of chapter three, so I 
only stress the following point here. Recorded information in the media certainly helps 
us to refresh our memory, but it does not become an element of personal identity until 
we locate it in the context of our lives. Recorded information is the data, and evaluation 
of it is still left to us. The mere data themselves cannot carry any personal significance. 
The recorded past shows us some details of the event, and when a person accepts and 
interprets that description along with other experiences, it becomes that individual's 
61 Darnton (1984). 
62 For example, see, Neuman (1996). 
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particular memory. Hence, the media only give the data and we need to locate it in our 
lives in order to make them elements of our identification through time. Memory on this 
conception is not the same as infon-nation stocked in the media, but it is supposed to 
work to interpret the meaning of events and to arrange them in accordance with one's 
own personal history. It is the particularity of memory compared to the media, which do 
not include any interpretation in the process of replay. 
Although I refer to 'memory' without any qualification, it is classified into 
categories depending on its performance. Of the different works or performances of 
memory, psychology gives us a comparatively systernatised definition. That 
categorisation is useful to understand types of memory that are concerned with the 
reconstruction of memory, so we will follow the relevant arguments in this field in the 
next section. 
1.5. Týpes of Memory 
I use 'memory' as a term to generalise our remembering, but if we turn our eyes to the 
study of memory, we see that it can be divided into several types. Some of them are 
concerned with the reconstruction of memory and others are not, so it will be useful to 
consider which types of memory we are discussing. There are a number of theories that 
define the types of memory, and not all researchers employ the same terminology. Thus, 
we need to specify the field that we consult, and I refer to the psychological 
categorisation of memory. Tlle main reason for my choice of categorisation. is that it 
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treats the types of memory comprehensively, we would like to obtain its inclusive view. 
This is an important point, because if I choose the term 'autobiographical memory' for 
our discussion, it may cover most areas of memory that are examined in this thesis, but I 
cannot mention those types of memory that I do not apply to the reconstruction of 
memory. I want to designate not only which memory is employed but also which 
memory is omitted. For this purpose, I reckon that a basic theory in psychology is useful 
for offering an outline of memory. 
First, psychologists divide memory into two types, short-term memory, more 
recently called working memory, and long-term memory. This two component model is 
traceable to William James in 1890. He distinguishes between events which have just 
been experienced within seconds (he calls it primary memory) and events which are 
stored after the experiences and may be recalled later (secondary memory). 
63 His 
component model has been influential in psychological discussions of memory with 
some modifications. 
64 
Short-term memory consists of two sub-categories, sensory registers and short- 
term storage. Information first stimulates sensory organs, and is stored in sensory 
memory in a few seconds. 65 The retained information is then forwarded to short-term 
memory, which temporarily stocks and recalls information. We use this capacity when 
we remember the spelling of a name, retain a telephone number while dialling, calculate 
63 William James (1981, chapter XVD. 
64 Waugh and Norman proposed the two-component model, which was an expansion of 
the original model of primary and secondary memory (1965, pp. 89-104). That model 
was developed by Atkinson and Shiffrin, who suggested three buffers of memory, 
sensory registers, sort-term store, and long-term store. 
65 Gregg (1986, p. 91). 
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numbers, and understand the meaning of a word which consists of a number of letters. 66 
This type of memory can be excluded from our discussion, since no reconstruction 
occurs at this stage. Further, the concept of personal identity presupposes continuous 
existences at different periods of time which are longer than a few seconds. From this 
point, we also conclude that working memory is not the ability which we discuss. 
Any information which is stored longer than a few seconds is retained in long- 
term memory. Long-term memory is divided between procedural memory and 
declarative memory. 67 Procedural memory is related to our procedural actions, which 
are described as 'how to do' something. It is mostly linked to skills which are repeated 
almost automatically, (e. g., how to ride on a bicycle or how to play musical instruments), 
so this type of memory is hard to explain consciously. We also remove this ftom 
consideration, because it refers mostly to kinds of skill and is unrelated to rcorganisation 
and re-interpretation of the past. 
Declarative memory is the general term covering episodic memory and semantic 
memory. 68 All memories which are concerned with personal events, episodes, and 
phenomena are called episodic memory, in which 'personal experiences are not limited 
to externally observable events but include private events such as dreams, thinking 
through problems, and emotional experiences'. 69 Episodic memory refers to the capacity 
to remember one's personal and specific incidents. 
GG The capacity to store information is limited. According to Miller's experimentation, a 
typical adult can remember 7- plus or minus 2- items in the short-term stock. (1956, 
pp. 81-97). The capacity of the short-term store is also measured by a length of time, 
which is less than thirty seconds without rehearsal. 
G7 Terms that are used in this section such as 'declarative' and 'semantic' follow a 
general psychological glossary, so they do not imply any particular grammatical or 
philosophical meanings. 
68 Tulving (1972). 
G9 Gregg (1986, p. 24). 
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On the other hand, knowledge in connection with the world belongs to semantic 
memory. It does not need to relate to personal events but contains general knowledge. 
Languages, social rules, and historical events can be included in this type of memory. 
For example, the following concepts are representations of semantic memory: What is 
the capital of Peru?; What is a typical breakfast in Hong Kong?; Who was the first 
person to go to the moon? Semantic memory is encyclopaedic knowledge essentially 
connected with the use of language, and freely recalled without private experiences, 
though it does not exclude personal information. We cannot have memories of when we 
were bom, but we know our date of birth because it is an objective event. In this case, 
the answer includes private information but is not a case of episodic memory but 
semantic memory. 
In declarative memory, it is obvious that episodic memory is involved in the 
reconstruction of memory, because without any personal episodes we cannot construct 
and reconstruct our life story. Then, the question is whether or not semantic memory is 
concerned with the reconstruction of memory. I assume that semantic memory can be 
the target of our discussion, and the reason for this lies mostly in the difficulty faced in 
dividing semantic memory from episodic memory exactly. For instance, to answer the 
question 'how long does it take from here to city X by car?, ' some people may check the 
distance between two places and calculate the average time (using semantic memory), 
while other people may remember their experience of going to the city and reckon the 
time (using episodic memory). Then, if a person had both varieties of knowledge, the 
distance between two places and his or her own experience of going there, the division 
of these memories would become difficult. In another case, if your answer to the 
question 'where did you go on your summer holiday last yearT is 'I had a wonderful 
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time in the beautiful capital of Y country, ' this answer contains both a private event and 
general knowledge of geography. 70 
Therefore, episodic and semantic memory are considered to be concerned with the 
reconstruction of memory. We might not accept semantic memory unconditionally, 
because some such memories seem not to relate to the discussion of the reconstruction 
of memory. 7 'Nonetheless, there is a grey area in which we cannot definitely say 
whether this memory is episodic or semantic, and I only mention that on occasion even 
semantic memory can be reconstructed. 72 Hence, for the above reason, I include 
semantic memory as a type of memory which can be concerned with reconstruction. 
This understanding is, as I mentioned at the beginning of this section, only one of 
the categorisations of memory popular in psychology, and there are other theories which 
sort types of memory differently. For instance, episodic memory is sometimes called 
personal memory and semantic memory is called factual memory in philosophy. These 
terms are mostly used with similar meanings to those of the terms I used before, so 
personal memory relates to experiences of which the person was an agent or the witness, 
and factual memory relates to the facts of past events. Several researchers prefer to use 
other terms convenient to them, so Richard Wollheim employs 'experimental memory' 
in the explanation of his view of personal identity that is similar to what I call episodic 
70 Alan Parkin mentions this difficulty as follows: 'One particular problem is that 
people may often use semantic memory as a basis for answering a question that 
appears to address episodic memory ... Conversely, episodic memory can sometimes 
be 
used to answer questions that appear to rely on semantic memoW (1999, p. 8). 
71 J6r6me Dokic discusses the roles of and confusion between episodic and semantic 
memory (2001). 
72 An instance of semantic memory being reconstructed might be a man, who had 
believed the geocentric theory, but now accepts the heliocentric theory. His 
understanding of the world must change dramatically. This may lead to changes in the 
view of his past and he may describe the meaning of events in his life differently. 
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memory here. 
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However, there are arguments over definitions and suggestions of using other 
terms instead: Charles Hartshorne argues that ... impersonal memory" would be 
analogous to the physical pole of Whitehead's prehensions, and "personal memory" to 
the mental'. 74 Andy Hamilton emphasises the necessity of distinguishing between 
personal memory (personally experienced events) and merely factual memory (events 
which have been told). M. J. Eacott criticises his use of these terms: Hamilton contrasts 
personal memory and merely factual memory, but 'Psychologists do not make a 
comparable distinction. Although Hamilton mentions the distinction between episodic 
and semantic memory, this is not really equivalent'. 75 There are both points in common 
and of difference in their arguments. To consider this problem more, I would need to 
enter into specific discussion of the categorisations deeply involved in research into 
memory. But that is not exactly our concern. Hence, I do not step further into this topic 
except to briefly discuss 'autobiographical memory', which seems to have similarities 
to the reconstruction of memory, so it will be beneficial to mention the reason why I do 
not employ that term. 
The use of the term 'autobiographical memory' has been defined in a number of 
theories, and I suppose that its gist is described in the phrase: 'autobiographical memory 
is concemed with the capacity of people to recall their lives' . 
76 This type of memory 
may overlap with reconstructed memory for the greatest part, because it is the memory 
of events that happened to and are recalled by one person, but I do not use 
73 Wollheim (1980). 
74 Hartshorne (1972, p. 210). 
75 Hamilton (1998), Eacott (1998). Shoemaker (1970) and Malcolm (1963) also 
participate in the discussion of personal and factual memory. 
76 Baddely (1992). 
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'autobiographical memory' instead of reconstructed memory. Ilie reasons are that the 
term does not express sufficiently well that recalled memory is re-structured 
experiences. In addition, there is also a difficulty in terminology. 
On this matter, Brewer's provides an example. He confesses that he once used the 
terms 'personal memory' and 'autobiographical facts'; the former refers to the 
phenomenally experienced aspect of memory for information relating to the self, and 
the latter refers to 'the nonphenomenally experienced aspect of these tYPes of 
memories. ' He, however, abandoned the former term 'given the total lack of agreement 
concerning the technical terminology in this area' and in its stead adopts 'recollective 
77 
memory' as a technical term. This is the labyrinth of terminology we face, and I am 
not a memory theorist, so I shall stay within this broad definition of memory and this 
will be enough for our discussion: The type of memory that can be involved in the 
reconstruction of memory is episodic memory and partly semantic memory, both of 
which roughly cover the sphere of our life stories. The latter variety of memory may be 
hard to reconstruct, and I do not insist that all such memory is dramatically altered each 
time we recall it, but I indicate rather the possibility that such memory can change. 
The next question concerns in what circumstances we reconstruct our past. We 
cannot enumerate all patterns of it, but can grasp a general idea of it through observing 
instances. My insistence is that the reconstruction of memory does not only occur in 
extraordinary situations but also occurs in our ordinary lives, and we shall confirm this 
point from the next section onwards. 
77 Brewer (1995, P. 20; p. 33). 
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1.6. The Reconstruction of Memory as Organisation of our Life Stories 
I have mentioned the relation between the reconstruction of memory and the concept of 
personal identity, but the work of this reconstruction may be still unclear. Hence, it will 
be helpful to refer to some cases in which people modify their past in their minds. We 
will first look at extreme cases, since these vividly depict the peculiarities of the 
reconstruction of memory. Then, we will move to more general instances which will be 
closer to our ordinary lives. The following reveals the occurrence of personal 
remembering and its modification. 
Remembering is dissimilar to recorded information, so the video tape recording 
can be played back as it was at any time, but our memory does not work in the same 
way, as I mentioned before. When we recall our past, there is alwaYs the likelihood of 
reconstruction. I count Ian Hacking as one of the researchers who reflects on this idea of 
memory along with the issue of personality from both philosophical and psychological 
perpectives. His basic view of the reconstruction of memory is that: 
New meanings change the past. It is reinterpreted, yes, but more than that, it is reorganized, 
repopulated. It becomes filled with new actions, new intentions, new events that caused us to 
be as we are. I have to discuss not only making up people but making Up Ourselves by 
TC'VVOTking OUT memories. " 
Our remembrance of experiences can be modifited by our most recent perspective, and 
this act has an influence not only on the meaning of experiences but also on our 
78 Hacking (1995, p. 6). 
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awareness of who we are. 79 Although subjects in his research are mostly people who are 
suffering from, what he calls, 'multiple personality, ' these can be cited here as examples 
that depict the idea of rewriting and reproducing the paSt. 
80 
In Hacking's research into multiple personality, two types of operations are 
considered; one is the recovery of memory in relation to multiple personality, and the 
other is the inducement of false memory. 81 Recovered memory is studied in the context 
of traumatic experience which is usually regarded as the cause of multiple personality; 
in his discussion it is chiefly considered in relation to child abuse. 82 Trauma is primarily 
a symbolic experience which cannot be faced squarely by the subject of the experience, 
because its stress overwhelms the patient's ability to cope and that is why it becomes 
trauma. The patient's re-awareness of the experience as the cause of the trauma is 
important for his or her treatment, so psychiatrists and therapists undertake cooperative 
work with their patient in order to excavate the patient's hidden memory. According to 
Judith L. Herman, the fundamental stages of recovery are threefold: 'Establishing 
safety, ' 'Reconstructing the traumatic story, ' and then 'Restoring the connection 
79 Wollheim also has a similar view: The present is tied to the past, a new past is thus 
constructed under whose influence the future may then be brought, and so the 
diachronic expansion of the person, his life, gets its unity'(1980, p. 305). 
80 Hacking prefers using'multiple personality' instead of other terms. 'Multiple 
personality disorder'is rarely used, since for him 'disorder' appears as'code for a vision 
of the world that ought to be orderly. 'He also avoids 'MPD'and 'DID', because'there is 
nothing like an acronym to make something permanent, unquestioned. Thus, I use 
4multiple personality' when I refer to Hacking's discussion. (1995, pp. 16-17. ) 
81 There are arguments as to whether multiple personality is real, a kind of fabrication, 
or the symptom of different disease. Hacking does not get involved in that discussion, 
because his interest is in what has been caused by the expansion of the concept of 
multiple personality today. 
82'Trauma'is defined as having many subcategories. I use this term to mean the 
psychological trauma caused by both physical and psychological damage and having 
long-lasting effect: The individual's ability to integrate his/her emotional experience is 
overwhelmed, or the individual experiences (subjectively) a threat to life, bodily 
integrity, or sanity (Pearlman and Saakvitne, 1995, p. 60). 
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between the survivor and his/her community. ' 83 If patients face their traumatic 
experiences, they may be able to restructure their life stories ftom different angles, and 
they may then reorganise the relation between them and the external world. Recovered 
memory will in this manner help patients to recover from the harmful effects of 
traumatic, experiences. 
This is a simplified and idealised view of recovered memory, but it sometimes 
leads to problematic situations due to the difficulties involved in'treatment. One of the 
frequent problems is the inducement of false memory. A significant number of people 
who have multiple personality insist that they 'remembered' something, for example, 
that they were maltreated by family members when they were children. Some abuse 
must have actually happened to them, but there are those who wam against believing 
the recovered memory without examining its accuracy. Robert F. Belli and Elizabeth R 
Loftus point out the danger of inducement in which 'misinfon-nation' sometimes makes 
people remembered events that had not occurred in their lives and so were not 
'recovered'. In treatment, therapists may employ ways to 'recover' patients repressed 
and distorted memory. This may heal patients, but Belli and Loftus also warn that such 
healing techniques 'may also be, if there was actually no history of abuse, a potent 
source of misinformation'. 84 Inducement is not always the reason for false memory, but 
if professionals such as therapists or psychiatrists are influenced by preconceptions 
about the cause of the symptoms, in this case the suspicion of child abuse, their 
treatment might become the source of false memory. 
In addition, not only therapists but also patients themselves introduce false 
83 Herman (2001). 
84 Belli and Loftus (1995, p. 173). 
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memory unintentionally. Hacking cites the case of a woman who revises her past: She 
'remembered' during treatment that she was raped by a stranger when she was eight 
years old. She believed that it had happened several hours after her father's death, and 
told that to her therapist. Nevertheless, the therapist believes that her trauma was 
actually caused by her father's death and the experience that followed, in which she was 
confined to a room alone for three hours. The therapist concludes that the rape itself 
seems not to have happened, but that she made the false memory for her protection, so 
Mie abuse was real, but cloaked in fantasy'. 85 This shows that without strong and direct 
inducement, the reconstruction of memory can be operated by a person for a particular 
reason. There are a number of cases in which people have rewritten their past, and after 
this rewriting the memory becomes plausible for them. 
The conditions of recovered memory and false memory are, of course, different. 
The fonner case involves the abuse actually having happened but patients being unable 
to endure remembering the experience. In this former operation, people lose their 
memory of a particular experience, and later recover it within a new context. The other 
involves 'memory' of something not having happened in their lives, and being 
'recovered' incorrectly. The recovery from trauma and the occurrence of false memory 
must not be confused in medical treatment, and I certainly understand this necessity. 1, 
nonetheless, cite them as examples which indicate the work of the reconstruction of 
memory, in which memory can be greatly changed by a person depending on the 
perspective of his or her life. Both of them are included in the reconstruction of memory, 
though the latter operation may be more difficult to accept than the forrner one owing to 
its falseness. We will return to tile reliability of reconstructed memory later. 
85 Hacking (1995, p. 120). 
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Recovery from trauma must be a difficult experience, and people who have such 
experiences may think that the meaning of their lives is totally changed and that they 
have a deeper understanding of their past. There is no reason to deny this view, but we 
should not forget that that understanding of the past is only its latest version and it is not 
necessarily the final interpretation of their life stories. The reconstruction of memory is 
never complete but is always in process, as Hacking describes: 
I am pursuing ... the way in which the very idea of the cause was forged. Once we have that 
idea, we have a very powerful tool for making up people, or indeed, for making up ourselves. 
The soul that we are constantly constructing we construct according to an explanatory model 
of how we came to be the way we are. 86 
During the re-understanding and reorganisation of memory, people construct their 
present view of themselves. Hacking does not ask the exact cause of multiple 
personality but considers the way in which people think about the reasons for multiple 
personality and how that understanding is correlated to circumstances in which memory 
is reported and examined. His research is, in this point, suggestive for the study of the 
reconstruction of memory. The above are significant cases in which people dramatically 
reconstruct their memory, so some people may feel that such memory is fictitious and 
not reliable. Therefore, we will examine one more extraordinary pattern in order to 
settle this problem, and then move to more ordinary cases. 
86 Ibid., p. 95. 
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1.7. The Reliability of Reconstructed Memory 
In the previous section, I used the term 'false memory' to refer to cases in which people 
'discovered' a past that had not actually happened. One's memory is usually defined as 
false if it is inconsistent with external facts for the most part. Such facts may include a 
third person's opinion, recorded information, and common. However, people usually 
must not accept an event as true if they sincerely know it is. false. Barclay indicates this 
point in his study of autobiographical memory: 'truth in autobiographical memory is 
preserved as one conveys the meaning of life events through plausible reconstructions 
of those events. ' 87 Memory must be credible for that person as long as no contradiction 
to the remembering occurs, and in addition we in general do not ask others' judgement 
on things that we have no doubt of. 
The point is that the reconstruction of memory does not reflect the raw data of 
past events but interprets them in the light of the present understanding, so the first 
person viewpoint is fundamental in this operation. However, it must not be that that 
reconstructed memory is a total invention. The reconstruction of memory may appear as 
if it can be made in complete disregard of the accuracy of memory, but it is not. The 
truth of events for a person is examined by his or her judgement that includes not only a 
dogmatic view but, in general, also the common sense that is produced through 
interaction with society. Because of this interaction, we usually learn that the accuracy 
88 
of memory should accord with the extemal world. 
87 Barclay (1988, p. 293). For more discussion, see Barclay (1986): Swinburne (1984, 
section 4, 'The Evidence of Personal Identity'). 
88 See Ludwig Wittgenstein's instance of colour: Suppose we paint a particular colour 
"C', which is made by the chemical substances X and Y combined. If one day C strikes 
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Therefore, the idea of the reconstruction of memory does not suggest that we 
make up our memory based on what we want to believe. Instead, it is supposed to 
organise experiences by, so to speak, tile practical sense of the enviromnents by which 
that person is surrounded. In this manner, the reconstruction of memory cannot occur 
based on which a person is totally unreliable. The reconstruction of memory is not the 
claim that we always ignore the third party's opinion. The point emphasised in this 
discussion is that memory of events must be first reliable for the person whose memory 
it is in order to be accepted as true by him or her. 89 After the acquisition of a view of the 
past, we may realise it is not exactly correct through other people's remembering, and 
modify our memory according to this. First person accuracy does not disturb that 
change. 
Besides, there can be an indistinct zone in which memory might or might not be 
precise, but even if the accuracy of memory is doubtful, we can still comprehend our 
past based on the present understanding. Let us imagine that our past is wiped away and 
a completely false memory has been induced. Even if we are informed that our present 
memory is totally wrong, we will have to start our consideration from our 
'remembering'. If someone tells us our 'true' past and it is far from our understanding, it 
may be difficult to accept this past instantly. In this respect, once established 'self- 
narratives are very hard to change' by means of external information. " The following 
us as brighter than before, we would say we must be wrong and that'the colour is 
certainly the same as yesterday' (1958, section 56). 
89 As regards the plausibility of memory from the first person's viewpoint, Freyd's 
opinion can be helpful: 'Often each author or researcher thinks his or her position is 
balanced and that other (different) viewpoints are extreme. (It would be fairly strange 
if you heard someone say "my own position is an extreme and unbalanced one. ") For 
this reason I like to say "Balance is in the eye of the beholder. " In this case you are the 
beholder' (2003). 
90 Neisser (1994, p. 6). 
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instance, which depicts a conflict between the past and the present memory, may help us 
to grasp this view. It is an extreme story borrowed from a science fiction film, but it can 
bc acceptcd as a thought cxperiment conceming mcmory. 
There was a man who has been happily married to a beautiful wife for eight years. 
One day he was told that all his present memory was false, implanted after the erasure 
of his former memory; the woman who he thought of as his wife had only met him six 
weeks ago; his work, colleagues, past experiences, and everything surrounding him 
were arranged to make him believe the implanted memory to be true. After being 
infonned of this news, he watched a screen on which a person,, who looked exactly like 
him, was talking. The man on the screen ('Hauser' is his name in the story) indicated 
that it had been recorded before he who is watching the screen (his name is 'Quaid') 
was implanted with the present memory. Quaid was not the person who he believed 
himself to be but was, rather, Hauser. Later, the recorded Hauser said that implantation 
of memory was necessary to complete a particular task and that Quaid had succeeded in 
it, so Hauser wanted to take his body back. This meant the erasure of all Quaid's 
memory and the re-implantation of the former memory. Quaid was against this plan, 
because he thought that deleting Quaid's memory would be the same as the death of 
Quaid. 91 
I do not mean to determine which one, whether Quaid or Hauser, is the personality 
which should take over the body, but the interesting point is this: Even though Quaid 
recognises the fact that his past was artificial, he wanted not to be Hauser, but to have a 
future as Quaid. Hauser actually had a double existence, one as a resistor of the dictator 
91 Taken from the film, 7bt: alJ? ecaII(1990). Recent films, I believe, sometimes provide 
interesting issues for the thought experiments regarding personal identity. For other 
examples that deal with identity and memory, see Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless 
Mind (2004), Being John MaIA-ovich (1999). 
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and the other as the dictator's spy (the latter role is real for Hauser). Quaid accepts his 
existence as a resistor but refuses to obey the dictator, because he, due to his present 
- intentions, empathises with resistance's ideology. 92 Quaid chooses his position 
according to the present viewpoint. For this decision he needs to use his judgement 
based on his present policy, will, and morality, but their reality is not essential for him. 
Even though he knows his past is invented, there is no other way to act but in 
compliance with his present understanding of his life, and this understanding cannot be 
separate ftom his present perspective. 
Robert Pirsig's biography may support this view. Pirsig was a highly educated 
man, but because of his mental illness, he was given Electro-Convulsive Shock Therapy 
in the 1960s. As a result, he almost lost his personal memory, and he starts his 'new' life 
haunted by the shadow of his former self (he seems to be able to possess ordinary 
knowledge after the treatment). He always dreads the return of his former personality, 
named 'Phaedrus, ' because it might mean a relapse into his mental illness. Besides, his 
denial seems to have other reasons; for Pirsig, the evaluation of Phaedrus may mean the 
denial of his present self. Although he does not totally reject Phaedrus and tries to 
understand Phaedrus's thought through writing, he wants to establish his own status 
(actually, he is exasperated by seeing his son when he misses Phaedrus). 93 
What I try to indicate by these examples is the idea that we make a decision on the 
accumulated past, and even if the credibility of memory is suspicious, we have to judge 
things based on our present perspective. In this account, I want to repeat the point that I 
921f Quaid returns to the dictator's organisation, his memory will be deleted. This is a 
reason for his denial of the dictator, but even though if it were proposed to Quaid that 
his memory would not to be deleted, it would be doubtful that he would want to accept 
the dictator's offer. Quaid's view is totally against the autocratic government's. 
93Pirsig (1974). 
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do not suggest that the accuracy of our memory is needless. For instance, if a customer 
insists that he had deposited one thousand pounds in his bank account but that it had 
disappeared, a banker would check the account and say there is no record, and suggest 
that the customer may misunderstand something. The customer may realise his mistake 
- that he actually used a different bank for the money - when he found another bank 
account in which his money was transfeffed. In most cases, objective fact is the 
foundation according to which people correct and modify their memory. However, it is 
also said that even if there was a conflict between our remembering and external 
information, the method by which that conflict is resolved is left for that person's 
judgement. Accuracy is important for the reconstruction of memory, but in order to 
regard an event as accurately remembered, we need to use our judgement on things that 
are formed based on the present understanding of the past. Therefore, the first person's 
viewpoint is given priority in this discussion of personal identity. 
This suggests that the reconstruction of memory is not intended to bring about a 
dogmatic view, because inconsistency with the external world can be a cause of serious 
problems for what we remember. The point here is simple; we do not sincerely and truly 
and with awareness invent our memory when memory is reconstructed. I have so far 
discussed extreme cases, so next we will turn to more ordinary instances, which will 
show how we reconstruct our experiences in our daily lives. 
1.8. More Ordinary Cases 
We shall start from a story in which a boy was punished for stealing fruit from an 
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orchard. He may have felt miserable himself at that time because of the punishment. 
Later he became a brave officer, who was admired for his achievement in taking a 
94 
standard from the enemy. He finally got the position of general in advanced life. If the 
general remembers his boyhood, he might regard his stealing of fruits as a premonition 
of his seizure of the enemy flag, and furthermore he might be proud of the act without 
remembering his young misery. The event, the stealing of fruit, is not changed in the 
story, but his evaluation of the event is different in his childhood and in his manhood. 
The general reinterprets his act and rewrites its meaning unconsciously. The subject of 
memory at present (the personal history which is believed by the general) and the 
subject in the general's memory (flogging, but now understood as a courageous act) are 
made to coincide by the operation of reconstruction. 
This exemplifies the occurrence of the reconstruction of memory, and for more 
factual cases, we shall look at an example involving married couples that shows a 
change of feeling towards events at two different times. Several couples are interviewed 
about their feelings about some impressive events concerned with their partner, and later 
they are asked to recall a number of these events. People whose relationship with their 
partner is deteriorating tend to describe their formerly positively-viewed events 
negatively and their negatively understood events more negatively; while people who 
have kept a good relationship do not show a significant difference between now and 
before. Therefore, it is concluded that 'people may rehearse prior interactions and 
integrate them into their model, altering or maintaining the affective dimensions. Secure 
spouses may be reminded more often of prior unpleasant interactions as another occurs, 
94Characters in this example are borrowed from Thomas Reid's Brave-Officer problem 
with my own modifications. 
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and regard that as evidence that reinforces their negative stance'. 95 An event can be 
interpreted both positively and negatively by the those who experience it, and this 
interpretation is changeable depending on the perspective on the past had at that time. 
These cases may be easy to accept as reconstructions of memory, because they 
demonstrate a change in the evaluation of events, the structure of which does not alter. 
The following Chinese proverb, 'Saiou's horse, ' also presents the same pattern, in which 
only the meaning of events is reinterpreted: There was an old man whose name was 
Saiou. One day a horse escaped from him. People felt pity for Saiou, but Saiou did not 
think he should be pitied. The horse later came back with a fleet steed. People at this 
time were pleased with his luck, but Saiou said 'it may tum to disaster. ' The rest of the 
story is the same; when people thought Saiou. had misfortune, he refused their pity, and 
he regarded the general fortune as his ill luck. (Saiou's son was fascinated with the fleet 
steed and loved riding it, but he fell off the horse and broke his leg. However, the son 
was not enlisted because of the fracture, and did not die in the battlefield. ) The truth of 
this proverb is that we cannot predict at the time it happens whether an event is 
fortunate or not, because our evaluation might be altered in a later context. 
In that proverb, although people's views of an event are altered in accordance with 
other, later events, the structure of events is not reconstructed. T'hus, it might be 
objected that even though the meaning of past events is not fixed, their structure is kept 
in ordinary situations. A change in the structure of memory rarely occurs to any degree, 
and we need to distinguish rigidly between non-nal and pathological occasions. I take 
issue with this opinion, and now discuss a case in which a change of memorY- structure 
seems to occur without pathological symptoms. I cite the so-called 'affaire Aubrac' as 
95 John A. Robinson (1995, p. 208). 
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an instance of this view. I refer particularly to the report by Susan Rubin Suleiman in 
which she deals with the works of memory. The example is a story about the role of 
those who were concerned with the arrest of the Resistance leader Jean Moulin and his 
associates including Raymond Aubrac in 1943. These people were arrested by betrayal, 
and another resistant, Rene Hardy, was suspected as the betrayer. Moulin died as the 
result of torture which was carried out by the Gestapo chief, Klaus Barbie, while 
Raymond Aubrac escaped from the Gestapo and survived. This is the background of the 
affaire Aubrac. 
In 1984 Lucie Aubrac, who was also a member of the Resistance, published her 
memoir on the affair, in which she played the crucial role of setting Raymond Aubrac 
96 free from the Gestapo. After the book was published, the Aubracs came to fame and 
they became prominent public speakers. Barbie died in prison but left a document, the 
so-called 'testament de Barbie'. In the document he designated Raymond Aubrac as the 
true betrayer of Moulin. Although it was thought to be unreliable and received little 
response, Gerard Chauvy, who was a journalist and pointed out several contradictions in 
the Aubracs' testimonies, restored Barbie's statement in his book of 1997. Suleiman 
writes: 'Although he (Chauvy] finally concludes that there is no documentary evidence 
to support Barbie's accusation, Chauvy clearly insinuates that the Aubracs were guilty 
of not telling the "whole truth. ""' The reaction of Raymond Aubrac to this criticism and 
its result make this case complicated. He asks historians to attend a meeting in which 
they can ascertain the truth of the matter. 
96 Lucie Aubrac (1994). This book was later made into a film as well. 
97AIl quotations concerned with the affair Aubrac are cited from Suleiman (1999, PP - v* 
xiii). 
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[T]hc historians grilled them about the inconsistencies reported by Chauvy and about the 
hitherto unexamincd documents published in his Appendix. The Aubracs were unable to clear 
up the inconsistencies. Instead they invoked the failures of memory, the exigencies of 
simplifying a factual narrative for the sake of greater coherence and readability..., and finally 
even their own puzzlement. 
Even though the Aubracs won a case in which they accused Chauvy and his publisher of 
libel; as a survey of memory, historians in the meeting 'concluded ... that "areas of 
shadow remain" in the Aubracs' story. ' I do not aim to investigate the historical truth of 
this affair, but I would like to bring it forward as a kind of thought experiment about the 
reconstruction of memory. If one of them, the Aubracs or Barbie, intentionally told a lie, 
this case would be simple. However, we can also think that both sides believe the 
validity of their stories, and we pursue this possibility irrespective of this affair's 
authenticity. 
I treat this affair as a conflict between two sides' remembering, not as a simple 
mistemembering, misunderstanding of details, or intentional lying. Can two sides have 
different memories about the fact of an affair without lying? From the first person's 
viewpoint, the answer is yes. If a person repeatedly thinks and talks about a particular 
view of an event, the person might believe that it is not his or her own opinion but the 
fact about the event. Even if in the first instance the person did not completely believe it 
to be true, it is possible that he or she might come to regard the view as factual. 
This does not occur only in pathological cases, and several researchers report that 
ordinary people have 'remembered' events which did not happen to them. For example, 
Ira Hyman and his colleagues conducted an experiment in the inducement of false 
memory. Subjects were presented with actual events together witli a false experience, 
for instance, attending a wedding party in boyhood (a true event) in which one's parents 
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spilled a punch bowl on the bride's parents (a false event). During the first interview, no 
subjects remembered the false event, but 18 per cent 'remembered'the false event in the 
second interview, and 25 per cent remembered in the third interview. 98 As similar sorts 
of experiments show, people do sometimes create memories of events which did not 
happen to them. 99 
In addition, Neisser and Harsch's report demonstrates that even without 
experimental inducement people create false memories. They asked students to record 
the source by which they first knew of the explosion of the space shuttle Challenger in 
1986. Then, forty four students who were still on campus were asked the same question 
three years later. 
About a quarter of those accounts, including many reported with high confidence, were 
entirely wrong ... [One subject] who had actually heard the news from 
ftiends at lunch in the 
cafeteria, remembered how "some girl came running down the hall screaming 'The space 
shuttle just blew up. ' "... Even then they [the subjects] were reluctant to abandon their 
incorrect memories: "Yes, that's my handwriting-but I still remember it this other way! " ' too 
If the students had not left a record, they would have had no doubt about their memory 
of the first source of information about Challenger's explosion. I assume that this minor 
change of memory can happen at any time. Most such changes may not be socially 
important, so tend to be overlooked. Our present perspective on the past will not be 
dramatically different from tomorrow's in ordinary circumstances, but this does not 
98 Loftus (1997, pp. 70-75). 
99 Spanos (1996). 
100 Neisser (1994, p. 6), Neisser and Harsch (1992). 
65 
entail the invariability of the structure of our memory. 101 
Therefore, I insist that even in non-pathological cases, people on occasion 
rewrite not only their memory's meaning but also its structure. Tlicre must be obvious 
cases that can be categorised as pathological but not all patterns that show a dynamic 
change of remembering are counted as unusual symptoms. The contradiction of the 
affair Aubrac can be interpreted in this manncr. Thus, it is possible for both the Aubracs 
and Barbie not to have lied though their testimonies are in discord. We also do not need 
to understand one of them to be pathological, and in accordance with this understanding, 
discrepancies between the Aubracs and Barbie can occur without suffering mental 
illness. I do not insist that this is the fact of the affair Aubrac, but suggest that the 
conflict between two parties may well be understood in this way. It is the conclusion of 
this section that not all cases, in which the structure of events is modified, are caused by 
extraordinary conditions. We reconstruct our memory in order to make sense of 
experiences to a greater or lesser degree, and this act is the source of the framework of 
persona i ent ty. 
In conclusion, I propose that our concept of personal identity is formed when we recall 
the past from the present perspective. This perspective is not fixed but adaptable to 
101 As another example of false memory, I count my experience: My family had a dog 
when I was a child. I believed that he had escaped from my house at night and never 
come back. One day, when I was an adult, I casually asked my parents what would 
have happened to the dog after he escaped. They were surprised and told me that he 
died in a traffic accident, which I had witnessed. I had cried and cried, and did not 
move from holding him, they said. I did not remember the accident at all. Later, I 
thought that I might have remembered the scene in which the dog was hit by a car, but 
I still wonder if it came from my own memory or I just created the scene according to 
my parents'tale. I do not think this accident has become some sort of traumatic 
experience for me. I still like dogs, am not extraordinary afraid of cars or of crossing 
the road. However, I deleted and added episodes to my memory unintentionally, and 
believed that the modified memory was true. 
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circumstances, so our memory can be re-interpreted and re-organised depending upon 
the current perspective on the past. This is the reconstruction of memory, which 
includes change in the meaning of our remembering as well as change in its structure. 
This reconstruction is usually not operated fully intentionally, otherwise we could create 
our past as we wish. I do not take that solipsistic position and regard social and cultural 
interaction as necessary factors for the judgement of our memory. 
It is we who form the framework of personal identity, but the source of this 
operation relies not only on the individual but also on circumstances which encircle us. 
As George Kelly notes, 'Since an absolute construction of the universe is not feasible, 
we shall have to be content with a series of successive approximations to it. 'This phrase 
represents his theory of 'constructive alternativism' which indicates the relation between 
our understanding of the universe and its alteration: 'all of our present interpretations of 
the universe are subject to revision or replacement ... there are always some altemative 
constructions available to choose among in dealing with the world. ' '0' very 
interpretation of the world contains the possibility of alteration, but this does not 
indicate that we create all our views from the beginning. 
External factors can influence our conception of ourselves, and because of this 
work memory is always possibly reconstructed by the introduction of new information. 
That information must be mediated by our interpretation so as to grasp its meaning in 
the relation of other memories, and we are supposed to operate that work from a specific 
perspective in our lives. We have confirmed those points through the discussion of this 
chapter. Moreover, if, as I have argued, memory is reconstructed from the current 
perspective, the way to organise memory is an important issue in terms of the 
102 Kelly (1963, p. 15). 
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framework of personal identity. I suspect that if our experiences were not organised at 
all, our past would be without perspective but would be a mcre enumeration of events. 
The relevant issue is the order of memory, and this shall be our topic in the next chapter, 
where we will look at 'narrative, ' which gives a story to an understanding of one's 
actions in the context of one's life. 
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Chapter 2 
NARRATIVE 
The Narrative Approach to the Reconstruction ofMemory 
2.1. The Relation between Narrative and Life 
To look back upon the past is to make a connection between memories in accordance 
with the present perspective. Our experiences become comprehensible through being 
put in the context of other experiences, and this is what we have determined to be the 
framework of personal identity. This is the gist of the previous chapter, and what we 
have not yet examined is the manner in which experiences are arranged in intelligible 
fonn. If experiences were just haphazardly connected with each other, we would not be 
able to make any sense of the past. Based on this assumption, I will in this chapter 
examine the order of the reconstruction of memory. 
Corresponding to this insistence, the opinion that disorder of experiences is an 
adequate explanation of human beings might arise. This is typically found in Humean 
discussions, and our consideration might be counted as a counterargument against them. 
However, I do not think that it is a criticism of Hume, since Humeans and I deal with a 
different notion. To seek order in the reconstruction of memory is not to ask if there is a 
definite theory by which things in the universe are ordered, or by which causation in the 
69 
world is proved. Instead, it asks if we give order to our experiences in terms of 
comprehending their meanings. It is the method of arranging experiences as if there is a 
relation between them for the sake of making sense of the past. In this regard, the issue 
in this chapter does not become an attack on the Humean view, though neither does it 
imPly Hume's theory, since the discussion of the real existence of causation is not our 
issue. 103 
To start with, we will discuss the interaction between the narrative form and our 
life, and ask how the former organises the latter. It is my assumption that absolute chaos 
is beyond our comprehension, and we need to organise memory in some way in order to 
understand it. I will first examine the framework associated with narrative, which I will 
discuss as a form that gives an understandable explanation to experiences. Tlie past 
acquires meanings through being organised in intelligible connections, and it is this that 
is called the narrative form here. 104 As characters in Samuel Beckett's drama say, to 
have lived and to be dead are not enough for us but we 'have to talk about it'. 105 We do 
not just breathe and spend our time but live with the past and an outlook on the future. 
We often talk about, look back upon, and envisage our actions in order to make the 
figure of life. Life in this view is, I insist, understood in a narrative form; experiences 
are located in the context of a life story. 
Second, we will turn our eyes to the organisation of the reconstructed memory. We 
103 Hume advocates three systems that deal with philosophical problems differently; 
the false philosophical system; vulgar system; and the true philosophical system. On 
this understanding, our discussion is close to the vulgar view. For more discussion, see 
Donald W. Livingstoes survey of Hume (1998). 
104From a sociological standpoint, Vivien Burr mentions the relation between the 
narrative form and memory in that way: 'Memory allow us to look back on our behaviours and experiences, to select those that seem tohand togetherin some 
narrative framework, 'and this framework provides'us with the impression of 
continuity and coherence. '(1995, p. 30). 
105 Beckett (1965, Act II). 
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tend to narrate our lives in an intelligible style by which a series of events become 
understandable. This is a narrative approach to our lives. 711e necessity of the narrative 
approach is precisely analysed by Alasdair Maclntyre, who argues for the role of 
narrative in structuring memory. According to him, we should consider the method by 
which past events are organised if we regard that life is 'more than a sequence of 
individual actions and episodes'. 106 He contends that if life is to be meaningful for us, it 
should be grasped as a whole, because the significance of an action should be 
interpreted not on its own but in its role in the longer-terin perspective of a person. 
The same sort of view is also found in the work of Peter Goldie, and Bernard 
Williams. Goldie defines narrative not as a mere sequence of events but as interpreted in 
one's own way, 'thereby giving coherence, meaningfulness, and emotional import to 
what happened'. 107 He puts emphasis on the point that the narrative of life needs to be 
re-organised in order to be significant for us. Williams makes a similar point. He insists 
that elements of events must be accurate and consistent if they are to be intelligible for 
us, but that is 'not enough'. More, 'the sequence of events has to make sense to us, and 
make sense of the outcome. Such a story is one kind of narrative'. ' 0' These remarks are 
deeply concerned with our discussion of the reconstruction of memory which must not 
be a mix-up of disordered events but takes an understandable form. Grounded on this 
assumption, we will consider what kind of order can be applied for that form if memory 
is not a mere miscellany of experiences. 
The preceding is a summary of the first half of this chapter in which the relation 
between the narrative account and our understanding of a life will be considered. I 
'Or, MacIntyre (1984, p. 204). 
107 Goldie (2003, p. 203). 
108 Bernard Williams (2002, p. 233). 
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should, however, mention that we will not only follow tile usefulness of that account. It 
is certainly important to discuss the effect of the narrative account in order to analyse 
the organisation of the reconstruction of memory, but I also insist that only that account 
may not be enough to deal with the reconstruction of memory. The narrative account 
could be effective if we focus on the identification of a person through time, but it may 
not be suitable for our other notion, differences. In order to examine this point, I will 
also ask if there is the minimum within this narrative account. The fragmentation of 
identity will be the key theme in the latter half of this chapter. 
It will be better to emphasise the point that I mentioned in the Introduction: I 
assume that there are two tendencies when we grasp our experiences over time. One is 
towards making a unitary understanding of a life by which experiences are harmonised 
with each other, and the other deviates from that harmonisation. The narrative account is 
used for considering the way to make coherence between one's own episodes according 
to the context of that person's life, so it is concerned with making our concept of 
identity. This relation between narrative account and a person is, for example, described 
thus: 'the identity of the character is comprehensible through the transfer to the 
character of the operation of emplotment, first applied to the action recounted. "09 A 
unity of a person over time is formed through narrating one's own experiences, namely, 
the narrative approach performs to make a bridge between experiences when they are 
recalled by that person. This is a basic view of the relation between the narrative 
account and the concept of personal identity in this chapter. In this understanding, we 
will also examine what kind of order we can find in the naffative form. 
The issue of the narrative account will be centred upon first in this chapter. Tlien, 
109 Ricoeur (1994, p. 143). 
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as the minimum of this account, I will indicate that there could be experiences that are 
not put into that coherence but are still important for that person. This will be examined 
in the second half of this chapter. I insist that those two tendencies show different points 
of the condi! ions of a person, but do not necessarily eliminate each other. 110 
2.2. Our Lives in the Narrative Form 
We first consider the necessity of the narrative form for grasping the meaning of life. 
MacIntyre describes modem life as divided into several segments; we separate leisure 
from work, private from public, the personal from the corporate, and each segment 
possesses its own principles and behavioural character. For example, being a good 
teacher is measured by a different yardstick from being a good mother and being a good 
author, and every role holds up a different aim. MacIntyre argues that if this separation 
were achieved to a great extent, we would lose our view of life as a whole and would 
consider our existences as based on each segment on each occasion. This is the situation 
in which we find ourselves today, but he states that the life of virtue, which is the 
subject of his discussion, is achieved through the unity of life in which each episode is 
dealt with in the prospect of making a consistent life. Human behaviour is understood 
not only in terms of the outcome of an individual action but also by the relation of each 
action to the rest of a life. Hence, in his notion any shorter-term intention should be 
properly described by reference to the longer-tenn intention. 
110 This point will be discussed more in chapter four and five as different tendencies of 
modern thought and postmodern thought. 
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Maclntyre uses the following example to explain his discussion of intention; if 
there was a man in a garden who was doing something, the answer to the question as to 
what action was being performed could be described in a number of ways, 'Dtigging, ' 
'Gardening, ' 'Taking exercise, ' 'Preparing for winter, ' or 'Pleasing his wife. The 
primary intention defines the meaning of the action, so if the primary intention is to 
prepare for winter, it would imply a particular life-style, that of those who understand 
gardening as a seasonal event in a household 'setting with the peculiar narrative history 
of that setting. ' In the case of pleasing his wife, the act is located in the context of a 
relationship between a husband and a wife 'in the narrative history of a marriage. ' These 
instances show that the intention relevant to an episode is properly described only if it is 
put in the context of the longer-tenn intention. "' 
Moreover, to put an episode into the context of the longer sequence of behaviour 
is understood as to narrate episodes according to a personal history. As George C. 
Rosenwald andRichard L. Ochberg strongly insist, 'Personal stories' do not only show 
the structure of one's life, but 'they are the means by which identities may be fashioned. 
It is this formative ... power of life stories that makes them important'. 
112 Moreover, the 
meaning of an event can be changed depending upon the context of other events as well. 
For this instance, I cite an episode in The Leopard. A man invented a rude story and told 
it to a lady. The lady believed it and got angry, and kept away from him. Fifty years later, 
his friend told her that it was an invention. She then knew that that man did not behave 
as badly as in the story, and this fact greatly changed her view of the past. She now 
remembered his wann side, and thought that he might have loved her (though the truth 
"I The topic of intention and action may evoke Anscomb's discussion. MacIntyre in 
another context mentions that his argument is influenced by Anscombe in some points. 
(MacIntyre, 1984, p. 53, Anscombe, 1957,1958). 
112 Rosenwald and Ochberg (1992, p. 1). 
74 
is still ambiguous), and thought that it was her who killed her future by avoiding him 
due to pride. This is a new interpretation of her life that she never imagined before. The 
sequence of events is the same, the man told a story, she was offended at that, and they 
did not marry. Nonetheless, when the event is shown in a different context from that of 
what she believed, the understanding of her past in the last fifty years is totally changed, 
and she is shattered by that new view. ' 13 In narrating experiences in the context of a 
whole life, they are recounted as a personal history and acquire an irreplaceable position 
in that person's narrative. 
The making of personal history is applied to resolving the problem of personal 
identity in Maclntyre's discussion. He regards a person as a character who lives his or 
her own narrative from birth to death. A person at different times is hence identified by 
the consistency of their character. A person's character may change over time, but 
MacIntyre would not think this to be a problem as long as a comprehensible explanation 
is given of the change. A man under description X would be the same man under a very 
different description Y if he could give an elucidation by means of which we can 
understand 'how he could at different times and different places be one and the same 
person and yet be so differently characterized'. 114 If the explanation was acceptable 
enough, the person would be thought of as keeping a consistent character, so the person 
possesses unity of character through his or her life story. ' 15 What MacIntyre stresses is 
that personal identity cannot be discussed separately from this work of narrative, 
113 Lampedusa (1960, pp. 184-186). 
114 MacIntyre (1984, p. 218). 
115 1 wonder to what degree MacIntyre's account can be applied to the study of personal 
identity. He does not offer a thought experiment, but if, e. g., Margaret Thatcher's 
memory was gradually exchanged with Maruquis de Sade's memory, would it be in the 
range of an acceptable change, or not? If we strictly applied MacIntyre's theory to this 
case, the answer would be positive as long as one can make an intelligible narrative of 
the relation between these personalities. 
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intelligibility, and the account of a life. A study which treats personal identity 
independently of these factors will tum out a failure. In MacIntyre's notion, to possess 
the sense of personal identity, which can be compared to the sense of personhood, is to 
be able to give an intelligible account to changes in one's character through time, so the 
continuity of a person corresponds to the unity of a life story through which the gaps 
between different stages are explained. 
It is not only MacIntyre who has made the connection between narrative and life. 
There are researchers who have also indicated this connection within the context of 
making personal identity. For instance, Paul Ricoeur deals with human action using the 
notion of narrative. He asserts that to determine the identity of a person is to answer the 
question 'Who did it? ' He assumes that there is a person who undertakes the action, and 
the identity of the person through time is confinncd by a narrative account which 
describes the agent of the action: 'To state the identity of an individual or a community 
is to answer the question, "Who did this? "... What justifies our taking the subject ... as 
the same throughout a life ... ? The answer has to be narrative. ' 
116 There is the doer who 
undertakes actions, and the continuity of the doer is proved by putting actions into the 
narrative form in which an action is explained in relation to other actions. This is what 
Ricoeur calls 'narrative identity': A story consists of what the person has done, and the 
unity of the person thus relies on the unity of narrative in which diverse experiences are 
ordered. In his opinion, we possess the ability by means of which self-constancy is 
achieved, and this ability inheres in being a narrator of one's own life story. 
Moreover, the work of narrative in giving a certain account to events is, though 
from a very different angle to that of Maclntyre and Ricoeur, also mentioned by Jean- 
116 Ricocur (1988b, p. 246). 
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Frangois Lyotard as an evaluating system of discourses. He supposes that science is 
always in discord with narratives such as myths, legends, and folklore. For science, 
these narratives are mere fables that cannot be equal to logical and rational thought, 
which are but the yardstick of science. However, Lyotard asserts that science also needs 
to adopt the narrative form 'to the extent that science does not restrict itself to stating 
useful regularities and seeks the truth, it is obliged to legitimate the rules of its own 
game'. ' 17 For the sake of an insistence on the superiority of scientific truth over 'fables', 
science nonetheless needs to adapt a sort of narrative which demonstrates this 
legitimacy. Narrative is thus described as a system of estimation by which the genre (in 
this case, science) is provided with the significance and the meaning of its discourse. 
Narrative in this view is used as an explanation of how people are provided with a way 
to grasp events from the genre's particular perspective. ' 18 
As a conterargument to Lyotard's understanding of narrative, I cite the opinion of 
Jerome Bruner. He asserts that there are two modes of thought: the paradigmatic or 
logico-scientific mode and the narrative mode, and they are inconsistent with each 
other. 119 In Lyotard's discussion, the logico-scientific mode is also included in the 
narrative mode. This difference is that while Bruner's logico-scientific mode points to 
scientific theory itself, Lyotard's narrative indicates the mode by which science proves 
the necessity and legitimacy of its theory. If science constructs a paradigm, in Lyotard's 
opinion, it must include the problem of legitimacy in terms of appealing to its authority 
over other thoughts. Thus, Lyotard insists that science also has its own narrative mode 
117 Lyotard (1984, p. xxiii). 
118 Lyotard does not only approve the work of narrative but criticises it so as to forcibly 
make the subject coherent. This problem will be examined later in this thesis. 
119 Bruner (1986, pp. 12-13). 
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as long as it participates in the discussion of evaluation. 120 If a set of episodes and 
events is more than a list of independent descriptions, we need to be able to identify that 
by which its significance is declared. To secure the meaning of an action is to clarify its 
value, and this is acquired not through the mere itemising of performances but by 
making a narrative account of them. In this respect, the narrative approach is necessary 
for the reconstruction of memory, which makes experiences comprehensible. 
Although we have already used the term 'narrative form, ' it must be added that the 
relation between experiences must not be randomly made. Instead, there should be some 
order if the relation is reasonable for us. I will next discuss this assumption in terms of 
analysing standards of order. We will first observe the case of inconsistent description 
through which the inevitability of order will be realised, and then consider what types of 
order can be applied to the narrative understanding of memory. 
2.3. The Necessity of Order 
Disorder is a difficult topic for us to grasp, because it slips through the comprehensible 
description of things. Languages are more or less ordered according to their rules, so it 
is not surprising that it is hard to delineate a thought that lacks arrangement. The 
following sentence is an instance of such an incoherent description. It was written down 
by an erudite man who excelled in language: 'There we waited on the ladies- 
Morville's. -Spain. Country towns all beggars. At Dijon he could not find the way to 
120 Lyotard (1984, p. 8). 
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Orleans. -Cross roads of France very bad. -Five soldiers. -Women. -Soldiers 
escaped. -The Colonel would not lose five men for the sake of one woman. -The 
magistrate cannot seize a soldier but by the Colonel's permission, etc., etc. ' 121 We may 
be puzzled by this fragmented description due to the lack of a proper connection 
between phrases. It is hard to guess its proper meaning since the phrases do not leave 
enough clues for us to make a comprehensible story. 
The above description is quoted by MacIntyre ftom. Samuel Johnson's record of 
his travels in France in the eighteenth century. MacIntyre cites it as a counterargument 
to the opinion that to represent our past in a narrative form is nothing else than to 
deceive ourselves by giving life a false form, because it gives order to events which did 
not exist when the events happened. If we neatly tell our life stories, it is sometimes 
suggested the lives described would be always artificial; they are already reorganised in 
our minds, so they are not the experiences as they were. "' Mactntyre disagrees with 
this claim, because he supposes that it is impossible to understand our life without 
following the narrative form, without which it becomes a mixture of events with no 
connection. The only picture which he can draw which escapes a narrative 
understanding is 'the kind of dislocated sequence, ' which is exemplified by the above 
quotation from Johnson. Maclntyre's insistence is that any attempt to characterise 
actions prior to the narrative understanding ends in failure, because we will only obtain 
'disjointed parts of some possible narrative' that elude our understanding. 123 According 
to Maclntyre, the order of narration is necessary for acquiring an intelligible account in 
121 This sentence is quoted from Philip Hobsbaum's book by MacIntyre (Hobsbaum, 
1973, p. 32, MacIntyre, 1984, pp. 214-215). 
122 This discussion is specifically of Jean-Paul Sartre's argument in Nausea, in which 
Sartre regards human actions as unintelligible occurrences (Sartre, 1965; MacIntyre, 
1984, p. 214). 
123 MacIntyre (1984, p. 214). 
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which life is unified. 
Our difficulty in understanding inconsistent sentences seems to reflect our 
tendency to try to make events coherent. We want to give an elucidation of events by 
ignoring a little contradiction, or even by creating a bridge bctween apparently unrelated 
descriptions. In a wide sense, this tendency is evident in various fields in which the 
narrative understanding is used. 124 in order to grasp episodes and events, we tend to see 
a relation between them, which means we put them into a certain context, in a certain 
structure. In this respect, 'man is in his actions and practice, as well as in his fictions, 
essentially a story-telling animal, ' as MacIntyre declares. 125 To grasp experiences from 
one9s own perspective is to tell them as events that relate to others. Narrative works to 
make the past coherent, or we would be at a loss in a chaotic world of experiences. 126 
To tell a life story in the narrative fonn. also relates to the possession of a specific 
position from which events are narrated. If there was no point of view that could give a 
particular understanding to experiences, there would only be a collection of descriptions 
that could not be in any way related. We denied the possibility of an overarching 
standpoint as the 'tenseless' approach to experiences in the fonner chapter, and we shall 
consider this aspect further in reference to Arthur C. Danto's discussion of history. He 
uses the image of an Ideal Chronicler who is presumed to be able to know of anything 
that happens in the world as it happens, the way it happens, including that which occurs 
124 For instance, in some myths, phenomena are personified in order to'read'the law of 
the nature (e. g., the stormy seas are due to the anger of the Sea God, so we have to 
offer a sacrifice to the God). In addition, if this tendency were not highly developed, 
some literature which is almost incomprehensible in common reading would be never 
written and read, for example, James Joyc&s Knnegans Make. 
125 Ibid., p. 216. 
12G This is a strong view that pushes forward the narrative understanding. In 
MacIntyre's opinion, it is a 'good'way to establish virtue in life. However, it can be 
questioned whethersuch an understanding is always 'good' (see e. g., Galen Strawson, 
2004). We will return this problem in the latter half of this chapter. 
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in other's minds. Could the Ideal Chronicler make a perfect description of history? 
Danto declares that even this is not enough for making history, because the entirely 
neutral position cannot make any connection between events. 
The Ideal Chronicler cannot even make the sentence 'The Thirty Years War begins 
now' in 1618 'if that war was so-called because of its duration' . 
127 It is necessary to fix 
a certain point in order to interpret events as a particular state of affairs. 'nie, Ideal 
Chronicler, who cannot fix such a point, may describe the events in the Thirty Years 
War: 'Ferdinand of Styria is elected as king of Bohemia'; 'two members of the royal 
council are thrown from a window'; 'Johan Tzerclaes Tilly's army defeated the 
Bohemians'. There is no explanation of the connections between events, since the Ideal 
Chronicler only can record occurrences individually. This is an example of a mere list of 
events, and what is lacking in the Ideal chronicler is the way of comparing, temporally, 
by means of which the status of an event is defined in terms of its place in a longer 
sequence. Thus, although we can say that the assassination of Archduke Franz 
Ferdinand in Sarajevo causes the First World War, the Ideal chronicler only mentions 
that assassination and cannot relate it to the peace conference at Versailles in 1919.128 A 
perspective is necessary to give a meaning to events, and it cannot be provided by the 
omnipresent viewpo nt but needs to be arranged from a particular position. 
A similar point is indicated by Bernard Williams, who notes that any narrative 
includes a chronicle 'which is simply a list of happenings in chronological order, ' so it 
is necessary for the narrative form to include a temporal understanding. He also insists 
that 'A chronicle does not try to make sense of anything' but what we need to 'make 
127 Danto (1985, p. 152). 
128 We cannot even call the period of this war the First World War, because it is so 
named only after the occurrence of the Second World War. 
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sense9 of events is some explanation of them. 129 William mentions the necessity of the 
narrative form and of a person's own position in order to understand the meaning of 
events. Danto also considers that this is the task of narrative, through which independent 
episodes are comprehended as part of an intelligible event: 'Narrative sentences refer to 
at least two time-separated events, and describe the earlier event. ' 130 This is his 
definition of the narrative form. The ability to explain the significance of the former 
event in connection with the latter is hence necessary to narrate history. He believes that 
narrative plays the role of locating at least two events within a certain perspective in 
which specific meanings can be added to them. The narrative form is relevant to the 
reconstruction of memory in this way, since it is that through which episodes and events 
are ordered and become comprehensible. 
The above is the reason why narrative order is important for our comprehension 
of experiences, and I will next discuss the precise varietY of order. I assume that there 
are two standards by which experiences are systernatised. First, there is the standard of 
time, since memory presupposes temporal differences, and as Danto suggests, the 
meaning of an event is given by the context of other events occurring at different times. 
Second, experiences are nevertheless not only ordered in a chronological sense, or we 
would have to recall all memories from the beginning of an event when we want to refer 
to a specific episode in it. I propose therefore that experiences are also arranged in a 
causal relation in which episodes and events are connected as cause and effect. 131 This 
account of causality is a characteristic of narrative theory more than that of 
129 Bernard Williams (2002, p. 238). 
130 Danto (1985, P. 159). 
131 MacIntyre writes that intentions 'need to be ordered both causally and temporally' 
(1984, p. 208). Ricoeur also argues that to make a plot is to mediate between time and 
narrative (1984,53-54). 
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philosophical litcrature. This thought will be mentioncd more in section 2.5. 
In respect of the structure of narrative, E. M. Forster's definition shall help our 
understanding. He defines the novel as consisting of a story and a plot; a story is 'a 
narrative of events arranged in their time-sequence'. A plot is defined as a narrative of 
events, the emphasis falling on causality. "'The king died, and then the queen died, " is a 
story ..... The king died, and then the queen died of grief' is a plot. 
"" The same event is 
described differently according to each standard. 133 In my discussion, following Forster, 
a story corresponds to the temporal order, and a plot is the causal order. These are 
regarded as the main methods of organising our own experiences in the narrative 
form., 34 
2.4. The Temporal Order of the Narrative Form 
Objective Time and Subjective Time in the Narrative A ccount 
First of all, to have a sense of time is necessary in order to compose memory. James 
William defines memory as 'the knoivIedge of an event, orfact, of which meantime we 
have not been thinking, with the additional consciousness that ive have thought or 
132 Forster (1927, p. 116). 
133 There are various debates about the issue of the structure of narrative in narrative 
theory, and this discussion only indicates points concerned with the reconstruction of 
memory. We do not have enough space to focus upon this wide area, but for further 
consideration of narrative theory, see H. Porter Abbott (2002). 
134 The chronology of narrative is a huge issue in narrative theory. For this debate, see, 
for example, White (1987). 
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experienced it before'. 135 By this means we distinguish the present from the past, and 
because the reconstruction of memory is the operation that ties together events that 
happened on different occasions, the sense of time must be essential for the order of 
memory. Our view of life is thought to be influenced by this temporal order. Ibis is seen 
strongly in our presupposition that any person follows the chronological sequence that 
people are born as babies, become adults, and arrive at their senescence. A life might 
come to an end early but this order does not change nor go backwards. 
This preconception about the sequence of life has an influence on the structure of 
reconstructed memory. For instance, if we write our autobiography, the descriptions will 
not be a random collection of episodes without any relation between them. We may start 
it from the present and go back to childhood, or may intentionally shuffle episodes that 
happened in different times and order them not according to the temporal sequence. 
However, there is a general expectation that readers can re-arrange episodes within the 
passage of the author's life in chronological order, at least when they reach the end of 
the book. To see this matter from another angle, consider that if we can make sense of 
divided and seemingly disconnected episodes, it means that we can envisage their 
sequence by reshuffling. It is also seen in stories such as novels and films in which an 
episode seems not to connect with the plot at the beginning, but we eventually 
understand its meaning when we can relocate it in the web of other episodes. It is true 
that there are kinds of autobiographical writing which do not fit the above pattern. 
Nonetheless, apart from literary works that designedly stray from the ordinary writing 
style, we can say that to be able to rearrange episodes according to the temporal order is 
135 James Williams (2001, p. x). 
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to make a story more intelligible. 136 
The sense of time can be divided into two types. Wlicn we recall an event, we may 
note its calendar time, the date of its occurrence, (I met the girl in summer in 1980), or 
we may try to evoke the time at which it happened in our personal history (I met the girl 
when I was only a small boy). I call the former sense objective time, and the latter sense 
subjective time. Steen R Larsen, Charles P. Thompson, and Tia Hansen discuss the 
differences between these in their research into autobiographical memory. The former 
variety of time is calculated by physics and shared publicly in the form of the calendar, 
clock, or the cycle of seasons. The latter is an individuals' sense of time which consists 
of the past, present, and future. 137 Subjective time is described from one person's 
perspective, so it does not unfold according to the physical calculation of time, but it 
can offer a certain sense of time. The phrase 'When I was a child, I was afraid of the 
darkness' does not correspond to an exact time in the physical world, but it is sufficient 
to inform. us of what the phrase means. 
In addition, to have subjective and objective time is a characteristic of human 
beings, because it is only us who want to give an explanation to actions in reference to 
temporal order. This view is described by Maclntyre as an account of action; through 
establishing that account, an action acquires its own meaning in relation to other 
actions. 13S A similar point is also found in Hannah Arendt's contention that through 
speech and action human beings distinguish themselves from other beings: 'In acting 
136 There are a number of writings which take an autobiographical style but include 
contradictions. They are not mere wrong descriptions, but the resolution of 
contradictions may spoil the writing's literary value. Thus, I do not insist that all kinds 
of autobiographical work can be understood in terms of chronology, but these 
intentional works can be counted as exceptions to our argument. 
137 Larsen, Thompson, and Hansen (1995, p. 136). 
138 MacIntyre (1984, p. 209). 
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and speaking, men show who they arc, reveal actively their unique personal identities 
and thus make their appearance in the human world. ' 139 In her opinion, people appear as 
human beings through showing what they have done, and this discloses one's identity as 
a unique person. This type of identity is not required for the continuity of mere physical 
things but is required for existences that can act with responsibility. Additionally, Arendt 
claims that the other-ness between things resides in their kinds, and organic existences 
have variety even in the same kind, but only human beings have the ability to 
distinguish themselves ftorn others by themselves through their account of their own 
actions. Therefore, human life is described as a unique life story through which the 
agent of the story is disclosed. 
However, in Arendt's opinion, although the agent is the protagonist of the life 
story, he or she is neither the author nor the producer of the story. A person is the 
outcome of the action, and the evaluation of the action is always given after it is 
completed. Tbe individual who performs the action never knows how the life story is 
assessed, but the narrative of the action is invariably told by someone else. Thus, it is 
known who a person is when the life story is interpreted in relation to other people, 
when the actions are settled in the context of history. 
This may appear to conflict with our view of the reconstruction of memory, 
because a doer cannot be a narrator of his or her own narrative. Nonetheless, I infer that 
Arendt's opinion should not be seen as a criticism of the idea of the reconstruction of 
memory, because Arendt does not treat the same issue that we do here. The main 
differences between Arendt's opinion and ours lie in the standpoint from which the story 
is narrated; whether it is told from the third person's perspective or the first person's one. 
139 Arendt (1958, p. 179). 
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This insistence will need to be explained more, and further, to note this difference will 
be helpful in order to confirm the characteristics of the reconstruction of memory, the 
different viewpoint of narrating between third persona and the first person. For those 
reasons, we first look further at Arendt's description of a person and narrative, and 
consider the difference between her view and ours. Then, we shall discuss the way to 
depict life in the narrative understanding. The second issue is particularly considered by 
means of a comparison between the view of narrative of Maclntyre and that of Louis 0. 
Mink. 
The Different View of Narrative and Life 
The reason why Arendt denies the idea that an agent is a narrator of their own action can 
be gathered from her discussion of the philosophy of history. She asserts that history is 
comprised of a series of events, and the subject of an event cannot manipulate the future 
relating to it but only acts in the stream of occurrences. People are certainly active 
elements in an event, but they neither fully control the event nor exactly know the 
outcome, being always involved in the process. Why cannot subjects of events be the 
directors of these events? She determines that the resolution of this problem distresses 
modem philosophers of history: 'although history owes its existence to men, it is still 
obviously not "made" by them. ' 140 Without people, there would be no human history, 
but people cannot be the intentional authors of their actions who know the result of a 
series of events. One approach which settles this problem is to suppose an 'invisible 
hand' which conceals the background of settings and manipulates history like God, but 
Arendt disagrees with this due to it 'corresponding to no real experience. ' Instead of the 
140 Ibid., p. 185. 
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invisible director behind history, she introduces the notion that a docr is not an author of 
events but that posterity makes a narrative of events. 
Arendt's view of a life story is condensed into tile phrase: 'The only "somebody" 
it [a life story] reveals is its hero, and it is the only medium in which the originally 
intangible manifestation of a uniquely distinct "who" can become tangible ex postfacto 
through action and speech. ' 141 The person concerned cannot know the meaning of 
action, because he or she does not know what future the action brings. Life which is 
chronologically restricted in its extension is eventually grasped when the outcome is 
known, which means when a series of actions finishes, sometimes after the person dies. 
Thus, Arendt investigates the method by which one's action is narrated from the third 
person's viewpoint, especially in the context of history. For Arendt, narrative means an 
established story from the third person's point of view. The question 'who the person is' 
does not refer to how we consider ourselves, but refers to how life is evaluated by others. 
Hence, a life story for Arendt is not a mere result of one's behaviour but is connected to 
the uniqueness of a person as the only subject of the action. This uniqueness always 
links to the question 'who'did it, ' and the answer relies on the public understanding of 
the action. Arendt's concern is with the way to reveal who the person is through 
disclosing his or her action. 
Contrary to Arendt, I ask for the way to understand one's life from one's own 
perspective, that is, from the first person's viewpoint. The account of an event which is 
given before it is completed might be wrong according to the later understanding, but I 
allege that the possibility of change does not prohibit making an account of our 
experiences. It is true that Columbus cannot declare that he discovered the American 
141 Ibid., p. 186. 
88 
continent, but that statement is only made by posterity. Arendt is correct in this sense, 
but I insist that Columbus still can declare that he discovered a new route to 'India, ' 
because he believed that the islands that he arrived at were parts of India. Even though 
the personal narrative is not the same as the later narrative which is defined by the third 
person, the person concerned has no other way but to keep constructing their own 
perspective of the event. 
In short, Arendt analyses the outcomes of individuals' actions in history as 
estimated by the third party, and I consider the process of reconstructing memory from 
the first person's viewpoint. That is to say, Arendt examines the conditions of the 
description which discloses the conclusion of a person's life, in the context of history. 
Thus, for her, the answer to the question twho is ColumbusT is 'T'he man who 
discovered America. ' 1, however, ask about conditions in which Columbus himself 
thinks 'I discovered India. ' I assume that if Arendt is asked if she accepts that a person 
can establish a life story through his or her own perspective, she would not reject that 
but would merely say that her interest lies elsewhere. However, that is the point that I 
want to present as the perspective of the reconstruction of memory in this thesis. In this 
regard, I shall mention again that Arendt's writing and this thesis treat different aspects 
of the issue of identity. 
This is the way in which one's experiences are understood in accordance with the 
chronological order, especially in relation to the context of life. One more point that 
should be considered is whether or not to arrange the beginning and end in a life story is 
wrong, because it is impossible to experience our final parting from life. A typical 
disagreement is found in the work of Mink, so we next examine his discussion in 
comparison to that of MacIntyre. An outline of Mink's view is that from the first 
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person's position we cannot recall both the beginning and end of life, because they are 
not remembered or experienced by us. Ilius, it is impossible to narrate a whole life as an 
experienced story from the first person's position. The end is only told in a story which 
is made after life finishes. The cla 
iM 6 
stories are not lived but told' depicts well his view 
that the narrative understanding is a kind of production of events which have already 
occurred. 
142 
Mink's opinion would be appropriate to our discussion if we strictly applied the 
work of remembrance to the structuring of the life story. However, Maclntyre takes 
issue with this by asking 'But have you never heard of deathT. 143 We know that 
everyone who now lives came into being in the past and will meet their end in the future, 
and there is no exception to this fate. Hence, in his thought, we have lived our own 
narratives even before they are told, so we include our imaginary birth and death in our 
perspective of personal history. Additionally, Maclntyre's view of the three steps of life, 
the beginning, middle, and end, is discussed in the context of his idea of a virtue. A 
virtue is practised not by the achievement of individual goals at different stages in life 
but through the whole of life, which comprises a consistent narrative from birth to death. 
For this reason, Maclntyre stresses the unity of narrative from birth to death in his 
discussion. Even though we cannot narrate the end of life after we have experienced itq 
we can think about our death and organise our lives towards this imaginary end. T'his is 
the way in which we comprehend life, and the inclusion of birth and death is not 
inadequate if they are understood as elements that are part of the perspective of personal 
history. 
142 Mink (1970, pp. 557-558). 
143 MacIntyre (1984, p. 212). 
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In the understanding of narrative, I take a position close to Maclntyre's that it can 
include three steps of life even though some of them are imaginary. Although Mink 
denies this view due to the impossibility of having these as actual experienccs, I reckon 
that Maclntyre's opinion can be adopted as the method of constructing one's view of 
life. I, nonetheless, do not accept his opinion entirely, and reconsider the necessity of 
making a short-term intention connect to the context of a whole life (this point will be 
discussed later in this chapter). Whilst, as a matter of whether we can include the 
beginning and end in our narrative account of life, I affirm Maclntyrc's insistence rather 
rejecting it. We may not always reconstruct our memory according to our far distant 
future, but it is possible that the narrative understanding of life involves birth and death 
in its structure as imaginary but definitive periods. 
In short, the temporal order is a standard that is used when memory is 
reconstructed. The sense that our existences spread over time is essential for this order, 
and narrative is used to construct it. Ricoeur understands the necessity to this operation 
that we read our end into the beginning and the beginning into the end, and this 
repetition makes the perspective of experiences in memory. 144 It is called 'narrative 
time, ' which consists of a temporal structure that is not only made from the physical 
measurement of time but also made from the inner sense of time. 
Although we cannot know the outcome of life by ourselves, we still produce an 
account of our actions. This account can be a standard by which one's own experiences 
are ordered. Thus, a person is an agent, a narrator of his or her own experience, whose 
concept of identity is shaped through the organisation of his or her actions. As I 
emphasised before, I mainly concentrate on a way to give order to experiences from 
144 Ricoeur (1981, p. 181). 
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one9s own perspective, so this is the concept of personal identity made from the first 
pcrson's viewpoint. It is our nature to be rcstrictcd existences in time, so tile narrative 
form of memory is partly chronologically organiscd. We assumed two standards of 
order before, and the other was causation, which works to give relations of cause and 
effect to events, so we will next discuss this work. 145 
2.5. The Causal Order of the Narrative Form 
The Matter of Intention 
'Me causal order of the reconstruction of memory is defined as that by which an 
experience is arranged in the relation of cause and effect. It helps to make sense of 
events through putting them in an intelligible context. I suppose that this account may 
introduce two arguments: If it is really called the causal order; it fails to lead to a 
teleological aspect of one's own actions. Therefore, I shall first consider those points, 
and then move to the discussion of the causal order in a narrative account of life. 
For the consideration of the former point of view, it should be mentioned that the 
causal order that is examined here leans towards studies in narrative theory. Its typical 
example is Forster's distinction between a story (which is contrasted to the temporal 
order in this chapter) and a plot (which is contrasted to tile causal order) that we have 
seen at the end of section 2.3.17he causal order of this use works for connecting one 
event to another by locating them in the relation of cause and effect. Hence, it is the 
145 For further discussion of chronological explanation of narrative, specificallY 
concerned with history, see White (1978). 
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method of making a comprehensible account between events within the framework of 
causality. What I will examine in this section is the sort of causality that is oflen used in 
narrative theory. 146 It thus does not always match the study of causality in 
philosophical literature, for instance, as Kant discusses that any event in the universe 
must necessarily have a cause, and attempts to theorise causality as a prior 
conception. 147 We do not ask whether or not the causal order is really applicable for the 
law of the universe, but it is more concerned with the manner through which we 
organise, our memory in reference to our experiences. 
The second question of causal order can be described thus: if the causal order 
can be regarded as a standard that makes connection between events, there might not be 
any room for our intention when we describe human actions. In this case, the causal 
order may seem to lead to a systematic conjunction by which events are mechanically 
located, so it fails to include any aim, prospect, or emotion in human actions. In this 
case, the problem lies in the use of 'causality' between philosophical arguments and 
narrative theory. I propose that the intention of actions shall not necessarily conflict with 
the causal order of the narrative form. This notion may appear to be against a common 
view of causality that is usually opposed to teleology (which briefly means that agents 
have a goal-directed intention in their actions). However, as I mentioned in the first 
question, the causal order in this thesis is to give an intelligible account to actions in 
accordance with the context of one's own life. 148 If we stand at this viewpoint, I would 
suggest that the causal order and teleological view are not necessarily against each other. 
146 For example, Roy Jay Nelson defines causality in narrative as'areaderlyhypothesis 
about a relationship of derivativeness between two Observedphenomena. 1 Nelson (1990, 
P. xxv). 
147 Kant (1963). 
148 This sort of causality can be found in some research of narrative theory. For the 
arguments of causality in narrative theory, for instance, see Chatman (1978, pp. 45-48). 
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Since it is the matter of the judgement of experiences, it is not an absolute theory by 
which everything is ordered in the same manner, but there is scope for including 
intention. This view is partly influenced by the work of George Henrik von Wright. In 
his discussion, he defines 'quasi-causal explanation. 'I'his definition will be used to 
heipclarify the use of causal order in this section. 
According to von Wright, the quasi-causal explanation is used to show the 
reason'why an event occurs: 'T'hey [the quasi-causal explanations] help us to understand 
what something is (e. g. pain, and not horror) or for which reason (e. g. oppression) it 
happens. ' The explanations that belong to this type are oflen depicted as to 'why 
something happened necessarily. ' 149 He defines this notion as the investigation of the 
method by which human intention is inserted into the explanations of actions, especially 
in history and social sciences. For example, a description 'There was an uprising among 
the people, because the government was corrupt and oppressive' can be regarded as 
causal, because it refers to the past event (the governments' tyranny) in order to show 
the reason of the later event (the uprising). However, von Wright suggests that this 
could also be regarded as a kind of teleological explanation, since that situation can also 
be explained 'The aim of the uprising was obviously to get rid of an evil from which the 
people had been suffering. "50 In this version, the event of the uprising is interpreted as 
an emancipation of the people from the atrocious situation, and it could be said that the 
quasi-causal explanation is modelled in order to unify this type of causal (or von Wright 
also depicts it as 'nomic') explanation and the teleological explanation. 151 
149 The quasi-causal explanation is compared to another type of that which is described 
as to'how something is or became possible' (Von Wright, 197 1, pp. 84-85). For more 
discussion of this notion, see (Ibid., especially chapter III). 
150 Ibid., P. 85. 
15, One of the characteristics of the quasi-causal explanation by von Wright is that the 
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I suppose that the quasi-causal explanation by von Wright can be compared in 
relation to the causal order in the narrative theory that has been mentioned above. That 
causal- order is the organisation of events through which a plot is made, and in this 
notion it does not necessarily eliminate the intention of an agent from its order. Ricoeur 
discusses this sort of causal explanation in his thought of history and narrative in 
reference to von Wright: Ricoeur indicates that if we think about the unity of the nomic 
and teleological explanation, it will lead us to ask 'Whether a guideline from tile order 
of understanding is not lacking for holding together the nomic and the teleological 
segments of a quasi-causal explanation. ' Ricoeur's answer to this question is that 'this 
guideline is plot, insofar as it is a synthesis of the heterogeneous. ' He describes a plot as 
to make an intelligible view between events, which holds intention, motivation, or aim 
of an agent. 152 I thus consider that if we accept this kind of view of causal explanation, 
the causal order in this section will not necessarily be opposed to the teleological aspect, 
but it can include the intention of an action in its use. Based on that idea, the term 
ficausal order' is employed in this thesis. If this account is acceptable, we shall next see 
its work through which the order of events is given in relation to one's life. 
The Thought of the Causal Or(ler 
As an instance that shows the importance to give an intelligible explanation between 
events, I first mention MacIntyre's idea. He presents the example of an unknown young 
man who turns to us at a bus stop and says, 'The name of the common wild duck is 
validity of a nomic connection is not the problem. In the example of the uprising, the 
question whether or not the intention of the uprising is right is not the matter, but how 
that event can be described is taken into question. 
152 Ricoeur (1984, p. 142). 
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Histerionicus histerionicus histerionicus. ' This scntence is not itscif incoffcct, but the 
problem is the difficulty faced in guessing what lie wants to mean by the utterance and 
how we can answer it. MacIntyre gives possible explanations of this sentence, and 
claims that the discovery of a proper cause makes the sentence reasonable. For example, 
the man might mistake us for the person who asked if lie knew the Latin name of the 
common wild duck yesterday; A psychotherapist encouraged him to talk to unknown 
people, whatever the topic, in order to overthrow his shyness. In each case, we can give 
an acceptable reason to his utterance. This is the work of putting a sentence into its 
proper location in an intelligible story. `17hus, whatever the cause of the young man's 
utterance, the act of utterance is comprehensible if we can locate it in an intelligible 
context, namely in a narrative understanding. 153 Human actions are thought to be 
reasonable if they are provided with a proper account, and I suppose that the causal 
order is a method of making this account as well as the temporal order. 
The work of interpreting an experience in the context of one's conditions is often 
observed in the process of psychoanalysis. Ricoeur understands the work of 
psychoanalytic treatment as replacing fragmented episodes with a consistent and 
intelligible narrative: 'the very goal of the whole process of the cure ... is to substitute 
for the bits and pieces of stories that are unintelligible as well as unbearable a coherent 
and acceptable story, in which the analysand can recognise his or her self-constancy. ' 154 
If inconsistent episodes are placed in the context of cause and effect, they become 
explainable pieces of a life story. This has been a method in psychoanalysis from its 
earliest time, so what Freud does for his patients is to analyse and extract symbolic 
153 MacIntyre (1984, p. 210). 
154 Ricoeur (1988a, p. 247). 
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meanings from their fragmented statements in order to reorganise these into an 
accountable story. Under his interpretation, Dora's hysteria is retold as the censure of 
her father, and Rat man's obsession is explained as his mental conflict with his father. 155 
The case histories show the way in which Freud attempts to give a narrative consistency 
to subjects' statements. 156 
This causal order of memory is applied to the more general recollection of 
memory. The process of remembering our own past is, for example, examined by Brian 
J. Reiser, John B. Black, and Peter Kalamarides. 157 In their research, subjects are asked 
several questions which relate to their own experiences, and the type of strategies of 
recollection they use are analysed. The retrieval of an event is considered as a process of 
re-understanding it, in which the event is first recalled based on its general context, and 
then specified in terms of more particular features. In an interview, a student is asked to 
think of a time when he went to a public library and of what came to mind. The subject 
remembered one public library which was a mile away from his house, but did not 
recall any particular event. Then, he tried to remember when he had been studying, 
because it must have been in such a situation that he needed some books. He finally 
specified an event when he went to borrow a book on running but did not have his card, 
so could not take the book out. 
This interview is analysed such that the subject narrows his thought down from 
the general knowledge of 'a library' to a specific library, and then focuses on his reason 
155 Freud (1949). 
156- Some believe that narrative in psychoanalytic treatment does not only simply work 
to relocate experiences in terms of making a reasonable story, but that we need to 
ponder the form of narrative deeply. There is not enough space to discuss this topic, but 
for further discussion, see Slavoj ZizeYs analysis of Lacan (1997, '3: The narrative 
occlusion of antagonism, 'pp. 10- 13). 
157 Reiser, Black, and Kalamarides (1986, pp. 100-121). 
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for going there in order to recall a particular experience. I'llis is a strategy of recalling 
memory relevant to the causal relation, and this 'entails asking the question, "Why 
would I have perfonned that activity? " ' An intelligible experience is also an experience 
accountable by the person who remembers it, and enquiring afler the reason for the 
exPerience brings us to an answer concerned with its causal relatedness. Besides, in 
order to make a causal relation between events, the matter of perspective becomes 
essential too. Goldie puts emphasis upon the necessity of considering the position of the 
narrator in organising a life-story, and claims 'A narrative can report or otherwise 
indicate the perspective or point of view ... of one or more of the characters 
internal to 
the narrative, of whom one might be the internal narrator". ' 58 His 'internal narrator' can 
be applied to what I regard as 'the person who organises his or her own narrative by 
oneself'. 'Thus, as Danto's indication suggests, a particular point of view is unavoidable 
when composing the causal order of our experiences. 159 
It is true that not all questions of memory, 'why it was done in that way, ' always 
have certain answers. There are experiences of which no account is given due to 
forgetfulness of the details, lack of enough knowledge to judge it, or ignorance of the 
events. Nonetheless, I consider that we can say that we grasp our past if the largest part 
of memory is consistent, so the causal order and/or the temporal order are essential in 
terms of the reconstruction of memory as long as the greatest part of experiences can be 
explained in the context of long term intentions. It is the work of making a context, and 
we have thought of the way to gather experiences comprehensibly. If we cannot find out 
the meaning of an action, we may ask what the purpose of the action is or why it was 
158 Goldie (2003, p. 203). 
159 It indicates that we sometimes narrate our stories from a quasi-third person 
viewpoint. Nicola Mng's analysis of a self-narrative that is told by a survivor of 
Auschwitz is also effective for the consideration of the narrator's standpoint (2000). 
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done in that way, and the answer starting from 'because' roughly belongs to the causal 
explanation of that action. 
This view might cause questions that whether or not a person is actually reduced 
to a narrative, and who is the narrator of that narrative. For those questions, I indicate 
again that our issue is not to investigate the criteria of a person, but is to depict the 
manner by which the experiences of a person are given to an intelligible account that is 
arranged from a certain perspective. It is the issue of the manner, so I do not claim that 
human beings are actually and truly narratives. What I however insist on is that the 
narrative understanding makes intelligible connection between experiences, and our 
perspective of life is structured based on that connection. We live and tell our own 
narrative. 
Moreover, as I already pointed out before, our memory is reconstructed in 
accordance with the present perspective of life, so the narrative as a life-story is not 
already defined but always transformable. It means that the relation between the 
understanding of that narrative and the person who organises the narrative is interactive. 
The perspective can modify the description of the experiences, and the perspective can 
be influenced by the accumulation of experiences. In this respect, the narrator of a life- 
story is thought to be that person, and even though the narrator does not know the 
conclusion of that narrative, it does not prevent that person from being a narrator. To put 
it differently, that narration never finishes at least whilst that person is alive, but still a 
narrator can make a narrative from the perspective at that time. The narrator is involved 
in the narrative, but it does not become a real problem in order to tell a life-story from 
the first person's perspective. The act of narration fornis the comprehension of 
experiences and the sense of personhood of that person is shaped through narrating what 
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happened in the life. 160 Hence, I see that the framework of personal identity resides in 
the performance by which experiences become intelligible by narrating them. 
In conclusion, the reconstruction of memory is organised according to tile 
narrative fonn which is constructed by two standards, the temporal order and the causal 
order. The meaning of our experiences is determined by reference to the context of life, 
and I have worked to elucidate the necessity of this account of actions. The framework 
of personal identity resides in this performance by which experiences become 
intelligible through narrating thern. This is the notion of order in the narrative account in 
this thesis, but there is still anxiety that the term 'causal order' may sound too strong to 
represent the above mentioned idea. The matter of whether or not the causal order and 
teleological explanation can coexist in the account of the narrative approach possibly 
needs more study. It is a considerable point to examine but requires more research, so I 
would like to leave it as my further study. 
Then, although I have demonstrated the adequacy of the narrative account as the 
manner to form the concept of personal identity, I hesitate to push forward the idea that 
only explainable experiences deserve to constitute life. Is there any experience which 
does not fit in the narrative fonn but still has influence on one's life? This is a question 
of the minimum of the narrative approach in analysing the concept of personal identity. 
I do not deny the need for the narrative approach in terms of understanding tile past, but 
still feet it necessary to ask if this approach is applicable to every case. This will be the 
consideration of elements which may not be described in the existing narrative form but 
are still concerned with making the concept of personal identity. 
1GO This sense of personhood is, for instance, described thus: The question of personal 
identity as the continuity of characters 'seeks to define a relation that holds between a 
person and particular actions, experiences, or characteristics that are hers' 
(Schechtman, 1996, p. 77). 
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2.6 Replacing the Ambition of the Narrative Approach 
with a Qualified Narrative Approach 
We have considered the work of the narrative understanding in the reconstruction of 
memory, and the concept of personal identity is thought to acquire consistency through 
that work. However, in the latter half of this chapter, I will consider the extent to which 
this understanding is applied to the organisation of experiences. We have examined 
Maclntyre's arguments in the former sections, which emphasise the inevitability of 
narrative for the unity of life, so I shall also begin the discussion of its extent with a 
question of his making. 
A main purpose of MacIntyre's writing is supposed to seek the life of virtue, and 
the practice of virtue in his argument must not be divided into segments in terms of 
one9s roles but consists in 'the unity of a narrative embodied in a single life'. 161 Life is 
thus envisaged, or should be envisaged, as an individual narrative which is lived 
towards the quest for virtue. This is an ideal which is acquired with effort, that means it 
is not always naturally constructed. Moreover, this is the reason why Maclntyre 
discusses contemporary life as to which the importance of the unity of life is neglected. 
However, I want to reconsider the need for life to be consistent. 
It is certain that we often connect short episodes in order to make a longer story of 
161 MacIntyre (1984, p. 218). 
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them, but I first claim that the extent of the story does not always need to spread from 
birth to death. In this view I do not suggest that the narrative understanding does not 
work at all. This was already rejected as an improper approach to the reconstruction of 
memory with the help of Samuel Johnson's example. The occasion that we will discuss 
is that in which the narrative form of life is kept to some extent, but that may not be 
extended through the life, and in which there are difficulties in putting some experiences 
into that form. The following discussion is in two parts, the first is about expcriences 
which have sought their proper explanations but have not yet obtained them, and the 
second is about the method by which we grasp the inconsistent experiences mentioned 
in the first part. Therefore, it deals with some of the defects of the narrative form, 
though I would say again that it is not the insistence of a total collapse of the naffative 
account, but it points out its insufficiency in order to depict the interrelation between 
one's episodes and the life. 
We shall start with the study by Craig R. Barclay in which the characteristics of 
experiences which cannot be settled by the existing narrative form are investigated. 
Barclay focuses on the difficulties faced in making a coherent narrative of specific 
events in his research. He allows that it is natural for people to establish a consistent 
narrative structure of their memory, and it makes their lives steady and comprehensible. 
However, he also claims that there are cases in which the narrative accounts do not 
work well to make an 'idealised ecological model of autobiographical remembering' 
that he defines as a structure organised by the purpose, process, and products of 
remembering. 162 He specifically analyses those who have experienced traumatic events, 
because they often lack a consistent view of the events through which the significance 
162Barclay (1995, p. 97). 
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of a particular event is explained. 
The main reason why their narrative accounts are apparently incoherent is thought to 
lie in the problem of presenting their sentiment towards the traumatic episodes in the 
existing form of expression. Through the analysis of interviews of survivors of the 
Holocaust, Barclay states his opinion of why traumatic experiences slip througli the 
organised naffative fonn: 
[T]hey [the survivors of the Holocaust] have the embodied experiences of atrocities that 
cannot be conveyed to others in a descriptive language. 'nis claim may generalize other 
victims of trauma, who lack a coherent autobiographical narrative of the traumatic experiences. 
They ... cannot explain why they were traumatized and frequently lack the language to 
describe what happened to them -a language of victimization. 163 
The statement of traumatic experiences is not dissolved in the common framework of 
narrative, because, it does not prepare a language by which these experiences are 
described. He argues that this is the reason why such people struggle to find the words 
to express past events. A film, Gothica, may help to understand this situation. At the 
beginning, a woman, who is a patient in a hospital for criminally insane women, tells a 
psychiatrist 'that she 
has been raped by a devil. The psychiatrist wonders why she 
repeatedly mentions this, and thinks she may just be reiterating the story of her 
stepfather who she killed. However, finally it is discovered that she was actually raped 
by a prison officer in that hospital. The patient cannot talk about that fact using words 
that people usually use, but can only approach it in her own manner-' 64 In my 
interpretation, I would say that this is a case in which an accomplished expression is not 
IG3 Ibid., p. 12 1. 
IG4 Gothica, 2003. 
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effective, and in which people struggle to find a representation of their mind. 
These cases indicate a criticism of the existing narrative approach to the analysis 
of autobiographical remembering as well, since there are experiences which are 
embodied but cannot be told intelligibly. I understand that this is not a total denial of the 
narrative understanding of personal memory but a suggestion of the minimums of this 
approach. Barclay imagines that victims who share similar kinds of traumatic 
experiences might be able to create their own idioms and narratives which are 
comprehensible only in their group. 
Although Barclay tries to prove the shortcomings of the narrative approach in his 
article, he concludes that even though narrative accounts of experiences are limited, 
they still provide 'a useful but incomplete methodology for explaining the creation, use, 
and meaning of autobiographical memories in the construction of self'. 165 One's life 
will be meaningful, he says, if experiences are put in the comprehensible structure of 
personal history. The narrative approach does not cover all experiences, but there is a 
possibility of creating a new narrative style by which unexpressed sentiment may be 
realised. 
Barclay's discussion hints at the consideration of the minimums of the narrative 
approach, and I will focus on the idea that there is something which cannot be 
represented in the existing narrative form. His subjects are restricted to traumatic 
experiences, but we shall extend the range of the discussion. We have previously 
concentrated only on the point that not all of our experiences are expressed in the 
unified structure of narrative, but I would say that this thought is applicable to more 
ordinary situations. For example, as a prominent thought that pursues a new discourse 
165 Ibid., p. 123. 
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that did not exist before, I want to count some feminist theories which disclose the 
minimum of the authorised narrative approach. 
I centre our topic here upon the opinion that there is an insufficient social system 
in order to recount female subjectivity. This criticism is often directed towards the 
authority of the existing manner of narrative, so it can be interpreted as revealing a blind 
spot of the narrative consistency. Luce Irigaray's discussion of Freud indicates this 
deficiency: 'it would be interesting to know what might become of psychoanalytic 
notions in a culture that did not repress the feminine. Since the recognition of a 
'specific' female sexuality would challenge the monopoly on value held by the 
masculine sex alone. ' 166 This is a censure of the masculine tradition based on which 
academic study has mostly developed. In order to depict oneself as an active subject, 
she asserts that we shall need a different strategy from that traditional style of study, 
otherwise there is a danger of falling into the standard categories into which females 
have been placed. In relation to our discussion, her statement is read as the suggestion to 
generate a new basis of discourse that might be more comfortable for some people, who 
have not been suited to the existing discourse. 
This type of discussion can be found in arguments that aim to gain a more 
appropriate mode of discourse in which women can present themselves as the subject of 
narratives. Thus, what Judith Butler insists on in Gender Trouble is the reconsideration 
of political discourse through the analysis of the relation between gender, politics, and 
IGG Irigaray (1985, p. 73). 
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identity. 167 The title of G C. Spivak's writing, Can the Subaltern Speak?, manifests her 
attention to the view of intellectuals on subaltern woman, who are located in a 
dependent position. Spivak assesses the intellectuals' responsibility for approaching the 
subaltern woman and the difficulty and danger in studying the silent minority's location. 
It is anguishing to devise an eminently sensitive narrative on the subject. 
The acquisition of one's own discourse is counted as a condition of participating 
in society not as subordinate but as independent beings. Although the variety of 
feminists' theories are not standardised to one idea, it can be said that the search for a 
discourse by which untold narratives are disclosed is one topic in a number of 
debates. 168 There might be a question: As long as the concept of personal identity can 
be compared to the narrative form, people are, anyhow, narrativised during their lives. 
Even in the cases which are above mentioned, the subjects are thought to be able to 
acquire the narrative form in this notion, because they may, anyhow, hold the view of 
their past. My view to this opinion is that if people do not totally lose their sense of 
unification, they are indeed narrativised in some sense. However, putting their 
experiences into the existing narrative form bewilders them, since the meaning of 
experiences is seen not to be expressed sufficiently in that way. In such cases, people 
may feel estrangement to that existing narrative form, and I will concentrate upon 
depicting that situation. People who do not find comfortable places in their culture, 
167 Butler founds her writing on these questions, which can be interpreted as the quest 
for a new meaning ofgender': we ought to ask, what political possibilities are the 
consequence of a radical critique of the categories of identity? What new shape of 
politics emerges when identity as a common ground no longer constrains the discourse 
of feminist politics? And to what extent does the effort to locate a common identity as 
the foundation for a feminist politics preclude a radical inquiry into the political 
construction and regulation of identity itself.? '(1990, p. ix. ) 
168For the variety of such examples, see E. Marks and I. de Courtivron (1981), H616ne 
Cixous (1981). 
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society, and history are subjects who tend to fall out of the structure of existing 
narratives. People might keep silence in this isolated situation, or fight against the 
system which excludes their discourses. Whatever they choose, it is certain that their 
states imply that their narratives are not told enough in the accomplished structures, so I 
insist that the narrative form becomes an important issue in that situation. 
I have referred to two distant cases, traumatic experiences and feminist theories. 
This does not mean that I want to bridge the gap between them, but I cited them 
together due to the commonality that their narrative eludes the common structure of 
representation. There must be a number of cases that show the struggle of obtaining a 
mode of expression that may depict one's situation better than existing modes. 
interpret these struggles as signs of movements that endeavour to survive by making 
discourses more suitable for them. Trauma and some feminist theories can be 
remarkable instances that indicate what these struggles want to acquire. 
In another case, some memory such as a vague feeling or an impression of music 
is also difficult to concretely describe in the narrative form, but I do not reckon them as 
of a kind with the above struggles. The reason is that they do not become obstructions to 
forming a consistent narrative, so they do not need to cast about for their proper places 
in society. On the contrary, the cases that we have seen are those that cannot be located 
in the existing discourses in tradition, so they have to conflict with the stability of 
narrative if they want to be represented more adequately. For this reason, something that 
is not described since it is merely not suitable for some types of expressions is omitted 
from the above discussion. 
Moreover, although we have examined cases that desire to establish their unique 
expressions, there might be another possibility: that the notion which indicates the 
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minimum of the narrative approach does not even need to take the narrative form. Even 
though, some experiences do not become pieces of a whole picture of life, there might be 
a way in which they survive as a fragmentation, not a fragmentation of the whole but a 
10- fragmentation as it is. If we push ahead with this thought, we see the dissolution of the 
unity of narrative in organising memory. This dissolution is pondered by Lyotard who 
contemplates the system which resolves unsettled elements in the community, and he 
examines the method by which these elements survive their exclusion from the system. 
2.7. Residue: the Excess Part of Society 
The issue of narrative takes a central position in Lyotard's discussions. He develops a 
number of particular views concerned with narrative, and in those various points, we 
here converge upon his notion of 'residue'. First, Lyotard regards narrative in tradition 
as the function that produces collective memory and identity in society. That narrative is 
particularly located in primitive societies in which a tight interaction between members 
and their community is found owing to their exclusive attitude to that which is exterior 
to them. It is supposed that the society in which there is less exchange of information 
with external culture is apt to be cliquish, but is also one in which the closeness between 
members of the community grows intense. 
People in such a society are assumed to learn rules and manners of their 
community through telling and listening to traditional narratiVes. Lyotard writes 
metaphorically that the traditional narratives are 'like a plateful of anecdotes 
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[historiettes], ' which are absorbed by everyday conversation as folktales, precept, 
proverbs, implications, and so on. The anecdotes as general knowledge arc too natural 
to be specifically focused on in daily life, and people cultivate their manners in the 
society through the absorption of them day by day. Iliese narratives are digested by the 
members of the society and become their body and soul. In contrast, a residue is defined 
as the leftover of the orderly narratives which are 'not consumable as anecdote and 
which has no place in the universe of narrative phrases'. 169 The residue is something 
which runs off the range of the traditional narrative form, so is not assimilated into the 
basis of the society. 
The concrete subjects of the residue are different depending on culture, but their 
characteristic lies in the point that they cannot be absorbed into the standard of the 
society. On this point, it can be assumed that many societies are supposed to possess a 
system to deal with the residue. Using the example of primitive societies, Lyotard 
depicts the system of 'sacrifice' as a method of the disposal of uncontrollable elements. 
That which threatens the stability of the society must be released or deported, and a way 
by which this is done is to sublimate them by ritualistic activity (so, this sacrifice does 
not necessary mean to actually kill something). The things which are 'transformed into 
an airy element: smoke ftom sacrificial fires, the volatility of shaman spirits' are thought 
of as the residues, and their obstructive aspect to the society is removed in the process 
of the sacrifice. 
170 
The surplus, excess, or extraneous element which does not become part of history 
in the society is cautiously put into the sacrifice and sublimated in safety. In addition, 
169 Lyotard (1988, p. 154). 
170 Ibid., 
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although the sacrifice represents the dissolution of the residue in Lyotard's writing, 
other ceremonial events can be included as examples of this method. 171 Festivals, 
religious ceremonies, and folk customs which separate sacred events from the common 
can be counted as systems which work to release the residue of the society. 
Contradictions, discontents, and questions of the existing society are gathered up in 
ordinary life, and some rituals are arranged for the sake of the deliverance and 
forgetfulness of them. Human communities must empirically realise the necessity of the 
system through which the excess is dispersed, or it may be accumulated enough to 
collapse the society. 
This is the method by which the residue is dissolved, but Lyotard also considers 
the case in which the residue is not sublimated but seeks a way to survive without losing 
its particularity. 172 This is represented by the tenn 'phrase'. A phrase in his thought is 
characterised as a minimum style of expression, so it does not necessarily take the form 
of writing. A distinction of the phrase is that it does not always need to be put in the 
context of a whole life story from its beginning to end, but its meaning can be 
condensed into a link to another phrase. It is not enough to be considered a narrative, 
but it does not mean that the linkage of phrases is meaningless. The reason why Lyotard 
adapts the notion of a phrase is seen in his discussion of narrative in his relatively later 
texts. 
Lyotard understands the operation of narrative as making harmony of phrases, so 
171 When Lyotard asserts that 'To call this residue the "accursed part" [part ma Uditel is 
useless pathos, 'it is indisputable that he keeps in his mind Georges Bataille's 
discussion of the expenditure of excess energy. Bataille copes with the issue of the 
humanity based on Marcel Mause's gift-theory, and Bataille regards the expenditure of 
the gift as the accursed share in which various situations of the consumption of the 
wealth are included (1991). 
172 Thrase'is one of the main themes of The D*Terend(Lyotard, 1988), and the 
discussion of phrases in this thesis is largely owed to that text. 
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it works to settle differences of phrases into a harmonious story. To make a story by 
phrases is understood as to draw a certain line between them, so it shakes off phrases 
that do not comply with that line. Hence, narrative removes the heterogeneousness of 
phrases that may disturb the consistency of narrative, but Lyotard focuses on tile aspect 
of the uniqueness of phrases. I suppose that this disturbance leads to two attitudes to tile 
narrative approach; one is the requirement of one's own discourses that has been 
examined in this section, and the other is a doubt of the necessity of the integrating 
narrative. The second attitude is also represented by the forin of a phrase and the linkage 
of phrases that do not require the unity of narrative but make a sequence or chain of 
phrases. 
The loss of unity of the self, identity, and reality seem to be argued at present more 
than before. The identity of a person has been a notable topic in philosophical 
discussions, and although its importance does not fade away, I assume that another type 
of argument has also arisen today. This is the discrediting of the idea that individuals are 
unified existences. Although there are a number of studies that seek for the cause of this 
discrediting, I want to approach this problem in terms of the expansion of information 
that has particularly begun with the development of the electric and/or electronic media. 
This issue will be considered in chapter four and chapter five as a distinct feature of the 
present age, which I call 'postmodem'. Thus, I defer the full discussion of the 
breakdown of the unity of narrative and the influence of the latest media on it to later 
opportunities, and present only an outlines here. This will help me to present the way in 
which I unfold this topic hereafter. 
It is my assumption that our concept of what a person should be is largely 
ill 
cultivatcd by circunistanccs that surround us. 1731f the circunistanccs thoroughly alicr, 
06 the concept of a person, and the concept of personal identity as well, will undergo 
changes to a greater or lesser dcgrcc. Ilic cause that gives rise to the changcs can be 
multifarious, and I suppose that the role of the mcdia can be counted as the one of thcm. 
Information is morc rapidly circulatcd than cvcr bcforc, and Nvc rcccivc a massivc 
amount of mcssagcs rcgardlcss of wlictlicr wc likc it or not, and from %vlicrc thcy conics. 
Today, infortnation attacks us from around the world through nunicrous mcdia. I rcgard 
those characteristics of the present media as an opportunity that triggers off wide- 
ranging transfonnations of what a pcrsonhood holds, and insist that the changc of a 
mcdium can posscss the powcr to altcr social systcm and tradition. 174 If this notion is 
adequate, today's media are also able to show tlicir particular cffects on society. 
In the latest media, I specifically pay attention to digital mcclia in which the 
meaning of human interaction sccnis to suffer sonic changes. of writing on the 
computcr nc6vork, the qucstion twho 'is the subjcct of the phrasc? ' bcconics Icss 
significant, but a variety of phrases interact with cach other without reference to their 
subjccts as the solid and unified beings to which phrases belong. 
175 COM111LUjiCation in 
the digital world tends to converge upon the link of phrases at a particular time rather 
than put the phrase in a longer context of discourse. Oficn, it is not easy to know exactly 
who really wrote which, and to which context the mcssagcs belonged before. Illis is a 
charactcristic of computcr mcdiatcd communication in whicli pcoplc do not always 
disclosc tlicmsclvcs as a wholc but makc rclationship with cach othcr as phrascs, so in 
173 For instance, Alfred Schutz depicts this aspect by demonstrating a case that a 
stranger enters different culture and society. In that society, people naturally know 
manners there and behave according to'thinking as usual, 'but it stranger must learn 
patterns of that culture intentionally (Schutz. 19G4, Chapter One). 
174 Innis (2003, P. 21). 
I' M 110febre (2000). 
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this sense electric technology seems to work 'to disperse the self in the world'. 176 
Writing in the digital network can be received irrespective of the totality of its subject, 
so the unity of a person is not necessarily completed, on this thought. 
The consistency of narrative is not the necessary condition in this 
6 177 This communication. tendency depicts an image of dispersal in various media, and as 
a typical discussion of this view, I evoke Jean Baudrillard's argument about reality in 
which individuals are reduced to mass-produced codes. 178 He insists that reality has 
vanished in a flood of simulation, which does not accord with subjects in the actual 
world but is a reflection of reflection like a picture in a hall of miffors. Social systems 
produce copies without origins for their continuance, because the ceaseless reproduction 
provides the ceaseless consumption through which the system is retained. Reality is 
swept over by this symbolic reproduction and becomes 'hyper reality' in which only the 
image of reality remains, and individuals also become coded information in that hyper 
reality. Persons are depicted as pieces of reproductions in the simulation, as mutually 
reacting with each other. We see ourselves in the reflection of the media in which life as 
the origin of simulation collapses but the multiplying codes react upon each other. 
Persons are imagined as indefinite movements of codes that do not aim to establish a 
comprehensible account of the self as a whole. 
The concept of personal identity faces its destruction in this simulation-society, 
since the context of narrative as the kernel of the person is dissolved. To ask the 
criterion of personal identity also loses its meaning since there is only a play between 
17G Poster (1990, p. 128). 
177 Although this does not mean that people do not ask for consistency according to the 
tradition in the actual world, I stress the aspect that the requirement to be consist 
becomes lessened in this communication. For more consideration, see chapter five. 
178 Baudrillard (1993). 
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copies that are not restored to their original place. Poster detcnnincs that Baudrillard 
depicts the end of the previous idea of society and history as 'a culture in which subjects 
orient their practice around a sense of collective direction, in which public events are 
interpreted in relation to a "rational" metanarrative. ' Instead, Baudrillard argues about 
the decline of the mcta position from which events converge, but asserts that there is the 
flow of encoding and decoding of reproductions in this immensely computerized society. 
A person as the only organizer of their own narrative is lost in layers of hyper reality, 
and a number of simulations without origin are diffused in the media. 
I read these features of Baudrillard's opinion as the signs that the media have the 
potential to change our way of viewing a person. The situation that Baudrillard 
illustrates shall not happen without the expansion of electric and/or electronic media. 
We are absorbed into an incessant production of images through which we contact with 
the world; for example, we buy, sell, desire, and communicate with images offered by 
the media These features of the media indicate the question of whether or not people 
have different notions of themselves under different media. 
I have considered the minimum of narrative understanding in the last two 
sections, and shall review some points here. At the beginning of this chapter, the 
narrative approach to the concept of personal identity was depicted as that, that gives 
coherence to experiences through life. Tlien, I asked the question if it is necessary to 
cover the whole life when memory is reconstructed. A model of a person as an agent 
that organises his or her actions through a life is reconsidered in that thought. '17his is 
reduced to a question that whether or not the concept of personal identity can be formed 
without relying on the unit of a narrative. It leads to a fragmentation of the narrative as a 
story through life but focused more on a linkage between experiences.. Rather, I insist 
114 
that the fragmentation particularly becomes popular from tile late twentieth century, and 
one of its causes is assumed to be the expansion of infomation. 179 Based on this 
assumption, we see if the manner by which information is carried can possess any 
influence on the concept of personal identity. By tile fragmentation of narrative, I do not 
assert that the narrative consistency is unnecessary, but insist that the reliance of the 
consistency may have been doubted recently. It is specifically observed in the present 
age, in which a notion of a person, which has been cultivated based on the unification of 
personhood, is reconsidered. The reason why that notion is called into question will be 
examined in the rest of the chapters from several angles including its historical changes, 
the relation to the media, and the particularities of the contemporary era, which is the 
so-called postmodem age. 
Hence, the fragmentation of narrative is certainly an important topic for ýus 
hereafter, but I should stress again that it does not mean total rejection of narrative 
account. In some studies, researchers direct their attention towards an idea that the 
narrative account of life does not survive any more. I nonetheless should confess that I 
am not radical enough to persist in the idea that that we are only pieces of information 
without any sense of unification at all. I in some degree sympathise with Robert 
Scholes's comment on the idea of anti-narratives, which disapprove of the necessity of 
the narrative, order for the unity of a person. Although lie evaluates this idea as a 
challenge to overthrow the narrative understanding of a person, he affirms 'they [the 
narrative processes] are too deeply rooted in human physical and mental processes to be 
179 For instance, the relation between circumstances and personal identity is 
considered by Schechtman as follows"the view of morality, agency, and self* 
interest ... come from exclusive attention to a traditional conception of the self. 'Thus, 
our judgments of the conditions of identity'would be different if we operated with a 
different conception of what constitutes the story of a person! s life'(1996, P. 103) 
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dispensed with by members of this species. We can and should be critical of narrative 
structuration, but I doubt if even the most devoted practitioner of anti-narrativity can do 
without it% 180 1 accept Scholes's opinion on the point that we may not be able to 
completely abandon the narrative form for understanding our past. As long as we keep a 
certain comprehension of our experiences, it is assumed that memory is reconstructed 
through our own perspective. 
However, even though we may not stop telling our experiences, it might not be 
necessary for this to take the fon-n of narrative. I suspect that a phrase does not need to 
be put in the longer context of a whole story, but that it can be treated as not-yet- 
represented expression that may bring about a new type of linkage. Ilius, although I 
agree that we do not completely abandon the sense of making some consistency of our 
experiences, I still insist that we can depict the status of a person more loosely and 
scatteringly than as a fixed unity. That is why I do not only focus on 'differences, ' but 
the work of making 'identity' is also crucial in this thesis. Based on this notion, I will 
pursue the study of the fragmentation of personal identity hereafter, whilst remaining 
more positive than Scholes. 
To sum up, we have seen the work of the narrative account and how it is used to make 
an intelligible explanation of that person's experiences over time. This is different from 
the criteria-arguments of personal identity, because it does not ask enough and sufficient 
conditions of identity but asks the manner of explanation by which characters of a 
person at different times are given a compreliensible view. Two standards were counted 
as the order of this narrative understanding; the temporal order and the causal order. 
180 Scholes (1981, p. 208). 
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Their operation is reduced to the work by which one's experiences arc put in 
understandable positions in the context of a whole life. The reconstruction of memory 
corresponds to one's own life in this manner, in which people are doers of actions as 
well as the naffators of life stories. 
However, we should not overlook the point that not all experiences can be 
explained by this understanding. Straying from narrative consistency is not a case of 
mere forgetfulness or insignificant discrepancy of memory, but is the case in which 
experiences have an effect on life but cannot be fitted into the existing narrative forin. 
This inconsistent memory is sorted into two types, one is the idea that has not yet 
acquired an adequate form and seeks a method of expression. Tlle other is that which 
does not require the narrative form for its representation but acts as a phrase which does 
not contribute to make the unity of narrative. I claim that the narrative understanding of 
our identity is effective and it makes a basis of the unity of a person. Nonetheless, it 
would be too ambitious to claim that the narrative is the only form by which we can 
explain the concept of personal identity. I have therefore insisted that both works, the 
narrative approach and the minimum of that, are necessary for the study of personal 
identity. Because of this reason, I will consider the extent to which the dissolution of the 
narrative can be appropriate from here onwards. 
We have seen the influence of the media as one of the teasons that the diffusion 
of identity has appeared at present. I proposed that if tradition in society dramatically 
changed, the understanding of a person may suffer this change, and the concept of 
personal identity, which is inseparably related to the understanding of a person, as well. 
In this change, the media play an important tole, because a new medium is thought to 
possess the potential to change the social system through altering tile circulation of 
117 
information. "' I believe that there are several points in media history at which a 
dramatic shift of the circulation of information occurred. I will divide tile media history 
according to those points, and examine tile temporal transforniation of the concept of 
identity in them. This will also be the search for the time from which the modern study 
of personal identity arose in philosophy. 
181 Marvin (1988, p. 4). 
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Chapter 3 
The MEDIA 
EXtenial Influences and the Concept ofPersonal Identity 
3.1. The Social Factors of ldcntity 
We have discussed the method by which the framework of personal identity is formed, 
and asked if the method can be unconditionally applied to all cases. Ilie answer was 
negative, and we saw the reason in the minimum of the narrative approach, and 
examined that in the context of the present media. I will discuss this point further in the 
question; if the media have an influence upon the concept of personal identity, what sort 
of relevant features we can find in different media? In this study, I ask whether or not 
there is a particular medium through which the concept of personal identity cornes into 
being in philosophical thought. This will lead to the consideration of media through 
time in relation to identity. For this matter, I specifically pay attention to the concept of 
6person' in identity, because I assume that it is necessary to be conscious of 
individuality separate from the involvement of society in terms of establishing the 
concept of personal identity. 
As a preparation for this discussion, I should clarify three points. First, although 
I will focus upon the work of the media in this chapter, I do not regard the media as the 
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only reason that introduces the transformation of the concept of a pcrson and personal 
identity. The media are, in my opinion, an influential factor that can lead changes to the 
organisation of society and the understanding of a person, but there are a variety of 
causes that bring about the changes. For instance, the Industrial Revolution made a great 
impact on European societies in their industrial technology and labour situations, and 
the increase of the number of capitalist countries determines tile trend of economic 
situations in the world. Not only the media, but also others such as politics, economics, 
or armaments are essential elements in terms of analysing the common view of a person 
at that time in that community. I am aware of the point that the transformation of society 
is not so simple that it can be reduced to just one cause, but it is also true that I cannot 
treat all such factors at once, or the point of the discussion will be vague. Therefore, I 
choose the media as one of the factors through which the transformation of the concept 
of personal identity can be examined. The reason that I concentrate on this factor will 
also be mentioned in 3.3. 
Second, we need to detennine the area of our research, because the historical 
development of the concept of personal identitY is not the same around the world! 82 
Our target must be, broadly speaking, Western culture. The issue of personal identity 
first precisely examined as the subject of study there, and the conception of a person as 
an independent and responsible existence has also been well developed in this region. 
Away from this background, an argument about personal identity in philosophy would 
miss the mark. Thus, although other regions' situations will be cited as the occasion 
182 It needs further research to compare the historical development of identity in 
various cultures, so I will not be involved in that discussion but only mention the text, 
Nippon Seishin Bunsg-i [The Psychoanalysis of Japan] by Kojin Karatani (2002). It is 
about the development of the nation in Japan in relation to the advent of the sense of 
individuality from around the twentieth century. 
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demands, I will mainly examine the historical change in that conccpt in Wcstcrn 
cultures. Third, we are fundamentally involved in the society in which we were born 
and have grown. We cannot escape from this restriction, and our way of thinking and 
manners are essentially influenced by these external factors. Society is the ground 
against which the media work, so to confirm the interaction between people and society 
will be helpful in depicting the role of media. 
In this chapter, we shall first confirm what kind of relation we can make between 
society and identity, and the media and identity. Since my intention here is to try to 
show the interaction between external factors and the concept of personal identity, their 
status in that notion should be considered before we discuss the characteristics of a 
particular medium. Then, we will move to historical changes of the media as a 
communication method, and examine this influence on the concept of identity at that 
time. I divide media history into four periods; the medium of oral culture, the medium 
of writing, the medium of printing, and electric and/or electronic media, and 
characterise the concept of identity in each medium. 
In addition, although each period possesses its particular role in cultivating that 
concept, the most considerable period for us is that of the early modem age in which the 
term 'personal identity' has started to be used widely, as I will later discuss. Therefore, 
the medium of writing and of printing will be focused on more than the others due to 
their direct participation in the study of personal identity. Through examining media 
history, we shall follow the process by which people become aware of the concept of 
personal identity, particularly in the Western tradition. This study thus asks the ground 
from which today's arguments of personal identity has arisen, and I will attempt to 
demonstrate that the ground is not applicable to all human history but is the product of a 
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specific period of time. To mention in advance, it is my interest to reveal the present 
tendencies of the concept of personal identity if there is any. This notion already 
includes a presupposition that our concept of identity may not always be the same, and 
to present this transformability is what I intend to do in this chapter. For the 
particularities of contemporary concept of identity, I will spare chapter five, in which 
the work of electronic media is considered in particular. 
3.2. The Interaction between Identity and Society 
Unlike most infants of other animals, human babies cannot survive by themselves but 
need to be fostered for years after birth. During that period they are initiated into the 
basic knowledge of a community including language, behaviour, ways of thinking, and 
morality. We live in a society that existed before our birth and will exist after our death, 
and we are not free from this restriction. This involvement in society is a crucial theme 
in Alfred Schutz's research in respect of the system of knowledge in everyday life. In 
his view, people accept the sociocultural conditions of their community as guidelines for 
their lives that have been handed down from their ancestors, parents, teachers, and 
authorities. Almost all knowledge that we acquire is produced by members of the 
community, so Schutz states, 'All interpretation of this world is based on a stock of 
previous experiences of it ... those experiences in the form of "knowledge at hand" 
function as a scheme of reference'. ' 13 The inherited knowledge is incorporated in the 
183 Schutz (1962, p. 7). 
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way of thinking in which we fertilise tile image of ourselves in the society. 
Individuals in Schutz's thought are thus subjects that are cultivated in their society, 
so they are not characterised. as distinct from their inherited knowledge. 71iis kind of 
notion of persons is further exemplified in George Herbert Mead's notion that human 
beings are to be regarded as cultural and temporal products that structure themselves 
through relationships to other people. The organisation of a person is, according to 
Mead, formed by the common rules of a community: Tlie organisation of self is made 
from the organisation of society in which our attitudes are formed in accordance with 
common sense there. Thus, 'A person is a personality because lie belongs to a 
community, because he takes over the institutions of that community into his own 
conduct. ' Although Mead agrees that each person has their own uniqueness, lie argues 
that if there is no relationship to other members, consciousness of self would not be 
established. Self-understanding is only made from participation in society that reflects 
the 'general behaviour pattern of this social group'. 184 Individuals in his theory are the 
outcome of social organisation, so no personality is had without social interactions. 
Schutz and Mead place emphasis on the involvement of a person in and the 
influence of the belonging society. Even if a person claims his or her independence from 
society, this 'independence' cannot be established separate from human communication. 
As long as a person uses a language and has an idea of other people, tile person is not 
completely irrelevant to the notion of society. To take an extraordinary case, if there 
were a person who had never communicated with other human beings, lie or she would 
not possess any concept of personal identity such as that which we develop. The 
'personal', and the 'collective' both arise from relations and discords between an 
184 Alead (1967, pp. 162-164). 
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individual and others, so human communication is the unconditional factor for forming 
consciousness as a person. 
We should be cautious about one point: Schutz and Mead do not claim that 
individuals are mere puppets of society that are worked without volition. Instead, they 
describe humans as sub ects who represent their will through their lives. I'lius, I j 
interpret both researchers as claiming that individuals possess flexibility according to 
which they can modify their understanding of a person dependent upon the context of 
the belonging community. This mutability might appear to be too general to emphasise, 
but I insist on the necessity of clarifying this point. When we examine the issue of 
personal identity, we in the tradition of Western philosophy probably presume a person 
to be a distinctive and independent existence, but this idea is not absolutely common 
throughout various cultures and histories. This difference between concepts of a person 
and of personal identity is that which we have discussed here, so I want to place 
emphasis on this understanding. 
A critical opinion of this view is that even if there are dissimilarities between 
individual lives in different circumstances, it does not mean they have different ways of 
identifying themselves. Therefore, it is not effectual to consider social changes in the 
study of personal identity. The life of a nun in the age of the French Revolution and the 
life of a pimp in the twenty-first century must be greatly different in terms of morality, 
judgement, evaluation, and principles of life. However, as long as they stand as 
independent individuals, the criteria by which they grasp the continuity of themselves 
would be the same. I do not agree with that opinion. It is true that as far as a kind of 
communication can occur between people (the understanding of a language, gestures, 
and so on), they in a strict sense may not be completely incomprehensible to each other. 
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However, I still insist that it is possible that flierc could be insuperable differences 
between people in greatly different circumstances as to what a person, personal, and 
identity are. Referring to the experiences of Tobias Schncebaum will licip to understand 
this point. For his research, Schneebaum lived for a while with a primitive tribe, the 
Akaramas, in Peru. During his stay, he became aware of the lack of a sense of 
independence in that community. He notes that even the death of a member of the 
community is seemingly insignificant for the Akaramas: 'It was only hours then after 
his burial, but the Akaramas went their way as if he'd never existed, never died, never 
had been so much a part of their every moment. "83 Schneebaurn knew the dead man, so 
he grieved at his absence, but the members of the community who spent their lives with 
the man appeared to behave as if his death had no significance, or as if he did not exist 
at all. Schneebaum feels that this may show some deficiency in their concept of a person 
as a unique being. 
Schneebaum's report is examined by Holstein and Gubriurn as an instance of a 
tribe which seems to have almost no sense of individuality. They mention that the 
Akaramas 'did nothing independently, working, playing, hunting, and eating' and even 
sleeping together, and that 'the Akaramas hardly acknowledged separate individuals; 
each member was fullyý--and only-a part of the collectivity'. 186 If people did not act 
independently but always stayed with their fellow community members, it would be 
incredibly difficult to establish the inner self apart from communal life. Schneebaurn 
left the tribe owing to a fear that the Akaramas' custom had encroached upon his 
Western subjectivity. The Akaramas might have a sense of individuality in their own 
185 Schneebaum (1970, p. 137). 
186 Holstein and Gubrium (2000, p. 11). 
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manner, but from Schneebaurn's writing, we cannot gather whether they possess such a 
sense, or what the meaning of individuality is for them. We do not havc cnough 
evidence to analyse what concepts they have with regards to one another, but it is at 
least certain that their treatment of members of tlicir community strikes Sclincebaurn as 
uncanny within his traditional idea of a person. I consider that the concept of personal 
identity must not work in this tribe in the same way as it is discussed in Western 
philosophy because of the insuperable distance between their culture and ours. ' 87 
When we examine the life of a group of people in a different time and/or region, 
we should presuppose that our common sense may not apply to them and that they have 
their own customs. It is difficult to appreciate the preconceptions about a person one has 
oneselE Clifford Geetz advocates this problem as the necessity of putting oneself in the 
framework of the research subjects as much as possible, because it is easy for scholars 
to judge different cultures on their own authorities. 
The Western conception of the person as a bounded, unique, more or less integrated 
motivational and cognitive universe, a dynamic center of awareness, emotion, judgement, and 
action organized into a distinctive whole and set contrastivcly both against other such NN'holcs 
and against a social and natural background is, however incorrigible it may seem to us, a 
rather peculiar idea within the context of the world's cultures. 188 
When we face a different society, we should be careful about misreading its particularity, 
since we may not be free from bias as to the conditions of a person. Although we will 
deal not with different areas in the same era but with roughly the same areas in different 
187 Shoemaker touches slightly on the problem that if a social situation is totally 
different, it would not be clear to us which attitude is regarded as adequate (1984, pp. 
131-132). 
188 Geertz (1976, p. 225). 
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eras, this admonition can work to realise features in peculiar socio-cultural conditions. 
Illis issue is considered in connection to the media, but the 'media' are a wide 
conception that can include various methods, so we next detennine which aspects we 
treat in our discussion. 
3.3. What is the Connection between Identity and the Media? 
Any method of transferring information is what I call the 'media, ' which arc 
indispensable techniques for human communication. That is the main reason why I 
regard the media as a suitable subject for depicting the transformation of the concept of 
identity. We learn, from belonging within a community, how to become a 'person' as we 
have seen in the fonner section, so the interaction between people is necessary to 
cultivate the sense of who we are in society. The media are adequate in examining this 
sense, because they are the way to expand information from person to person. I regard 
the sharing of information as the method of organising a common understanding of the 
community including its social rules, the sense of personhood, its cultural knowledge, 
and so on. The media in this account are, thus, deeply concerned with the view of a 
person in that society. In addition, if we want to see tile historical changes of some ideas, 
we would need to employ a way that is applicable through the time. I include all 
measures, which mediate information between people, in the category of the media, so a 
medium can be found in any period of human history. As I mentioned before, the media 
must not be treated as the only method that causes the change of social situations, but 
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they are useful to observe the relation between circumstances and the concept of 
identity at a particular period of time. For these reasons, I employ the media as the 
method by which we will ask what kind of presupposition the study of personal identity 
is involved in. 
Moreover, there are all sorts of media which work not in the same way. 'The 
medium is the message' is a slogan of Marshall McLuhan who claims that a medium is 
not only a vehicle of information but brings its own message. People do not receive the 
same influence from different media, but each medium possesses its particular impact 
and has the capability to affect a social system by means of the power to circulate 
information. 189 For instance, the introduction of the telephone made possible distant oral 
conversation, and electronic mail brings a change in the circulation of information from 
paper to data, so each introduced new styles of carrying messages. These media are 
thought to alter our sense of time and space through the use of such new styles for the 
circulation of information. As the invention of writing induces tile shift of the storage of 
knowledge from oral to manuscript, the change of major media can have an impact on 
the society and knowledge based on which the understanding of a person is established. 
Numerous media have appeared in Western societies from oral conversation to 
computer mediated communication, but not all of them are straightforwardly concerned 
with the problem of personal identity. We need to reduce the scope of the media in order 
to make it relevant to our concerns, so I first determine which media will be focused 
upon. I pay attention to points in media history at which the circulation of information is 
dcfinitcly changed and people have had to adapt themselves to the new methods, though 
not necessarily all at once but sometimes taking some time. 
189 McLuhan (1964). 
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I maintain that there are four such points by which media history is divided. Ille 
first medium is oral, which is the most primitive method of human communication. I'lle 
second is writing, by which human beings first acquire the method of keeping their 
memory outside of their bodies. 190 Since the writing system was established, a number 
of improvements have been added to this medium, but the invention of printing 
technology should be seen as an epoch-making change. I'lle number of printed 
publications is incomparably larger to that of manuscript, and tile number of themes of 
writing also increased owing to this new technology. Printing introduces the 
popularisation of reading, so the advent of printing is counted as the third point of 
media history. The final is electric and/or electronic media that introduce faster and 
wider circulation of information than ever before. Iliese four media are rated in this 
thesis as the most remarkable changes in media history in Western cultures. 
This division of the media is indebted to predecessors' works that stress the 
technological aspect of transmission of information. Andr6 Leroi-Gourhan analyses the 
system of memory-storage with reference to the development of technology. "' fie 
divides the system of stored information into five periods and discusses their 
characteristics in relation to information. 192 Tlie transformation of the media is also 
considered by Jacques Le-Goff, who focuses especially on the connection of memory to 
history. He emphasises the power of memory in ruling societies, and discusses change 
in the method of keeping memory in a community over time in relation to the alteration 
190 1 do not insist that memory is equal to knowledge, but the store of information is an 
essential factor to cultivate knowledge at that place at that time. As an instance that 
demonstrates the importance of record in a community, see Ascher and Ascher (2003). 
For the connection between memory, narrative, and knowledge, see Lyotard (1984). 
191 Leroi-Gourhan (1993, pp. 259-264). 
192 The five periods are oral transmission, written transmission with table or indices, 
simple file cards, mechanical writing, and electronic sequencing, respectively (Ibid., p. 
65). 
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of social structure. 193 Jack Goody analyses the trans format ion of the status of 
knowledge particularly in a comparison between oral culture and writing culture, 194 and 
Mark Poster argues about newer circumstances brought by digital mcdia today with 
reference to contemporary philosophers. 195 Ille emphasis of these researchers is not 
exactly the same, but a point which they have in common is that they direct their 
attention to the transformation of the media as changing methods of storing and 
transporting social and/or individual knowledge. 196 
I take their side, in that to depict changes of media is to analyse modes of 
contemporaries' attitudes toward the custody of information, and I set four points in 
media history. Due to my interests, I also add the idea that those changes can introduce 
transfortnation of the concept of personal identity. On the basis of these conditions, we 
shall observe characteristics of each medium in the rest of this chapter. 
3.4. The Medium of Oral Culture 
How did people in oral culture develop the concept of themselves in order to identify 
them through time? This is the question in this section. Oral transmission is one of the 
oldest methods of conveying messages from people to people. Within the range of oral 
193 'Memory is an essential element of what will henceforth be called individual or 
collective identity, the feverish and anxious quest for which is today one of the 
fundamental activities of individuals and societies. But collective memory is not only a 
conquest, it is also an instrument and an objective of power. ' (Le-Goff, 1992, p. 98. ) 
194Goody (1977). 
195 Poster (1900). 
196 For more references, see Jack Goody (1968,1987), Olson and Torrance (1991), Innis, (1951,2003). 
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culture, I include other methods that can be regarded as instant communication; gesture, 
face, tone of voice, and pre-verbal sound. Since people have to mcct to receive 
information through those methods, I do not treat thern scparately but deal with tlicm as 
parts of immediate communication represented by 'oral'. A prominent feature of this 
medium is that utterance and gestures cannot be sent to the distant future intact, so 
people need to be in the place in which they listen to the utterance. For instance, when a 
narrative is presented, people receive it as a member of an audience, so oral 
transmission is a kind of joint work through which members of an audience are 
associated with each other. This medium is thus apt to make people unified as a group, 
and people foster their sense of identity in this affinity to their community. I call this 
collective identity in wliich people confirm their existences by reference to the sense of 
belonging to their society. I will explain this type of identity more in the next section, 
but focus on depicting the characteristics of this culture in this section. 
It is true that oral communication has never been renounced throughout historyo 
and it is still a popular method for us today. However, I specify the period of this 
medium as the age in which people were not involved in any other medium of 
communication, or we will miss its particularity. This period is roughly defined as from 
around the beginning of the use of languages to before the advent of writing. 197 
On consideration of this culture, we need to be cautious not to regard oral culture 
in the same light as today's oral communication. As Walter Ong asserts, literate people 
today have great difficulty envisaging what people are like in oral culture that has 
197 According to the anthropologist, Taryo Obayashi, the use of language can be traced 
back to the Old Stone Age. He also indicates that the period in whichsocial stratum 
were founded overlaps with the period in which several genres of narratives were 
generated (1998). 
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neither writing nor even the possibility of writing. 198 Litcrate people are rcrnotc from 
the tradition without writing, so need to make an effort to understand life in that period. 
The greater part of those who live in post-industrial countries are entirely involved in 
the literate mind, and even in oral communication we are often conscious of written 
expression. We may envisage spelling in our mind when we hear some words, and there 
are numerous expressions which are related to writing. 199 In addition, in the modem age, 
instant speaking is merely one method of communication, but utterance was almost the 
only way to exchange information for the people of oral culture. Apart from the direct 
meeting, they could not communicate with each other, so the weight of orality is not the 
same for the people in oral culture and the people at present. 
This characteristic of orality bounds people within the distance in which 
immediate communication can be undertaken, so the scale of communities was not as 
large as after they expanded in writing culture. Consequently, their narrative is supposed 
to directly connect with members' lives more than narratives of the later cultures. 
Although traditional narratives more or less reflect the manners and tendencies of a 
society in any medium, in oral culture a degree of remoteness between narrative and 
people must be lesser than in others. This involvement in society is supposed to have a 
great influence upon forming the sense of identity in this culture. 
Identity in Oral Culture 
In oral culture, remembering is the main way to keep infonnation, and in that fonil 
198 Ong (1982, p. 31). Similar discussion is found in HaveloWs work as well (1978, p. 4). 
199'A literate person, asked to think of the word "nevertheless', ' will normally ... have 
some image, at least vague, of the spelled-out word and be quite unable ever to think of 
the word "nevertheless" for ... 60 seconds without adverting to any lettering 
but only to 
the sound'(Ong, 1982, p. 12). 
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social manners are leamt. Eric Havelock focuses on this method by which narratives arc 
mcmoriscd in prclitcratc societies, especially in ancient Greece. Tbrough rcmcnibering 
epics people learnt law, tradition, and skills, so the narrative format is a formulaic 
technique' of education, and it plays the part of an oral encyclopacdia in prelitcrate 
Greece. 2'0 The words of epics represent the interrelation and behaviour of the 
community, so people find themselves reflected in these inherited naffativcs. 201 People 
remember epics through their rhythmic patterns, meter, repetition, and somatic gestures 
which are a special technique to help to memorise a vast amount of information. 
Havelock presumes that in this tradition people had to put inconceivable energy into 
remembering narratives, and this concentration is partly an obstacle to the rise of new 
ways of thinking. 
I compare two different types of narrative in order to spot the close relationship 
between narrative as knowledge in the community and its members. The following is 
borrowed from Lyotard's distinction between a non-cosmopolitical, or savage, narrative 
and a cosmopolitical narrative. The non-cosmopolitical narrative 'proceeds by phrases 
like On that date, in that place, it happened that x, etc., ' so these factors only belong to 
the specific community in which the narrative is told. 202 In contrast, tile cosmopolitical 
narrative consists of the universal history in which although the names and events may 
be referred to, they must be equally accepted by all addressees irrespective of their local 
differences. It is an attempt to make 'world history' applicable for any communityý 03 In 
200 Havelock (1986). 
201'A nonliterate culture can in this way maintain a basic identity for itself simply by 
maintaining the stability of its vocabulary and syntax ... one learns automatic responses to given situations' (Havelock, 1978, p. 19). 
202 Lyotard (1988, p. 15). 
203 That history is read as a metaphor of the modern ideal that pushes forward the plan 
by which equality of all people is acquired. This is more examined in chapter four as 
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contrast, the non-cosmopolitical narrative only belongs to the particular community's 
history. 204 
I'lle non-cosmopolitical narrative in Lyotard's thought is not restricted to oral 
culture, but its gist can bear upon our discussion of the immediate narrative. Whilst 
human communication is confined to oral transmission, events and characters in 
traditional narratives only pertain to the closed and narrow society. Within this limit, 
members must have a strong sense of participation in their own community through 
which collective identity is cultivated? 05 Therefore, in oral culture, consciousness as an 
independent subject of action is weak, but more likely, a person is understood as various 
roles in society, for example, someone's son, father, husband, and lord. Ong analyses 
this in the comparison of characters in oral and written narratives. He uses E. M. 
Forster's ternis and calls people wlio are described in oral literature such as epics, 'flat 
characters, ' who undertake predictable actions in a story and never act unexpectedly. 
206 
The flat character is classified- into a number of fixed types that perforni in expected 
ways. A deviation from the plot is bad form in oral literature, and audiences do not 
appreciate unforeseen perfonnances. TIle opposite of tile flat character is the 'round 
character, ' who is unpredictable in action and enacts a complicated personality. 17he 
round character has developed with writing according to Ong. 
The medium of writing requires the solo activity of reading, and consequently, 
reading requires introspection and individual thinking of readers. Characters in this 
fashion arc anticipated to show the depth of humanity. Ong concludes that the 
the Idea of the grand narrative in Lyotard's discussion. 
204IVe will return to the inconsistency between cosmopolitan and non*cosmOPOlitan 
narratives in chapter four. 
205 The direct connection between narrative and the members of the community is also 
suggested by Le Goff (1992, p. 59). 
206 Forster (1974), Ong (1982, pp. 148-152). 
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popularisation of the round character through writing and printing represents 'to 
present-day consciousness what human existence is likc'that includes the awareness of 
the inner self. 207 If we today could compare ourselves with the round character, the flat 
character would correspond to those in the tradition of oral literature. I do not insist that 
people in preliterate societies always behave predictably and did not possess any 
complex personality. However, it can also be said that characters in their narratives are 
thought to have an influence on their self-understanding as models in that society. 
Abstractive or Situational 
The understanding of the self in oral culture is also analysed by Ong in terms of whether 
it is 'abstractive' or 'situational'. Abstractive in Ong's dieory is explained by the 
example of the term 'tree' that 'refers to a concept which is neither this tree nor that tree 
but can apply to any tree. ' The situational in oral cultures is minimally abstract in the 
sense that those cultures 'remain close to the living human lifeworld' . 
208 He accepts that 
all conceptual thinking includes the abstract in some degree, but the use of concepts 'are 
more abstract than other uses' in oral culture. Tlius, self-understanding in oral culture is 
more situational and operational than abstractive. He cites A. R. Luria's work on 
illiterate people and concludes that these people find it difficult to articulate self- 
analysis: 'Self-analysis requires a certain demolition of situational thinking. It calls for 
isolation of the self'. 209 Solitude is necessary to establish self-awareness in order to 
reconsider the self objectively. Solititude is produced in writing more than in oral 
naffative. 
207 Ong (1982, p. 152). 
208 Ibid., p. 49. 
200 Ibid., p. 54. 
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Havelock also discusses the point that in the progression from oral to litcrate, 
cognitive structure alters from situational and concrete cognition to more conceptual 
and fonnal cognition. 2 10 Therefore, people in oral culture seem hardlY to obtain the 
abstract view of their existences. This means that it is difficult for them to grasp their 
own continuity as a self-independent doer of their own actions, since the cognition of 
their existence leans toward their roles in their local society. That is the circumstance in 
which people are deeply involved in their society, and in which reference to the past is 
only in memory. It is rare to see oneself from the outside, compared with the present 
situation. In this condition, I assume that the concept of the 'personal' is difficult to 
develop. However, even if we determine that there are communities in which that 
concept is not realised, there should be a way in which people confinn their being. 
People must not always have been confused about their own continuity over time even 
though philosophical discussion of personal identity had not yet arisen. I propose that in 
that situation that which discloses the doer of the actions may tend to be depicted in 
accordance with social conditions rather than as an individual. I expediently call that 
sense 'collective identity' in comparison with personal identity. 
I lastly should warn that we must not be confused by the fact that even though we 
observe those who seem to live without the concept of individuality, it will not prevent 
us from applying that concept to those people from the perspective of today's 
understanding. It would be possible to describe the people in oral culture as if they 
possessed the concept of personal identity, if we analyse their behaviour by the 
contemporary yardstick. However, I argue that this does not mean that these people 
were aware of this concept, and in this regard, I maintain that they only realised 
210 Havelock (1963). 
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collective identity at that time. 
I shall cite the status of children as discussed by Philippe Aries in explaining this 
notion of self-awareness of identity, and those who are not awake to that concept. 
Although he treats a different issue from ours, his idea is worth comparing to this 
problem. He advocates that there was no concept of childhood until Europe entered the 
modem age. The image of children in the Middle Ages was of young adults and there 
was no clear distinction between children after the age of seven and mature people. He 
states that the concept of childhood did not naturally exist in European culture but that it 
was made in the early modem period. 211 
Then, even though people in the medieval period had no concept of 'children' in 
today's meaning, we would not think that there were no people between the age of 
seven and adulthood; a boy would not have had his eighth birthday and immediately 
have become eighteen-years-old. In its stead, we understand that people at that time 
lacked the concept of childhood. Our discussion of the lack of tile concept of personal 
identity is described in the same manner. We may discover that people in oral culture 
seem to act in a way grounded in the principle of personal identity, but I claim that they 
could not have realised that concept and could not establish the theory needed to explain 
it. In this respect, I argue that a life story in oral culture consists not of what I have done 
but of what role is given me in society and how I behave in that role. 
In order to support that view, I shall cite Havelock's comparison between verbs 
in oral expression and those in written documents. He regards the use of the verb 'to be' 
in writing as 'the function of denoting not on an act, or an event, but a relationship 
211'In the world of Romanesque formulas, right up to the end of the thirteenth century, 
there are not children characterized by a special expression but only men on a reduced 
scale'(Aries, 1962, p. 32). 
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which is both logical and static. ' In contrast, oral poetry depicts 'what justice does, what 
is done to it, but not what it is'. In this notion, an objective view of things is largely 
concerned with the literate mind. He exemplifies their differences as follows; 'llcsiod 
would be able to say, "Ten thousand spirits guard the justices and reckicss works of 
men"; Plato could say, "Justice is that principle which preserves the city as one and is 
the opposite of nonjustice". 9212 In the context of our discussion, this can be interpreted 
as suggesting that the narrative in oral culture describes a person in tcnns of what 
position he or she is put'in, and the narrative in the modem age onwards points out 
which actions can be gathered under the framework of a particular person. I'llis example 
shows the different concepts of a person in oral culture and other media. 
In short, people in oral. culture cultivate their identity through their communal status 
more than through the perspective of their independent lives. They are assumed not to 
have sufficient distance ftom their society to structure a sense of the inner self. Hence, I 
state that the concept of personal identity was not formed in this medium, but that 
people grasped the continuity of their existences in reference to their positions in their 
community. To be cautious, I do not claim that we must have either collective identity or 
personal identity. Even if we in the present age were aware of personal identity, it would 
not mean that we do not possess any sense of collective identity. However, tile point is 
that people in oral culture did not cultivate their consciousness sufficiently to realise 
their personal identity independently of their surroundings. 
212 Havelock (1978, pp. 233-248, p. 325). 
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3.5. The Medium of Handwriting 
Writing is the definitive invention in media history. Not all cultures use writing but only 
a handful of them adopted this medium, and the cultures that did so underwent various 
213 
changes by means of writing. One of the most remarkable changes brought about by 
writing is the sense of remoteness. Oral communication requires the presence of 
addresser and addressee when information is exchanged. Conversely, in the medium of 
writing, the absence of an author is presupposed when the written material is read. 
Sound is visualised in writing, and this is the first invention that allowed people to store 
complicated information not in their minds but in external materialS. 214 This is the 
beginning of a new style of communication which leads to a number of alterations in 
society including the method of storing memories, the expansion of rulers' authority, the 
introduction of introspection, and the development of the sense of self. Isolation from a 
narrow and indigenous community is a characteristic of the era of writing. 
The system of writing was not an invention which was established overnight, but 
it was constructed over a long time. Tens of thousands of years ago, before the advent of 
the writing system, people made a kind of inscription which possessed symbolic 
meaning. 21 5 Leroi-Gourhan calls iconic inscription 'mythogram' in his research of 
Lascaux cave painting. Mythogram is not letters in tile strict sense but more than 
213 In numerous spoken languages that have arisen in history, only around 10G are 
thought to have established a culture of writing deserving to be called literacy. Today, 
there are assumed to be three thousand different languages in use, but only about a 
hundred are committed to writing (Ong, 1982, p. 7; Jean, 1992, p. G9). 
214 Havelock (1978, p. 4), Ong (1982, pp. 77-78). 
215 Jean (1992, p. 12). 
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'rhythmic manifestations' to which 'no meaning can be attached' . 
216 -17he mythogram is 
however not sufficient to express the complex import of oral languages. Early 
systematic writing was formed in the fourth millennium B. C. in Mesopotamia. 
In Western cultures, writing advanced with plionograms such as the alphabet 
which was established in ancient Greece in the fifili century B. C., and latcr, written 
language was dominated by Latin. The culture of manuscript flourished until before tile 
middle of the fifteenth century in which Gutenberg's printing machine was invented. 
This is the period of handwriting in which written materials are produced by manuscript. 
At this step literacy did not pervade ordinary life but was monopolised by the ruling 
classes. Writing was not at the disposal of the populace at all, but this period gave birth 
to the literate mind which has been more or less continuously passed on to present 
writing cultures. I will specifically observe changes to the social system and the manner 
of thinking brought by writing and the beginning of awareness of the inner self in 
consequence of those changes. 
Mriting, the Expansion ofAuthority and the Decline of Mnemonics 
If immediacy of narrative in local communities encouraged members' collective identity, 
indirect communication is assumed to bring about some diffusion of the tight 
relationship between narrative and community. The scope of voice is more limited than 
the scope of writing; voice fades away in the air just afler utterance, and only the people 
who catch it can keep the contents in their individual memory. Writing leaves a message 
as it is written, and people can always access the same letters. The meaning taken from 
a message may not be the same for all readers, but words themselves do not change 
216 Leroi-Gourhan (1993, p. 188). 
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through time. This sameness of writing is adequate to convey information over time and 
distance, and this characteristic opens the way for indirect goveninicnt of wide areas. 217 
niis medium is more suitable for the establishment of the concept of personal 
identity than oral, because of its comparative distance from the source of information. 
However, there appears to still be shortages in what is needed to make this concept arisc, 
and one of the reasons mostly resides in the monopoly of writing. Tbis is examined in 
two points in this section: One is the expansion of ruler's authority that brings about the 
change of governing system in society, and the other is the shift of the storing method of 
information from mnemonics to writing. 
At the beginning of writing culture there were a very limited number of people 
who could read and/or write, and such intellectuals belonged to religious or high classes. 
The medium of writing was the privilege of a handful of people in SoCiety. 
218 Since 
writing was governed by such ruling classes, they also possessed the power to choose 
whether or not an event was recorded in writting. Besides, written events were oflen 
arranged at the rulers' convenience, so 'every document has in itself tile character of a 
monument and that there is no unmediated, raw collective memory. 219 Myth and legend, 
which often describe the origin and authority of the rulers, are politically corrected 
narratives. The authority of such narratives is strengthened through the medium of 
writing due to its ability to transmit information more widely and for longer than did 
217 For instance, Innis claims that in ancient Sumer, 'Adaptability to communication 
over long distances emphasized uniformity in writing and the development of an 
established and authorized cannon of signs. Extensive commercial activity required a 
large number of professional scribes or those who could read and write'(2003). 
218 Literacy gave authority to the people who were engaged in the work, so'scribes to a 
certain extent constituted a caste apart, sometimes, perhaps, becoming more powerful 
than the illiterate courtiers or even the sovereign himself .. Knowing how to write was 
already a source of considerable power'in Babylon and Assure in Assyria in the ancient 
time (Jean, 1992, p. 21). 
219 Leroi-Gourhan (1993, p. 260). 
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0 22 oral transmission. 0 The close relation between writing and the governing classes 
means that a change of writing system can have an impact on the organisation of 
society. 221 An instance of the change is indicated by Innis in the case of ancient Egypt; 
as the writing material changes from stone to papyrus, as tile written letters are 
simplified from hieroglyphic script to hieratic characters, political and rcligious 
institutions suffer great alterations in terms of civilisation, culture, and authori I ty. 
222 
Transformation of the writing system, which was closely connected with the ruling 
organisation, carries cultural alterations in customs, living styles, and ways of thinking. 
The expansion of governing power relies not only on this medium, but it is certain that 
ruling systems suffered not a small change through the advent of writing. 223 
In the case of ordinary people, although writing was not in their hands for the most 
part of its history, they were not totally unconcerned with the medium of writing. People 
at any rate know that there is a method of writing and some people use it for retaining 
information. Moreover, literacy was not widesPread immediately, but this shortage was 
partly made up for by a proxy such as the clergy, scribe, judge, and ruler. 224 The person 
who read aloud the writing was not usually the person who wrote it but a deputy, so a 
writer and a reader do not communicate directly but have a mediated relationship. 
People began to receive information not only through immediate communication but 
also in interceded ways, and this custom is assumed to foster more abstract thinking in 
220 Georges Jean mentions the government of ancient Mesopotamia and Egypt when 
referring to the rule of the written narratives (1992). 
221 One reason that writing is strongly connected to religion is that letters were often 
believed to possess mystic force, so this medium itself was thought to be concerned with 
some holy power. 
222 Innis (2003, p. 22). 
223 For more consideration of this topic, see Claude Uvi-S trauss' view of writing with 
the Nambikwara in Brasil and Jacques Derrida's criticism of Uvi-Strauss (L6vi* 
Strauss, 1973; Derrida, 1974). 
224 Clanchy (1981). 
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writing culture. 
Hence, writing helps to extend ruling power over the bounds of local community 
by means of its characteristic of remoteness. People are given the opportunity to 
reconsider the meaning of their community and themselves in this movement. 11iis 
distance from their locality becomes a moment that prepares people for the concept of 
personal identity in the era characterised by the next new medium. In this period, people 
in the ruling classes might have had the opportunity to cultivate their consciousness of 
themselves as individuals, but the number must be limited and not be influential enough 
to expand the consciousness in society. 
The introduction of writing furthermore brings a decrease in the labour of keeping 
information in memory. Narratives in the oral tradition are structured in a particular way 
that is easiest to remember in oral form, but after the advent of writing, especially of the 
phonetic alphabet in Greek, the style of narratives undergoes dramatic changes. The 
alphabet unties narratives from the restriction of acoustic remembering. The release of 
mental energies from the mnemonic leads to 'an immense expansion of knowledge 
available to the human mind. ' The Greek alphabet gives an opportunity to record any 
discourse in the same style, so in place of mnemonics and repetition, writing 'made 
possible the production of novel or unexpected statements'. 225 It is the start of new ways 
of examining both the internal and the external world abstractly and scientifically, so 
this medium 'introduced a new level of abstraction, analysis, and classification into 
226 Western thinking'. Objective thinking which is essential for the development of self 
awareness starts to be cultivated with the evolution of the medium of writing. 
225 Havelock (1982, pp. 87-88). 
226 Logan (2003, pp. 59-60). 
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The Beginning ofSelf in Ancient Greece 
One of the particularities of writing related to identity is to present a way of observing 
things from the objective standpoint. In ancient Greek philosophy, it is first applied to 
the investigation of the essence of nature and then to that of human beings. The matter 
of the self becomes an issue in the middle of the fifth century B. C. in which people start 
reflecting on themselves. People at this stage do not consider the issue of personal 
identity in terms of the sameness of a person at different times; consciousness of self 
relates instead to the long-term question 'what the self consists of' that leads to further, 
wider questions later, including the status of personal identity. Literacy was not the only 
condition by which the consciousness of self arose, and the settings of Greek society 
such as its politics, economy, and education are crucial to fostering thought, but it is also 
true that the medium of writing was greatly conducive to the growing of this 
consciousness. 
227 
In this history of the study of self, Plato's Socrates writing occupies an important 
place at its beginning. Self in Socratic discussion is mostly concerned with self- 
knowledge through learning, by means of which virtue is acquired, and the achievement 
of this ethical intelligence is that which he stresses to Athenians. T'his thought is 
condensed in the phrase 'care for the soul' based on which people form their own selves. 
Havelock regards the consciousness of self in ancient Greece as 'an invention of the 
Socratic vocabulary, ' it was originally the oral to which Socrate belonged and he was 
later written by Plato. 228 The terms 'a subject, or 'me' are formed in this vocabulary 
227 Thomas (2001). 
228 Havelock (1986, p. 114). 
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separate from natural environments and collective identity. 229 llierefore, in general the 
consciousness of self has been investigated from ancient Greek philosophy, particularly 
from Socrates. In addition, in relation to writing, it is interesting to consider that Plato 
keenly criticised writing as an untrustworthy method despite the fact that lie left a 
number of written materials. We will observe this point in Socratic-Platonic thought and 
seek features of the concept of a person in that age. 
A distrust of writing is mostly manifested in Plato's Phaedrus and Seventh Letter. 
In Phaedrus, Socrates reveals the confrontation between orality and writing. 230 Socrates 
emphasises the priority of spoken words over writing by mentioning the story of gods in 
ancient Egypt, and introduces his distrust of writing under the cover of these Egyptian 
gods: If people relied on writing, they would not remember things by themselves, which 
is equivalent to not considering things by themselves. 231 Socrates regards writing as a 
faithless medium for the acquisition of knowledge, but oral dialogue is a method of 
approaching the matter of truth. For him, writing possesses shortcomings in its nature 
that cannot be overlooked, enough not to be a valuable method of meditation. In 
contrast to writing, the method which is extolled is oral conversation, but lie does not 
include all sorts of speaking as trustworthy ways to access knowledge. Mcrc speeches 
which use rhetoric with complete control are not worth consideration, but only an 
intelligent word is worth learning. He believes that it is through dialogue that people 
may touch the truth, and writing will be left only for recreation and amusement. Written 
words are no more than the image of proper dialogue. This is Plato-Socrates' 
229 Havelock (1963, p. 201). 
230 All quotations from Plato without reference are taken fromPhaodrus (Plato, 1999b). 
231 Socrates interprets the invention of writing in the ancient Egyptian myth: It'will 
create forgetfulness in the learner's soul, because they will not use their memories; 
they will trust to the external written characters and not remember of themselves. ' 
Letters are an aid'not to memory, but to reminiscence'. 
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understanding of writing, which is only the semblance of orality and not a truly valuable 
matter to be considered. 
In this argument, we see a contradictory attitude of Plato's. Socrates only attended 
to discourse, so is not inconsistent, but Plato who criticised writing as a disturbance of 
memory, nonetheless, bequeathed written texts. Goody interprets this issue as a complex 
attitude to the new culture. He asserts that neither Socrates nor Plato was an 
'intransigent enemy of literate culture' but acutely felt the necessity of arguing about 
great changes in Athens that were brought by the new technology, by the medium of 
writing. Goody understands Plato's agony in being tom between two thoughts, one is 
his interest and understanding of the new technology of literature, and the other is his 
trust and 'occasional nostalgia for' the unwritten customs and laws. 232 Ong, on tile other 
hand, analyses Plato's negation of literacy to a perplexity with new technology. 
Ong compares Plato's denial of writing to the discomfort of people who feel an 
aversion to computers today: 'Most persons are surprised, and many distressed, to learn 
that essentially the same objections commonly urged today against computers were 
urged by Plato in the Phaedrus ... and in the Seventh Letter against writing., 
233 Then, it is 
concluded that Plato's distrust of writing is a reluctance to accept a new technology that 
most people may feel when the a new medium appears. He, nevertheless, does not see 
Plato as a mere bigoted opponent to writing, but Plato's works are, in his understanding, 
beyond the limit of oral culture. 
Plato's entire epistemology was unwittingly a programmed rejection of dic old oral, mobile, 
warm, personally interactive lifcworld of oral culturc... Mc term Nea, form. is visually bascd4 
232 Goody and Watt (1968, p. 52). 
233 All quotations in this section by Ong are taken from Ong (1982, pp. 78-80). 
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coming from the same root as the Latin video, to see ... Platonic form was form conceived of 
by analogy with visible form. The Platonic Was are voiceless, immobile, dcvoid of all 
warmth, not interactive but isolated, not part of the human lifcwodd at all but utterly above 
and beyond it. 
Plato's texts show characteristics of writing rather than those of utterance, so even 
though Plato rejects the use of letters as a shadow of dialogue, his idea is rcalised more 
in writing than speaking. In addition, Ong claims that once one technology becomes 
popular, and if people want to criticise the technology effectively, they should put their 
words into that technology, just as Plato writes his text. 234 A criticism of a medium can 
be striking if it is diffused in that medium, so Plato had to write his texts for the sake of 
the denial of writing. 
Moreover, I assume that the different attitudes to writing of Socrates and Plato 
were caused by their circumstances. Socrates would have met the people who he wanted 
to discuss with, and all his actions were settled in Athens. lie was a man who was eager 
to stay in his city and did not find any true value outside of the city. 235 The city for 
Socrates was Athens which was the world for him. Even though we may be able to flind 
potential for developing a cosmopolitan conception in his thought, 236 lie was a resident 
234'Once the word is technologized, there is not an effective way to criticize what 
technology has done with it without the aid of the highest technology 
available ... Moreover, the new technology ... brought the critique into existence' 
(Ong). 
235 In Phaedivs, when Socrates was taken out to countryside, Phaedrus asked Socrates 
'Do you ever cross the border? I rather think that you never venture even outside the 
gates, 'and Socrates answered'I am a lover of knowledge, and the men who dwell in the 
city are my teachers, and not the trees or the country. ' 
236 Plutarch (1910). 
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of Athens, and othcr cities were not worth living in. 237 It was possible not to participate 
in the medium of writing in this Socratic microcosm, but I insist that this medium was 
necessary for the society, which experienced the exterior world, and which could not 
conclude all matters by the direct dialogue. 
Due to the decline of the tradition of the polis, the patriotism of the citizens of 
Athens also decayed. Plato lived in this transitional period in which lie could not 
unconditionally rely on the law and governments in a polis. 238 Socrates lived and spoke 
in Athens, and stubbornly deliberated everything from tile interior, but Plato often lived 
and wrote outside of Athens, and observed matters from the exterior - actually, he was 
the best witness of Socrates. In this difficult situation, I assume that Plato needed to 
sharpen his sense of the self apart from his tradition. This intricate position possibly 
made Plato's thought deepen, so as Innis mentions, "I'lie mixture of the oral and written 
traditions in the writings of Plato enabled him to dominate tile history of the West. 9239 
The consciousness of self in Plato's writing was the beginning of Western philosophy, 
and this thought was bom in the conflict between oral and written traditions. T'herefore, 
I understand that Plato's idea of self opens up the way for the study of individuals, of 
what a person consists of, and his work may not have been established without the 
medium of writing. 
237 When Socrates was recommended to escape from his prearranged death penalty, he 
answered that'you [Socrates) never stirred out of her [Athens]: the halt, the blind, the 
maimed were not more stationary in her than you were. And now you run away and 
forsake your agreements. Not so, Socrates, if you will take our advice; do not make 
yourself ridiculous by escaping out of the city (Plato, 1999a). 
238 Jay Bolter indicates the position of Plato in history in a similar way to us: 'Plato's 
dialogue was a nostalgic form looking back to a time when Greek culture could do 
without writing. Plato lives in a period of transition in the history of literaCY'(1991, p. 
ill). 
239 Innis (1951, p. 10). 
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As a conclusion, we shall review our discussion and extend our scope to the medieval 
period. Ile age of handwriting was a turning point from which people entered into 
different cultures which used letters. Narratives in oral culture are directly connected to 
a community, but narratives in writing culture move toward making an indircct 
organisation. This new tradition introduces more abstract thinking to people, and it also 
leads to the beginning of the awareness of self separate from collective identity. This 
change is, for example, observed in Plato's writing which includes contradictory 
features of both orality and writing. 240 Further, after Plato, the sense of self has been 
widely studied, such as in Aristotle's discussion of the soul, and the concept of the 
cosmopolitan in Stoicism. Later, in the philosophy of the medieval period, scholars 
mostly deliberated the matter of self in relation to Christianity. 
Christianity is a religion that has been deeply concerned with writing. The clergy 
preached orally, but their words followed the holy text. They vigorously transcribed the 
Scriptures and prayer books. They believed that to be literate was to read and/or write 
the holy language, Latin, and dominated ordinary people by privilege since only the 
people who understood Latin could access the texts. Transcription was important work 
for monks, and monasteries became the places in which manuscripts were produced, 
collected, and stored. Writing was mostly dominated by the religious classes during the 
Middle Ages that allowed the classes to control religious, intellectual, and authoriscd 
works. 
As a work that keenly investigates the matter of self in this period, I cite 
240 For further discussion of Plato's response to writing, see Jacques Derridas 'Plato's 
Pharmacy'(1997). 
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Augustine's Confession that specifically presents a great concentration on the 
recognition of the inner self as reflecting God. His method of confession, constructed 
through inner dialogue, shows the strong consciousness of T in his mind, and the great 
effort involved in recalling and reconstructing his memory. His writing is interpreted 
thus: 'To see how and why Augustine invented tile private inner space of the se is to 
understand something about the possibilities of self-understanding available to human 
beings in the West. ' 241 It is Augustine who introduced the interior self to Western 
thought, and the course of the investigation of self, which was awoken by Plato and was 
inherited by Descartes' cogito and Locke's discussion of personal identity, is thought to 
be decided on in Augustine's writings. 242 The Confession is an autobiography in which a 
self appears as the narrated and written self, and without reading and writing, it is 
supposed that this type of self-awareness would not have been strongly established. 
However, religious power over writing gradually declined. Manuscripts were 
produced by monks for more than a thousand years, but the work was also left to 
craftsman from around the twelfth century as the increase in demand for transcription 
was beyond the capacity of tile monks. Afterwards, the genre of writing was expanded 
in order to reflect readers' interests, so written materials became concerned with not 
only religious subjects but also treatises on philosophy, logic, mathematics, astronomy, 
and literature. 243 This large variety of subjects prepared the market for printing, because 
printing technology would not have become widespread if there was only a little 
demand for written material. 
Therefore, the development of writing prepared the way for the sense of the inner- 
241 Cary (2000, p. 242). For further discussion, see Stock (1996), Hanby (2003). 
242 Taylor (1989, pp. 111- 199). 
243 Jean (1992, pp. 88-90). 
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self, but the concept of personal identity did not arise fully in the era of this medium 
properly. The sense of the inner-self unfolded well in the Middle Ages, but it was tightly 
bound with high classes and religious thought. It is not necessary to separate oneself 
from religion in order to require the concept of personal identity, and I do not say that 
Locke or Hume established their thought irrespective of their religion. However, at the 
dawn of its study at least, people need to keep some distance ftom that great influence. 
This means that writing should be shared in public in order to be implicated in wide 
reconsideration of the conditions of a person. It is the medium of printing that made it 
possible to expand literacy, and to develop the sense of individuality. 
3.6. The Medium of Printing 
Since the establishment of the writing system, a number of modifications have been 
added to its method from scratching on a slate to the use of a word-processor, but an 
epoch-making change must be, before everything, the advent of printing. The reason 
why it is significant for our discussion owes to the expansion of the habit of reading and 
writing through this medium. I'lie influence of literacy on people completely changed 
after the rise of printing, and we will pursue this change here. 
Printing technology transfonned the production of books and other written 
materials from hand-crafted to machine-made. It lead to the point of no return in terms 
of the amount of publishing, the variety of subjects, and the use of every written 
language from Latin to the national languages. In addition to these changes, the 
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development of printing technology also opened the way for the age of reproduction and 
mass-production. The period that will be included as the cra of this medium is as 
follows: The start of printing technology was the responsibility of Gutenberg, who 
published the first printed paper, a 'Thirty-six line' Bible in 1450. Once this technology 
was established, it was improved in a number of ways. As to the quantity of printed 
papers, the hand press printed a maximum of three hundred sheets per day until the late 
eighteenth century, becoming I 100 sheets per hour in the 18 1 Os. Ille output arrived at 
4000 sheets per hour for The Times in 1828, and around 40,000 copies per hour were 
available in 1939.244 
The significance of these numbers is that there were people who read these 
printing products, so this implies a gradual penetration of literacy into ordinary pcople's 
lives. The period of time that is considered in this section ranges thus from Gutenberg's 
invention to before the rise of electric transmission, though tile eras of manuscript and 
electric tools overlap with the period of printing to some extent. We will hence pursue 
from what the concept of personal identity arose with the expansion of printing. 245 Iffie 
most remarkable features brought to the writing world by printing technology are the 
quantity of publishing and the augmentation of subject matter. There arc various reasons 
why these changes occurred, but I assume that the transfomiation of written languages 
was one of the crucial factors in this movement. 'nierefore, we first examine the advent 
of national languages with the improvement of education, and then move to features of 
the novel as a springboard for discussion of the features of this medium. 
244 Ibid., pp. 105-106. 
243 Although there are various products of printing, I will focus mainly on books. They 
are repeatedly read, handed down from generation to generation, and show a relatively 
unified form. These features contribute to the development of philosophical literature 
at that time more than other printing forms. 
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Printing, Vernacular Languages, and the Enlightenment 
In the age of manuscript, documents were usually written in Latin, which was regarded 
as the only language which was suitable for writing down intelligent matters. This 
doctrine of Latin is partly supported by the contents of books which were mostly works 
relating to Christianity, in which the holy language had to be used. However, this 
situation was not continued long into the age of the medium of printing, in which the 
use of national languages was gradually popularised. It is true that Latin did not 
immediately become a dead language after the advent of printing. For instance, before 
the sixteenth century, seventy seven per cent of printing products were written in Latin. 
This percentage is no wonder if we see the subject of the books, the majority of which 
were religious works including various editions of the Scriptures. 'What subject was 
more likely in the eyes of printers to sell at a time when most readers were clericsT 
Febvre and Martin asked, and the answer was obvious. 246 Ile printing industry was 
before everything a business and its purpose was the pursuit of proflt, so printers did not 
want to run a risk and preferred publishing those books which had already achieved 
success in manuscript form. 
This commercialism was, nonetheless, also the cause of the decline of Latin from 
the central position of published language. First of all, Latin had not been a national 
language adapted for customary use afler the disruption of the Western Roman Empire. 
It was mainly used in religious and academic areas as a written language, so texts in 
246 The percentage of written languages in books except Latin before the sixteenth 
century were as follows: About 7 per cent are in Italian, 4-6 per cent in German, 4-5 
per cent in French and just over 1 per cent in Flemish. 'Tho printed products except 
Scriptures were classical, medieval and contemporary literatures (over 30 per cent), 
law (over 10 per cent), and books on scientific subject (about 10 per cent), respectively 
(Febvre and Martin, 1976, pp. 249-250). 
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Latin were not for ordinary people's use. 247 The artificial aspect of this languagc was an 
obstacle to the continued use of Latin, particularly after tile invention of printing. In 
conformity with the expansion of the printing market, Illie book-rcading public 
became ... increasingly a lay public-made up in large part of women and of merchants, 
many of whom had hardly any knowledge of Latin, ' and printers published morc books 
which were written in local languages according to customers' demands. Until the 
sixteenth century, a diverse number of spoken languages were already written and had 
evolved around Western Europe, and owing to the advance of national languages Latin 
had become a dead language. 248 
To turn to the process by means of which literacy penetrated society, the weight of 
the Enlightenment must not be ignored for its contribution to public education. It was an 
intellectual movement which promoted the idea that human beings can progress through 
the acquisition of rationality, empirical science, and universal knowledge. Reliance on 
human rationality as a prime mover of improvement becomes the basis of modern 
thought in Western cultures. These characteristics are the base upon which various 
philosophical thoughts were produced. The philosophers in the period of the 
Enlightenment developed their meditations through responses to others' works, which 
were usually printed materials. Printing made imaginary ties between philosophers. 
Peter Gay understands that philosophers in the Enlightenment 'were neither a 
disciplined phalanx nor a rigid school of thought. If they composed anything at all, 
it was something rather looser than that: a family. But while tile 
247 Benedict Anderson aptly expresses the restriction of Latin: The determinative fact 
about Latin-aside from its sacrality-was that it was a language of bilingualS. 
Relatively few were born to speak it and even fewer, one imagines, dreamed in it' (1991, 
p. 42). 
248 Febvre and Martin (1976, p. 320). 
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philosophers were a family, they were a stormy one, ' and I assume that this looser 
relation can be made partly owing to the expansion of publishing. 249 111C expansion of 
the medium of printing made it possible to absorb and to ponder oil information beyond 
the differences between countries and times, and intellectuals interacted with each other 
through reading and writing. Diffusion of education and popularisation of publications, 
which cooperate with the evolution of the Enlightenment, made a contribution to 
forming the ground in which early modem philosophy was cultivated. 
We can even track the decline of Latin by following the development of 
philosophical writings. Latin was the academic language and this tradition continued in 
the age of printing, but philosophers gradually started writing in national languages. The 
choice of a written language did not only depend upon the time when it was written but 
also upon the circumstances in which the author lived, but it is certain that the number 
of philosophical writings in national languages increased after the middle of the 
seventeenth century. Books written in Latin almost faded away ftorn philosophy in the 
eighteenth century, at the height of the Enlightenment. 
In the period of transition from Latin to national languages, some authors chose 
their written language according to the subject and readers. For instance, Ren6 
Descartes is an early philosopher who wrote in a national language. lie released his 
three essays with one introduction written in French in 1637. His intention to use French 
was declared in the introduction to the book in which he compared 'those who avail 
themselves only of their natural reason in its purity' to 'those who believe only in the 
writings of the ancients. ' The fonner people are those who did not have any ill feeling 
towards reading French, and the latter people were those who only regarded Latin a 
249 Gay (1967, p. 4). 
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suitable language for an academic work. Descartes expected that the fornicr readers 
would accept his theory more readily than the latter rcaders, because the readers who 
used their reason were thought not to be gratified only by staying within the traditional 
method of writing, so they would not feel contempt for reading French . 
250 Not rapidly 
but slowly authors moved towards the use of their national languages, and this transition 
also reflects the way in which the habit of reading in national languages permeated 
people's lives. 
In this stream of early modem philosophy, the most remarkable philosopher for 
our discussion is John Locke, by whom the issue of personal identity was first addressed 
in modem form. He introduces the concept of a person in his discussion, and insists that 
we need to consider what 'person' stands for if we ask what 'personal identity' consists 
in. This question represents the point that the identity of 'person' is the issue and the 
concept of a person needs to be determined for this matter to be decided upon. Ile 
definition of a person in Locke's thought is 'a thinking intelligent being that has reason 
and reflection and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times 
and places'. 25 1 Any person in this statement is supposed to obtain, or at least can obtain, 
intelligence with reason and reflection. We find reliance in his thought on the idea that 
people must act rationally as long as they are intellectual beings. This is a new mode of 
thinking about human beings as subjects the life of which is unified by reason. Locke 
introduces the idea that the identity of a person needs to be measured by different 
criteria from the identity of things. If the Enlightenment was 'man's claim to be 
250'And if I write in French which is the language of my country, rather than in Latin 
which is that of my teachers, that is because I hope that those who avail themselves 
only of their natural reason in its purity may be better judges of my opinion than those 
who believe only in the writings of the ancients; and to those who unite good sense with 
study, whom alone I crave for my judges, they will not'(Descnrtes, 1931, pp. 129-130). 
251 Locke (2001, p. 180). 
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recognized as an adult, responsible being, ' the Lockean concept of personal identity can 
certainly be seen to have been formed under the influence of this movement. 252 
In Locke's thought, any person must be able to be indepcndcnt and take 
responsibility for their actions. We should not punish a person, Locke insists, for an 
action of which he or she is not conscious at all. If 'Socrates waking and sleeping do not 
partake of the same consciousness, ' we would have no right to punish Socrates waking 
for what sleeping Socrates did, because Socrates waking was not conscious of that 
action. 253 This is an arguable point in his thought, but putting aside its adequacy, We can 
see clearly his opinion of how a person must be understood. Persons have to be able to 
take responsibility for their experiences, and through this activity the person is regarded 
as possessing personal identity. 254 Because of this introduction of what a pcrson and 
personal identity must be, I count Locke as the most significant philosopher in the study 
of personal identity. 
In Locke's view, there is no room for social influence as a factor which affects 
the form of pcrsonal idcntity. This is the modcrn vicw of human bcings and pcrsonal 
identity, obtained beyond cultural and social conditions. Taylor names this modem 
notion of a person the 'punctual' self that was established under the influence of the 
Enlightemnent. The punctual self is the subject who can objectively control him or 
herself: 'Locke's theory generates and also reflects an ideal of independence and self- 
responsibility, a notion of reason as free from established custom and locally dominant 
authority. 255 Locke's thought cannot be analysed separately from the mode of the age in 
252 Gay (1967, p. 3). 
253 Locke (2001, p. 187). 
254 Locke, for example, depicts personal identity as 'the sameness of a rational being. (2001, p. 180). 
255 Taylor (1989, p. 167). 
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which the independence of a person from his or her locality was mooted. Hence, I insist 
that the concept of personal identity appeared along with the rise of modem philosophy 
which was based on the foundation of individuality. What I stress in this view is the 
periodical ground of the concept of personal identity, and I maintain that it blossomed in 
early modem philosophy which was greatly fostered by the expansion of the 
Enligbtenment. 256 
TheAdvent of theAuthor 
The use of national languages and its influence on intellectuals are significant events in 
the early modem age that are partly due to the spread of publishing. In this movement 
we shall consider one more factor which symbolises a shift in the concept of a person. 
This is the advent of the novel. Its impact on human lives is kecnly focused on in Walter 
Benjamin's discussion. Benjamin spotlights the genre of the novel in comparison with 
the nature of storytelling. 257 Storytelling in his thought is defined as 'orally, the wealth 
of the epic, ' for example, prose literature that has been acceded by long-established 
human experience. The features of the novel are opposite to those of storytelling, in that 
it is written in solitude and silently read. 
The distinction between the two comes from, Benjamin stresses, tile difference in 
the source of the stories. Traditional narratives are first of all shared stories, so 'the 
storyteller takes what he tells from experience - his own or that reported by others. 
And he in turn makes it the experience of those who are listening to his tale. ' A story 
becomes a part of collective memory in a community through being a common 
256 Of the situation of ordinary people, see Steinberg (1959). 
257 All quotations without references in this section are taken from the following text: 
Benjamin (2002, pp. 146-147). 
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experience. Although the narratives of a community are related not word for word but 
modified depending on circumstances, the outline of such stories is passed on from 
person to person. Oral literature has survived in this way. 258 
In contrast, the author of a novel does not share his or her work with others but 
writes about (the novel is fundamentally written texts based on publishing) matters that 
are that author's particular concerns, and are not necessarily expected to appeal to the 
public interests. Benjamin understands this separation of the author from other people's 
experiences as an absolute loneliness: 
The novelist has secluded himself. The birthplace of the novel is the individual in his isolation. 
the individual who can no longer speak of his concerns in exemplary fashion, who himself 
lacks counsel and can give none. To write a novel is to take to the extreme that which is 
incommensurable in the representation of human existence. In the midst of life's fullness, and 
through the representation of this fullness, the novel gives cvidcncc of the profound pcrplcxity 
of the living. 
The novel arises from the solitary pondering of an author, which does not aim to 
represent the collective memory of the belonging community, but which rather tries to 
depict the individual's internal agony and struggling which are lioned in the writing. 
This is the characteristic of a novel that is produced by an author, and '17he 
dissemination of the novel became possible only with the invention of printing. ' 
Individual uniqueness must be hard to transmit orally over time if it does not appeal to 
common interests, but it is eventually accepted as a matter worth writing about when the 
258 In the analysis of folklore Robert Darnton refers to an interesting case of 
modification (1984, P. 20). 
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medium of printing becomes available. 259 nIC method of expression of individual 
thought is actualised in this period, and this thought becomes the seed bed of the genre 
of the novel. 
On this point, that printing technology contributes to yielding a sense of 
individuality, Keiichi Noe suggests that if the author's isolation is the birthplace of tile 
novel, its most suitable subject must be the confession. T'he author who confesses his or 
her life must stare into the mind in order to express personal experiences, and Noe cites 
The Confessions of Jean-Jacques Rousseau as an example. Such an author needs to 
force phrases out of memory to write a confession, or in Rousseau's own words 'llic 
true object of my confessions is to reveal my inner thoughts... It is the history of my 
soul. ' Noe asserts that there is no person but only T who can access his or her own past 
in order to confess, so a confessor must be a person who is keenly aware of the 
existence of the inner self beyond the tradition of collective identitY. For this reason 
Rousseau said that 'to write it [the history of Rousseau's soul) faithfully I have need of 
no other memories; it is enough if I enter again into my inner self, as I have done till 
now'(1953,262). This consciousness of the inner self, which originated with Augustine 
as we have seen before, is a distinctive feature of the person who writes of personal 
experiences, because the source of writing in this case is only found in one's personal 
iife. 260 
A particularity of this age compared to the medieval period is the weakness of the 
role of God. Although religious thought is not completely removed ftorn intellectual 
259 Giddens asserts in his discussion of modernity and identity that'Modernity is 
inseparable from its'owný media. 'To make a medium in personal use is a characteristic 
of modern technology, and this trend partly leads to more personal thinking in that 
medium (1991, p. 24). 
2GO Noe (1996, pp. 23-26). 
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writing in the age of printing, a number of authors more eagerly excavate consciousness 
of self than search for the relation between the soul and God. This is also a cause of the 
fact that people were more conscious of the concept of personal identity than ever 
before in making a concept of themselves, and the novel as a genre serves to 
demonstrate this point. 
To sum up, the concept of personal identity flowered under tile circumstances in which 
the awareness of inner-self sharpened, and scholars consider those conditions in which 
persons can be supposed to be continuing agents of their actions. To take responsibility 
for one's own actions is to approve a bridge between a series of past events and the 
present self. People who accept this responsibility are thought to grasp their lives not as 
a miscellany of scattered events but as unified, and such subjects are regarded as being 
able to possess the concept of personal identity. in this manner, there is a connection 
between the awareness of individuality and the advent of the concept of personal 
identity. The medium of printing partly supported the connection by its contribution to 
the expansion of literacy and of knowledge, and this expansion can be a factor in 
introducing the realisation of the inner-self as an independent being. 
It might aid understanding if I call the concept of personal identity in the modem 
era the 'individual concept of personal identity' and collective identity the 'communal 
concept of personal identity'. The fonner concept is lioned, by the establishment of the 
sense of an individual self, and the latter is cultivated through living in a society. At any 
rate, what I have claimed is that the necessity of individuality is a particular tendency in 
the modem age, and the traditional discussions of the concept of personal identity have 
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arisen with that idea. 
At the end of this section, I would like to pay attention to possibility that some 
might say that this view indicates holisin. I do not treat the concept of personal identity 
completely independently from social functions, but argue that this sense is formed 
through interaction between a person and external influences. Does this interaction 
suggest a kind of holism, in which the relation between the whole and its parts is 
presupposed? I consider that if holism is the insistence on the priority of the whole over 
its parts, it would not fit our discussion. I do not mean that social factors surpass 
individuality but that there is only the interaction between them. Nonetheless, holism is 
a possible position in many debates. If semantic holism is viewed as the idea that the 
meaning of a part is defined in its connection to the whole, it might be thought to bare 
some similarity to our discussion. I also do not agree with that opinion, because the 
notion of the 'whole' comes into question in that thought. I consider that although the 
meaning of a part is understood through the network of others, that network does not 
need to be regarded as the whole. Tlle premise of the whole can be reduced to a more 
temporal relation, as I will discuss in chapter five. This might be compared with a sort 
of semantic molecularism, but this kind of debate will lead to huge arguments that are 
not directly concerned with our topic. Hence, I stop participating in it except to say 
again that we will not enter the discussion that presupposes the setting of 'whole' 
against 'part'. 261 
The concept of personal identity began with the development of the modern sense 
of the inner selE This awareness was not well established in the age of the medium of 
handwriting due to the restriction of literacy, but the medium of printing brings about 
261 Fodor and Upore (1992). 
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the relative popularisation of writing and reading. I insist that this is a prominent reason 
that the idea of the identity of a person through time flowered at that time, in that place. 
The ideal of a person as an indivisible existence that can exercise reason seems to 
develop in cultures that are influenced by this Western modern notion. If this ideal had 
not developed thoroughly, the concept of personal identity might not be a subject open 
to discussion. Thus, I reckon that the modem is a key idea in the question on what basis 
the concept of personal identity was established. 
Besides, since the study of personal identity has its roots in the modcm idea of a 
person, we are led to the idea that the concept might be changed if the idea is 
reconsidered. This is a possibility that we have considered in the last part of the 
previous chapter, and will ponder in the rest of this thesis. With regard to media history, 
it specifically concerns the advent of electronic media. 
3.7. Electric and/or Electronic Media 
The fourth part of media history is concerned with electric and/or electronic 
technology. 262 The most significant characteristic of these media lies in the fact that the 
circulation of infortnation shifted from material to immaterial. This caused a 
conspicuous alteration of the transformation of information, which is now conducted 
2G2'The electric media'indicates all methods of communication or information 
transmission that rely for their energy source on electric power, and although 'the 
electronic media'use the same source, their work is operated through digital signals, 
which usually use electronic circuits. Their precise division seems not to bring any 
further advantage to our discussion, so I do not strictly divide the electric media from 
the electronic media in this writing. 
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beyond our physically possible speed. Once information broke away from the yoke of 
physical transportation, the sense of time and space was somewhat aitcrcd in society. 263 
This distant communication is thought to have an impact on our understanding of a 
person and identity, as we bave seen in the cases of other media. 264 
In the category of electric and/or electronic media, we include communication 
using wires (wired communication) to the electronic, for example, the telegram, the 
wireless, the telephone, the radio and television broadcasting, and computer mediated 
communication. Among these, I believe that computer mediated communication 
presents the most prominent case in terms of depicting the current circumstances in 
which our concept of personal identity may have been seriously transformcd. For this 
reason, I propose that the details of electronic media that uses computer technology are 
worth examining in their own right. Thus, I will devote the rest of this chapter to the 
tendencies of electric and/or electronic media until the expansion of computer mediated 
communication as the pre-history of today's electronic media, and will discuss the most 
recent methods of communication independently in chapter five. 
From Wred Communication to Broadcasting 
The beginning of the new type of transmission, which does not materially carry 
information but uses electricity, can be traced back to the introduction of the telegram, 
when Samuel Morse laid the first telegraph cable in the United States in 1844. At first, 
this method was mainly adopted by businesses, for example as a trading method in the 
2G3There have been earlier methods which exceed the physical speed of a human; fire 
signals, firing a gun, beating a drum, and carrier pigeons were used for a rapid 
communication over long distances. However, these methods have not acquired the 
popularity that electric and/or electronic media have achieved (Hendrick, 2003, p. 123. ) 
264"Mediated experiences, since the first experience of writing, have long influenced 
both self-identity and the basic organisation of social relation(Giddens, 1991, p. 4). 
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commodity market and in journalism. 265 It took a little time until this distant 
communication was used by ordinary people, though the length of time is derinitely 
shorter than the period in which oral culture was unseated by the writing systcm. In tum, 
this medium is superseded by another technology, wireless communication. Wired and 
wireless communication require special skills for their use in that period, so although 
they are not as widespread as printed papers are, they are recognised by the public as 
one of the new transmission methods. 
Firstly, these media are effective in raising sympathy between people over a long 
distance. The tragedy of the Titanic was the very affair that drove home the advantages 
of this medium because of the unparalleled scale of the accident and tile quick 
circulation of the news. 266 When the captain of the Planic discovered that his ship was 
sinking, he ordered that rescue be requested by wireless. The first ship which rustled to 
the scene was not the geographically nearest one but a ship, which learnt of the accident 
by intercepting the radio message. The sinking of the I-Ilanic appeared in newspapers 
only the next day, and a massive number of people sympathised with the tragedy almost 
all at once. The unthinkable speed of the circulation of the news is owed to the medium 
of the wireless. Hence, it would be no wonder if those people, who heartily perceived 
the work of this medium, thought that it connected people together around the world 
through simultaneity of experience. The media help to combine people's interests, so 
265'It [the telegraph] shifts speculation from space to time, from arbitrage to futures. 
After the telegraph, commodity trading moved from trading between places to trading 
between times. The arbitrager trades Cincinnati for St. Louis; the futures trades sells 
August against October'(Carey, 2003, p. 159). 
2GG'The ability to experience many distant events at the same time, made possible by 
the wireless and dramatized by the sinking of the Manic, was part of a major change 
in the experience of the present'(Kern, 2003, p. 211). 
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they become tools to spread a sense of affinity among contemporariCS. 267 
The idea that people can feel more sympathy for others over distance due to the 
development of the media is upheld by our experience of the medium of broadcasting. 
Radio and television broadcastings clarified a feature of mass-media which made 
imaginary relationships between audiences. The importance of these two media is their 
bringing the social world into the family space. Until these media came into widespread 
use, to acquire the news generally meant to go out and enter a social space, so finding 
information was a kind of a social activity before broadcasting started. 268 However, 
society came into the home with the news from the first half of the twentieth century by 
means of radio broadcasting. 269 The radio broadcast has pervaded audiences' lives, and 
the distance between places becomes a lesser problem for the acquisition of information. 
Sympathy between listeners is abstractive because other listeners do not appear in 
front of us but exist in our mind. This imaginary linkage intensiried with the medium of 
television, which broke the meaning of closeness in our relationships. It is not strange 
for audiences to feel more intimacy with their favourite entertainers than with the 
people who are merely physically near to them, such as unknown neighbours, mere- 
2G7 Between wired and wireless communication, one invention arose and spread widely, 
which was the telephone. The significance of this medium is, after an, its ability to 
convey sound. At the beginning, this medium was at the forefront of wired broadcasting, 
too. The telephone, for the use of which no complex technique is necessary, offered a 
method of distant personal communication to ordinary people (Fischer, 2003, p. 150). 
2G8 The early medium that brings about official information in private Space is 
newspapers, which open the beginning of mass-production and mass-communication. 
This medium is mentioned in chapter four as the medium that effectively makes an 
imagined linkage between people. 
2G9 Douglas (1987, pp. 292-293), Sterling and Kittross, (2003, p. 220). 
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talked-to classmates, and unfamiliar colleagues. 270 Watching the television screen has 
encroached on our sense of reality. 
To demonstrate the influence of television, McLuhan cites an interview with 
Joanne Woodward in which she was asked about the difference between being a movie 
star and being a television actress. Her answer is that 'when I was in the movies I heard 
people say, 'There goes Joanne Woodward. ' Now they say, "There goes somebody I 
think I know". 27 1 The phrase 'I have seen the person before' did not work in the same 
way before the age of television. Through mediated images we 'meet' people who we 
never encounter directly. People may argue that this is an overstatement and that 
generally most audiences do not confuse the real and the artificial, or that they do not 
watch television as they are entirely involved in the fantasy offered by its programs. 
Nevertheless, involvement in the media is, I claim, not essentially concerned with the 
length of time spent watching television programs, but with the degree to which our 
lives are surrounded by a variety of media. 'Flie present life-style in post-industrial 
countries is highly mediated in this manner, in which the sense of distance and 
relationship between people undergoes some transfon-nations. 
What do these tendencies of the media indicate? I consider that they encroach 
upon the meaning of reality and of human relationships in particular ways rcalised by 
electric and/or electronic media. In accordance with the multiplication of information, 
local communities face difficulties in keeping their traditions alive. The arrival of new 
information and technology is often a cause of a discontinuation between generations, 
270'Television viewers live in a world of mediated reality. Increasingly they talk and 
think about people they have not met, places they have not been ... we 
borrow the 
newscasters themselves--with whom we fancy ourselves on a first-name basis--as 
surrogate busybodies, surrogate friends'(Stephens, 2003,277). 
271 McLuhan (1964, p. 339). 
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as a younger generation is put into contact with various types of infortnation beyond 
their culture. To simplify, the more people feel empathy for new ideas beyond the 
boundaries of their region, society, and tradition, the more people are likely to lose a 
tight relationship to their local communities. 'I'his is what has happened in late modern 
cultures by means of our enthusiasm for information. An interesting notion arises in this 
movement in the form of the sense of the nation. T11is notion is already found along 
with the previously discussed media such as national languages, but it is greatly 
strengthened in the age of electric and/or electronic media. 
The sense of the nation is concerned with both collective and personal idcntity. In 
collective identity, it appears to be beyond the local boundary. It is established based on 
an indirect relationship between its members, so even though people do not immediately 
face all other co-nationals, they still know that there are compatriots in their country. In 
the case of radio broadcasting in the United States, even though the idea of the nation 
was widespread in the early twentieth century, ordinary people would have found it 
difficult to foster a national spirit, because they did not have a clear idea of what the 
nation is. The radio is suitable for rousing patriotism in its listeners due to its essential 
equality. As long as people have a radio, they can receive its programs, regardless of 
their differences in living place, level of education, social class, and wealth. This 
equality and simultaneity accelerated the unification of the sense of the nation: 'a sense 
of nationhood, a conception that Americans were all part of one country, was only an 
abstract idea, often without much force... But now that atomized state of affairs was 
changing' by means of the medium of radio broadcasting? 72 To enhance the sense of the 
nation was an urgent issue for strengthening the power of a country, so people stressed 
272 Douglas (1987, p. 306). 
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that aspect of the radio that forms an imaginary closeness between I istencrs. 
As to personal identity, the awareness of the nation helps to intmisify the sense of 
a person as a unified subject. This sense is important for constructing the nation. 'Mis 
new idea, the sense of the nation, cannot appeal to the authority of tradition as a local 
community does, but it needs to encourage people to participate in the nation as an 
independent and rational existence keeping distance from the narrower restrictions of, 
for example, regional law and habits. This is a noteworthy characteristic of electric 
and/or electronic media through which people are suggested to be aware of their 
responsibility for the nation. Ilius, those media are effective in making a person unified, 
but ironically it is not only the age in which the unity of a person is enriched, but also 
the age in which anxiety about that unity begins to surface. Electric and/or electronic 
media, which once served to establish the sense of the nation, also became a factor in 
the disintegration of this ideology. 273 
In the above opinion, I do not claim that only the media make the conception of 
nation cultivated, but there are factors that make the sense of the nation beyond local 
and traditional communities. However, the influence of other factors does not exactly 
hit the aim of our discussion, so I will not mention them in this thesis. What I want to 
stress here is that: the advent of the sense of nation is the modern product that 
encourages the development of the concept of personal identity, and the electric and/or 
electronic media are concerned with the development. 
At present, people do not need to be involved in the ideology of the nation entirely. 
These media make any previously definitive idea comparable to others, and people are 
273 For the influence of radio and television broadcasting on the sense of collective 
identity, also see Morley and Robins (1995, 'Globalisation as Identity Crisis). 
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drawn into the whirlpool of the diversity of values. It can be said that today is the cra of 
disorder in which people lack an index by which to collect their selves as a unit, and the 
ground of the concept of personal identity has also been lost, to some extent. 
These are a quick reference of media history spccialised in the study of identity. We 
have confirmed two points there; one is that as one of the external factors, the media can 
contribute to cultivate the concept of a person and identity. In this view, I stress a point 
again that the medium of printing is not the only condition by means of which this 
concept arose, but with other factors such as the Enlightenment, the rise of national 
languages and nations, printing technology strongly puslics forward the development of 
the concept of personal identity. The other is that today's study of personal identity is 
not the exception, so it holds the assumption of what a person should be in its basis. In 
other words, although people possessed a kind of identity in the oral and writing 
traditions, the sense of personhood in the traditions was not suitable for establishing 
their individuality as a single and independent person. We needed to wait for the advent 
of the modem ideas in order to establish the concept of personal identity. 
Moreover, grounded on those points, a question may arise; if tile criteria-arguments 
of personal identity are a kind of modem product, the basis of that study may need to be 
reconsidered some time. Put another way, I assume that the concept of identity possibly 
faces its transformation today owing to remarkable changes of communication methods 
in society. The concept of personal identity became common sense in the age of electric 
and/or electronic media in Western cultures; nevertheless, this conccpt seems already to 
face some distrust today. We have seen that distrust in the last part of this chapter, and 
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will follow it from now on. Lastly, I shall mention some views of that distrust here for 
the indication what kind of topics I will treat later. 
According to Benjamin, 'experience has fallen in VaIUC,. 274 People's customs and 
practices used to be stored as the general knowledge of a community, and passed on, 
generation to generation. It nevertheless has lost its authority under new circumstances. 
He furthermore argues that people feel insecure because of this decline. Experiences 
present wisdom which is worth leaming for survival in a region, but the rapid 
development of technology has destroyed this tradition. Benjamin depicts solders in the 
First World War as an example that indicates the fall in tile value of experiences. lie 
argues that people are thrown into a completely different environment and are stunned 
by that situation as solders: 
A generation that had gone to school on horsedrawn streetcars now stood under the open sky 
in a landscape where nothing remained unchanged but the clouds and, beneath those clouds, in 
a force field of destructive torrents and explosions, the tiny, fragile human body. 275 
In the battlefield their traditional experiences are of no avail, and furthennore, their 
practice in the war is not commensurable with the traditional community to which 
soldiers returned. Soldiers thus keep silence after coming back from battle. Their 
personal and collective experiences belonging to their communities arc crushed by a 
gigantic force, and Benjamin states that the development of technology takes part in this 
demolition. 
Discontinuity of generations owing to the development of technology can be 
274 Benjamin (1996). 
275 Benjamin (2002, p. 144). 
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found all over the place today. 17he special skill of accountancy is exceeded by using 
accounting computer software. Knowledge of using one piece of computer software 
soon becomes old, since a new version of the software is published in a moment. We 
now know that experience quickly becomes useless if it is regarded as old, so the 
throwaway principle in the present era is also applied to our experiences. I'lie value of 
experiences, in particular the social value of experiences, has been declining in this 
electric and/or electronic age. In addition, if people's experiences are mostly not worthy 
of becoming general knowledge and collective memory, they would be only stored as 
personal memory. This individual who is separated from collective experiences but 
maintains his or her own concerns evokes in us an image of an author of a novel that we 
have seen before. People have to wbet their sense of individuality in order to form their 
identity more than ever before, because although society is still a body of collective 
identity, it has lost the capacity to take diverse personal experiences as its source due to 
the serious dispersal of individuals' episodes. 
Moreover, if society lost its authority and as a result the disorder of social 
organisation occurred, the concept of personal identity, which is in part formed based on 
this organisation, would suffer this chaotic situation. Although human reason is prized 
in modem Western societies, anxiety about reliance on reason has been discussed in 
those same societies. We can see an admonition of this anxiety in, for example, Edmund 
Husserl's statement: 
Scepticism about the possibility of metaphysics, the collapse of the bclicf in a universal 
philosophy as the guide for the new man, actually represents a collapse of the belief in 
"rcason"... It is reason which ultimately gives meaning to c%, cr)illing that is thought to be, all 
things, values, and ends ... Along with this falls the faith in "absolute"' reason, through which 
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the world has its meaning, the faith in the meaning of history, of humanity, the faith in man*5 
freedom, that is, his capacity to secure rational meaning for his individual and common human 
cxistcnCe. 276 
This passage demonstrates a great faith in human reason, and to lose it is 'not just n 
matter of a special form of culture-'science' or 'pililosophy'-as one among othcrs 
belonging to European mankind. ' The fall of rationality is not a mere disruption of one 
academic area but implies the crisis of the reliance on reason, which has been the basis 
of human arts in Europe. However, in spite of his warning, people seem to step ahead in 
an inconsistent and scattered situation, especially since the latter half of the twentieth 
century. 
If trust in universal human reason vacillates, the concept of personal identity may 
be suspected in terms of its validity, and this is particularly observed in the medium of 
computer communication. At the beginning of the electric and/or electronic age, the 
media were used for gathering people's minds together, but they have also worked to 
destroy the unification of community. I do not say that reliance on hunian reason has 
totally collapsed, but today's situation implies a doubt about the idea that human beings 
will be improved by the use of intelligence and rationality. A serious suspicion of the 
modem idea is, I shall say, represented by the term spostmodem, ' which is a movement 
that brings doubt of values which were established in former ages. The postmodcrn is an 
ambiguous term used in various ways, so we shall examine ideas about this term in the 
next chapter, before starting a discussion of tile identity and difference of a person in the 
age of electronic media. 
27G Husserl (1970, pp. 12-13). 
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Chapter 4 
The POSTMODERN 
The Discontinuity between the Modern and the Postmodern 
4.1. What We call 'Postmodern' 
The influence of the media on our concept of identity was the former topic, in which 
transformations of communication technology were followed until the advent of electric 
and/or electronic media, just before computer mediated communication arrived. 
Although we will pursue the effects of that latest medium here, it will be proritable to 
first consider in what context they will be analysed. This context is the circumstances in 
which the expansion of information occurs in a wide range and traditional knowledge 
loses its authority. 1, in a word, call this tendency 'postmodem'. 
I realise the difficulty involved in using this word, since the postmodern is often 
described as a resistance against staying in a fixed idea that can include denying giving 
a definition of its own meaning. In addition, it is used in various areas in a number of 
ways from 'an already outdated vogue' to 'a not-yet realised movement'. 277 It is not an 
easy tenn to discuss on the whole, however, it is also true that I have not been able to 
find any alternative term which can include the present state of affairs in which our 
277 Palmer (1977). 
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circumstances are kaleidoscopically changing and the indexes of life arc dispersing. 
Only 'postmodem'may satisfy this demand. T'llus, I will darc to use this term in order to 
depict tendencies of the present age in which we live. I'llat is the reason why tile term 
'postmodern' is employed in this discussion. However, it must not be used without 
further consideration owing to its various interpretations, so I supply this chapter to 
catch its meaning. The approach to the concept of personal identity in the former 
chapter was historical, seeking the point at which the concept was generated. Although 
the determination of the postmodern also includes a temporal view, especially in 
comparision with the 'modem, ' this will be an analysis of tile contemporary rather than 
temporal understanding of the concept. 
It may be helpful to mention in advance the vicw which I plan to reach at the end 
of this discussion. I claim that the traditional concept of personal identity corresponds to 
the modem ideal that promotes people as stable and rational. I'liese characteristics are 
suitable for the smooth conduct of the modem social system, but I arrange postmodern 
thought as the disturbance of that conduct. It attempts to embody aspects that are not 
represented by such modem thought. On tile matter of identity, the concept of a person 
that is considered after this doubt of the modem ideal is called 'postmodcrn identity' 
here. It is thought to be directed more towards the dissolution of a person than its 
unification. It is a deviation from the narrative consistency of life, and we will track that 
-concept of identity by characterising postmodem thought. In that process, the minimum 
of the narrative approach for making pcrsonal idcntity is rcconsidcrcd as well, and I 
focus upon the elements that are less than narrative-phrases. A phrase is always linked 
to another, and if we set the concept of identity in the postmodern age, it would be done 
in terms of that linkage. This is the basic view of this chapter. 
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In the analysis of the postmodem, I should first cniphasisc that this notion cannot 
be studied without referring to the modem. 'Postmodcrn' n1rcady includes the word 
'modem', so to discuss the postmodem is to reconsider the propriety of the modem, and 
to seek the relation and separation between these two conceptions. In this respect, it is 
also our concern to locate the status of the modem. Roughly speaking, the characteristic 
of the modem is condensed into the ideal that we are opened to mutual understanding 
by liuman communication. It makes it possible for us to reach a consensus overcoming 
particular socio-cultural conditions, and today's confusion with rcgards to socicty, 
ideology, and the comprehension of a person brought by anti-modcmists must be cured 
in such a way. If we were to identify a particular scholar who asserts the modern 
ideology, it would be JUrgen. Habennas, who declares the necessity of accomplishing the 
modem projeCt. 
278 Habermas pushes the idea of making a consensus to resolve conflicts 
by the use of human reason, and this is what Lyotard argues to be the authority of the 
modem. We will discuss the denial of such modem ideals as a particular feature of the 
postmodem, and seek a method of surviving insecure conditions not by returning to the 
stability of modem identity but by pursuing the condition of postmodern identity. 
The point of examining the postmodem is, as in former chapters, its relation to 
identity and naffative. We have used naffative as an explanation of the way in which we 
grasp the continuity and consistency of a person over time, so to investigate a type of 
narrative in postmodem thought is also to contribute to this study. In this regard, I 
believe that Lyotard's discussion is worth examining, since it includes postmodern 
conditions, the role of narrative, and the status of the modem. Although lie does not 
directly mention the problem of identity, there are indications of tile status of identity in 
278 Habermas (1987a). 
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the postmodern age in his writing, in relation to doubt of the modern compt of a 
person. He contemplates peculiarities of the postmodern and the modem in terms of 
knowledge, society, and technology, so to follow his research will be helpful in 
considering the connection between personal identity and the postmodem. 
In this chapter, we will first observe the rise of postmodcm tliought in some fields. 
Although I mainly refer to Lyotad's thought in the discussion of the postniodeni in this 
thesis, his notion is peculiar and specific. We may lose the context of postinodcni 
thought in which Lyotard is located if we only examine his theory. For this reason, we 
shall glance over more general notions of the postmodem in several f iclds, and dcf inc 
the period in which this term appears in philosophy. I'lien, we will move towards a more 
specific idea of the postmodem, and the modem as well, in Lyotard's thought. T'here are 
two views of the postmodern in Lyotard's thought. According to one view, it is defined 
as a period of time that comes after the modem, and in tile other, it is regarded as a 
movement of thought that is not necessarily arranged in chronological order. The former 
view seems to be more popular than the second view, so we will start our discussion 
with the chronological understanding of the postmodern. 
In Lyotard's thought, the postmodem is expressed as the 'breaking up of the grand 
narrative'. Grand narratives, or to use another tenn of his, 'meta- narratives, ' represent 
modem Ideas, which were once expected to be a beacon of the development of society. 
Instead of the decline of grand narratives, Lyotard highlights the performance of little 
narratives, which is another name for postmodcrn thought. 111us, we will consider the 
characteristics of grand and little narratives in order to identify tile subject that faces its 
decline. The postmodern and modem will also be characterised in comparison with the 
classic, which is relevant to 'before the modem, in more primitive social systems than 
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those of the modem and postmodern. 
We will later shift to the argument for the non-chronological division of the 
postmodern, the modem, and the classics. We do not decide which is a more adequate 
view than the other beforehand, but investigate what kind of picture we will obtain from 
each definition. In this view, those three terms are considered as dillerent movements of 
thought, and we will see the differences through examining the legitimacies by which 
each idea insists its validity. 
4.2. A Rough Sketch: The Beginning of Postmodern Thought 
The term 'postmodem' is not independently arrived at in philosophy but corresponds to 
movements from the latter half of the twentieth century in architecture, literature, art, 
politics, subcultures, and so on. The outline of the postmodern movements in those 
fields is as follows. Architecture is one of the fields in which this term is introduced in 
the early days. In this field, the death of modem architecture is sensationally declared by 
Charles Jencks. 279 This is accepted as a symbolic incident in the modem and the 
beginning of the postmodern in architecture. 280 The idea of postmodemism is also 
advocated by Robert Venturi, who inspired the rejection of the modem style of 
architecture in his writing in 1966. 
279'Modern Architecture died in St. Louis, Missouri on July 15,1972 as 3.32 p. m. (or 
thereabout) when the infamous Pruitt-Igoe scheme ... [was] given the final coup do 
grace by dynamite' (Jenckes, 1986, p. 9). 
280 The modern architectural idea is depicted as attaching a single meaning to 
construction. Jencks proposes 'double coding' as the concept of postmodern architecture 
that gives at least two different styles of coding to construction. 
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In literature, postmodern thought appeared in literary criticism in thc1950s as a 
new trend in literature. Ihab Hassan was one of those who announced the affival of 
postmodemism in this field . 
28 1 Literature has produced a number of works that can be 
understood as postmodem texts. They often take a style that does not commit to 
certainty and fixed reality but to disorder, multiplicity, meta-description, and indeed 
those notions become keywords in depicting the tendencics of postniodcm literature. 282 
In art, the advent of plural contexts in art works can be regarded as the beginnitig of the 
postmodem. 283 It develops as the negation of modem art, and becomes a popular 
movement in the 1980s. In music, it coffelates with tile above movenicnts in the 1960s, 
and flourished in the 1980s. To sum up, the term 'postmodem' has been used 
deliberately from around the 1960s in several fields. It then expanded into wider areas, 
for example, sociology, politics, film, drama, anthropology, and cultural theory from the 
1970s onwards. 
It develops in each area differently, and the postmodern conception in contrast 
with that of the modem is diversely illustrated; opposition, reaction, excess, 
supplementation, following, or caricature. However, there is a common interest between 
them; an interest in criticism of modem establishments. 284 philosophy is not the 
exception. The period in which the temi 'postmodem" is introduced to philosophy is 
defined as the time at which Lyotard advanced his writing, Tile Posiniodern Condition: 
281 Hassan (1975). 
282 To help imagine this movement, I cite those authors to which Brian NIcHale refers 
in his analysis of the shift from modern fiction to postmodern fiction; Samuel Beckett, 
Alan Robbe-Grillet, Carlos Fuentes, Vladimir Nabokov, Robert Coover, and Thomas 
Pynchon (1989, pp. 12-25). 
283 Danto (1998), Jameson (1992). 
284 As a brief summary of the advent of the Postmodern, see also Berman (1983, p. 351 (24n)). 
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A Report on Knowledge in 1979 . 
285 The central argument of t1lis book is conccmcd with 
the decline of modem thought and with the investigation of another method by which 
knowledge is transmitted and shared in public. 17his idea, the decline of the modem, 
gives rise to arguments both for and against, but it is certain that the declaration of the 
fall of the modem is influential to model the image of tile postmodem in philosophical 
thought. Thus, it can be said that the beginning of tile use of the term 'postmodern' has 
been spread among philosophers since the 1980s. 
However, it is also true that the establishment of a thought is not only the work of 
one person, but that there were pioneers who left indications of the postmodcm. As a 
recent movement, post-structuralism is not clearly distinguishable from postmodemism. 
Besides, if we concentrate more on the postmodem's anti-fundamental aspect, Friedrich 
Nietzsche can be counted as a philosopher who earlier stated distrust of the Western 
tradition. The essence of his claim of the 'transvaluation of all values' has been inherited 
by a number of later postmodernists today, so his study can be considered as the ground 
of postmodem argument. On another interpretation, the postmodern is categoriscd as a 
part of the history of scepticism, which is portrayed as 'a long-running tradition in 
Westem thought that stretches back to classical Greek philosophy" . 
286 Doubt of all 
existing authority and a refusal to admit universal validity are general features of the 
postmodem, and because of these characteristics, it can be dealt with in the context of 
the long tradition of scepticism. 
Although I appreciate the value of studying the postmodern from these viewpoints, 
285 There are scholars who indicated this concept in its early period, so Lawrence 
Cahoone writes that the term'seems first to have been used in 1917 by the Germany 
philosopher Rudolf Pannwitz'. However, as the person who first used the term 
'postmodern' accurately, I count Lyotard as the first philosopher in the study of the 
postmodern (2003. p. 2). 
28G Sim (2001, p. 3). 
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I will centre on the flourishing of the postmodern in more recent times rathcr than 
produce a genealogical study, otherwise our discussion will cover too many topics to 
manage at once. I set up the beginning of the postniodern roughly from the middle of 
the twentieth century. Post-structuralism falls within this sphere, but other above- 
mentioned discussions are not included. Nietzsche may be understood as a precursor of 
the postmodem, and scepticism possibly prepared the groundwork for postmodern 
arguments, but I locate them as early signs of this notion. I will focus on this narrower 
range of the postmodem in what follows. 
In addition to the above topic, I feel it necessary to mention the way I use several 
tenns here. I have used the tenns 'postmodem' and 'modern' so far, but there are words 
related to them that are sometimes used differently, such as 'postniodemism' and 
'modernism', 'Postmodernity' and 'modemity'. lbeir definitions arc not exactly in 
agreement but rather depend on the person who uses them. 287 Their definition is not the 
aim of this chapter, but it is necessary to think about their use when discussing the 
modem and the postmodern. Of the distinction between modernity and modernism, 
some people use them almost in the same way, 288 or modernity may be applied for the 
broader period of modernism in relation to the status of social and political systems. 
Modernism in this respect is probably regarded as a response to modemity, making up 
for its insufficiencies. 289 
However, it is still hard to clearly separate modernity from modernism. For 
287 For example, Cahoone (2003, pp. 1-13), Sarup (1993, pp. 129-132), Eagleton (1996, 
P. vii). 
288 For instance, Habermas does not make a clear distinction between modernity and 
modernism in the above mentioned article. He calls the movement began in the middle 
of the nineteenth century both the 'most recent modernisrný and daesthetic modernity' 
(1987b). 
289 Sim (2001, p. 319). 
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instance, modernism can be thought of with reference to an artistic movement, 
especially in the first half of the twentieth century. Douglas Crimp writes that 'the 
bcginning of modernism in painting is usually locatcd in Manct's work of the carly 
1860s'. 290 Nonetheless, Habennas searches for the establishment of the concept of 
'modemity' tracing back to its original form in Latin, 'modemus, ' and dctcrtnines that 
recent modernity is most sharply contoured in the work of Baudelaire. 291 It is adequate 
to see Baudelaire as the father of the modern poet, but in Crimp's and in Habermas's usc, 
we cannot find a difference between modemity and modernism. 
Thus, I change the question, from what is the difference between modernity and 
modernism, and ask rather what conditions I will deal with in my discussion. As we 
have seen in the previous chapter, I set the beginning of modem thought in the portent 
of the Enlightenment in the late seventeenth century, as that period from which the 
292 
sense of the individual began to be firmly established . Which term is most suitable to 
grasp this period? Modernism does not cover the period due to its general understanding 
concerned with artistic movements. However, modernity is still ambiguous in its status 
and may incur unnecessary confusion if scholars understand the term in relation to so- 
called aesthetic modernity. Hence, I prefer to use 'modem' in order to include this 
sphere of time. 
As for the postmodem, there is basicallY not a significant difference between 
4postmodern' and 'postmodemism, ' though postmodernism corresponds in some way to 
modernism. Postmodernism represents movements that start from the latter half of the 
290 Crimp (1983, p. 45). 
291 Habermas (1987b, p. 5). 
292 On another understanding, the modern period is thought to start from the 
Renaissance. This is reasonable on one view, but I do not include that period in my 
discussion in order to make clear the point that the awareness of individuality is the 
essence of modern thought. 
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twentieth century, as we have seen above. I use postmodemism in this manncr, but 
mainly employ 'postmodern' in compatison to the 'modcrn. Postmodcrnity does not 
embody particular meanings unless the notion of modernity is given a peculiar 
definition, so I will not use this term. In short, the modem in this discussion implies tile 
period in which rationality and individuality are assumed to be important human 
conditions. The postmodem is the attempt to demonstrate the minimum of that modem 
thought. It is a broad notion which cannot be applied to spccific argumcnts such as 
literary theory or architecture, but I think it works for our discussion. Based on this 
assumption, we shall consider further the notions of the modem and postmodcm 
hereafter. 
The characteristics of the postmodem are surnmarised by Lyotard as the fall of 
grand narratives which implies a crisis of the absolute Ideas that have supported the 
social system. Thus, we will start our discussion with the question: 'What is a grand 
narrativeT in order to grasp the subject which faces its 'breaking up'. In Lyotard's 
thought, this type of narrative is connected with the modem, so firstly the modem, and 
next the postmodern, will come up for discussion in the following sections. 
4.3. Grand Narratives as the RePresentation of the Modern 
A basic conception of the breaking up of grand narratives, or meta-naffativcs, is their 
loss of credibility from at least the end of the 1950S. 293 'I'lie subject based on which 
293 Lyotard (1984, p. 3). 
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grand narratives establish their credibility is, according to Lyotard, modern ldcas. I 
count three characteristics of these Ideas. First, their remarkableness is seen in reliance 
on the use of human reason for the development of society. I'his owes its foundation 
largely to the Enlightenment, that presupposed equality through education, so 
universality is an essential aspect of grand narratives as well. Second, the Ideas of the 
grand narrative are understood to be tasks which have to be realised, and any other 
mode of organisation is located in a subclass that must be governed by them. Hence, the 
modem Ideas have to be 'meta' narratives, because they need to be beyond locality and 
need to enact their rules over the peculiarities of different communities. 
Third, although the concrete contents of these Ideas are described in different 
ways depending upon the goals they are intended to achieve, they have one point in 
com. mon: They are intended to produce the narrative of emancipation from temporal and 
pitiful conditions. The following are mentioned as typical grand narratives: The 
Enlightenment is regarded as the narrative of emancipation from subordinate situations 
owing to lack of knowledge, and it rescues people through 'knowledge and 
egalitarianism?; capitalism promises the release from poverty that can be actualised 
through the evolution of technology and science. Marxism is also a kind of narrative of 
fteedorn from exploitation and alienation of people through the socialisation of work. 294 
Thus, modem Ideas are represented as an advocacy of release from tile conditions 
that oppress people's lives. An important function of tile narrative of emancipation is to 
offer a new view to people according to which all events are reinterpreted as 
preparations for accomplishing the Idea. For instance, if a narrative gives an explanation 
of estrangement and poverty as being due to the existence of the exploiting classes, and 
294 Lyotard (1992, p. 36). 
184 
claims that equality and socialisation of work will change the situation, it proposes a 
particular view of society. If another narrative demonstrates that lack of education is tile 
cause of people's subordination and dependence, but that equality of learning will 
improve the situation since all human beings can be educated rationally, it gives its own 
order to the understanding of human beingS. 295 
These statements are only vulgar imitations of the original Ideas, but I try to 
illustrate in outline the way in which the grand narratives appeal to people through tile 
reorganisation of events. If we apply the modem concept of personal identity to this 
type of narrative, it may be described thus: It is the narrative of emancipation from 
infancy and irrationality through the establishment of individuality and rationality. 
People participate in society as respectable and mature beings by the realisation of 
personal identity, by which they can prove the consistency of their actions. Due to this 
operation, modem social systems such as law, the election system, and debit and credit 
arrangements, work smoothly. Hence, I believe that the purpose of grand narratives is to 
rewrite history, assessing all events as warnings of the forthcoming future and arranging 
the actualisation of the Ideas at the end of their narratives. Meta-narrativcs assure us that 
their theory is universal beyond regional and cultural conditions, and demand 
participation in the Ideas for bringing about the ideal world. 
The study of personal identity from the late seventeenth century onward is 
indebted to this meta-idea according to which human beings can be equal irrespective of 
their local differences. This is a relatively new ideology that makes an abstract relation 
between people over regional restrictions, as we considered in our discussion of media 
295 For a criticism relating to the un-necessity of 'emancipation' in making a 
cosmopolitan-narrative, see Rorty (1991). 
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history. I want to review this point here, stressing what kind of relationship is promotcd 
between people in that ideology. For this consideration, Benedict Anderson refers to the 
newspaper as an effective medium for making imagined links between people. 
Newspapers are printed in huge quantities in a day but become old just tile next day, so 
they are 'one-day best-sellers' which are 6merely an "extreme fortn" of the book, a book 
sold on a colossal scale but of ephemeral popularity. ' This characteristic highlights what 
Anderson calls the 'extraordinary mass ceremony. ' 1"his ceremony is an imagined one, 
conducted every day, and the participants in the ceremony know of the existence of 
other readers through the daily ritual: 
(TIhe almost precisely simultaneous consumption ('imagining') of the ncwspapcr-as-fiction. 
We know that particular morning and evening editions will ovcr%%, hclmingly be consumed 
between this hour and that, only on this day, not that ... 
Yet each communicant is well aware 
that the ceremony he performs is being replicated simultaneously by thousands (or millions) 
of others of whose existence he is confidcnt, yet of whose idcntity he has not the slightest 
notion... What more vivid figure for the secular, historically-clocked, imagined community 
can be envisioned? 296 
The readers confirm their imagined linkage to others by the fact that newspapers are 
sold all over the place, even though they never ascertain exactly who rcads thern. T'his 
imagined linkage is a kind of fiction, and the 'fiction seeps quietly and continuously 
into reality, creating that remarkable confidence of community in anonymity which is 
the hallmark of modem nations'. 297 A person feels a connection with a massive number 
of others without having any real acquaintance with them, and this sympathy is thought 
29G Anderson (199 1, P. 39). 
297 Ibid., pp. 39-40. 
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of as a particular tendency of the modem. 298 
The abstract relation is necessarily advanced by grand narratives, because these 
narratives bind people by Ideas that are not naturally rooted in tradition. In the 
community that can settle problems by face-to-face meetings, tile normal relation is not 
highly abstract. 299 To overcome the boundary of locality is to polish the sense of indirect 
communication, and it is the modem tendency that encourages people to be involved in 
that kind of relation. The modem concept of personal identity is not an exception to this 
more distant sense of locality. When the system of local community declines in 
accordance with the collapse of direct communication, it is no wonder fliat people want 
to seek another way of maintaining the stability of identity such as in the nation, 
religion, capitalism, and so on. Grand narratives respond to that need by offering Ideas 
that allow people to organise and re-understand their experiences, and consequently 
unify their lives. 
300 
The modem is partly characterised by its invention of a person as a unique 
existence, as Fredric Jameson argues in relation to the 'modernist aesthetic'. It links to 
'the conception of a unique self and private identity, a unique personality and 
298 '[Tlhe convergence of capitalism and print technology on the fatal diversity of 
human language created the possibility of a new form of imagined community, which in 
its basic morphology set the stage for the modem nation. '(Ibid., p. 49. ) 
299For example, James Burke depicts illiterate villages in the Middle Ages: 'On the 
very rare occasions when news arrived from outside, it was shouted through the 
community by a crier. For this reason few villages were bigger than the range of the 
human voice, and towns were administratively subdivided on the same scale' (2003, p. 
75). 
W Hoffmann-Axthelm describes the modern ideal of identity as the power to organise 
the social system: 'Identity was one of the grand promises of the modern ... It was hoped that dominion of collective suppression and prevailing linguistic patterns would end 
and that identity would be based in ones own person and one's own responsibility. ' (Hoffmann-Axthelm, 1992, p. 200. ) 
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individuality' which throws its peerless perspective to the world . 
30 1A person, on this 
view is thought to possess the ability to distinguish his or her existence from others' and 
constructs the framework of the self on his or her own. 302 However, a person is, as 
Anderson's discussion indicates, also regarded as anonymous in the abstract relation 
that supports imaginary belonging to a huge society. Therefore, uniqueness and 
anonymity are characteristics of modem identity, and in both concepts a person is 
accounted for as a unified existence that possesses reason in order to adapt to society. 
To construct a society that is beyond any peculiarity is the ideal of the modem, 
and Lyotard represents this in the tenn 'grand narratives'. His discussion is linked to the 
conception of the postmodern as a counterargument to the modem, so we shall see how 
it can be a criticism of the modem Ideas in the next section. 
4.4. Heterogeneity of Postmodern Thought 
If the establishment of the absolute Idea is a feature of modem thought, the postmodern 
is depicted as discrediting such an idea. The postmodem in this understanding is a 
notion which does not require grounding in a general theory that has authority over 
diverse societies but endeavours to achieve its own discourse. Lyotard calls this 
postmodem thought 'little narratives, ' which are characterised as 'incredulity toward 
301 Jameson (1987, p. 114). 
302 This modern identity, which relates to the abstract sense, is described by Anthony 
Giddens as follows: 'The reflexive project of the self, which consists in the sustaining of 
coherent, yet continuously revised, biographical narratives, takes place in the context 
of multiple choice as filtered through abstract systems. '(1991, p. 5. ) 
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meta-narrativeS,. 303 'Meta' is the nature of grand narratives, and although he criticises 
meta-narratives in terms of their doctrine, his intention is directed not primarily towards 
the notion of 'narrative' but to that of 'meta, ' which subjugates heterogeneous genres of 
narrative under its theory. 304 
The postmodern for Lyotard is epitomised in the act of seeking the point at which 
people do not need to be involved in any meta-activity but create heterogeneous 
discourses. 305 1 consider that this absence of a meta-position, from which experiences 
are regulated, is also the particularity of the postmodem concept of personal identity. It 
is interpreted as a denial of a meta-position by which experiences are settled in the 
context of a whole life story. It is my view that identity in this mode is reduced to a 
temporal network of communication through which dispersed information is connected 
at a particular time-but, I think this notion is still ambiguous. In order to present this 
notion more clearly, we need to grasp the characteristics of little narratives more firmly, 
and shall return to the concept of postmodern identity again. 
Little narratives do not participate in the establishment of theories that organise 
other narratives under them, so all of them are, in a sense, playing their own games. 
Lyotard uses the idea of 'language games' to explain this activity, a concept that is 
boffowed from Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophy of language. A language game on 
Lyotard's interpretation is described as a set of discourses and rules which define the 
303 Lyotard (1984, pp. xxiii-xxiv). 
304 Fraser and Nicholson state 'We should not be misled by Lyotard's focus on narrative 
philosophies of history. In his conception of a legitimating meta-narrative, the stress 
properly belongs on the "meta" and not the "narrative"' (1988, p. 376). 
305 In this sense, Lyotard's notion can beis comparable with Michel Foucault's rejection 
of'historico-transcendental dominance': 'My aim was to cleanse it of all transcendental 
narcissism; it had to be freed from that circle of the lost origin, and rediscovered where 
it was imprisoned; it had to be shown that the history of thought could not have this 
role of revealing the transcendental moment'(1989,203). 
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moves of a player. It is likened to the game of chess in which players follow the rules 
that regulate the moves of players. 306 A language game follows its own rule that is 
applicable only to that game but not to others, because a general rule cannot be formed 
that can cover different and equally self-legitimated language games without spoiling 
their individuality. This is what Lyotard describes as the incommensurability of different 
language games. 307 This incommensurability can be compared to the impossibility of 
combining different paradigms without changing their uniqueness. Language games are 
used to expresse the rejection of the meta-position from which it is as if a conflict 
between different language games can be settled equably. 
The question may arise, as to whether different language games are really 
incommensurable. If there is no similarity between them, we may not even be able to 
imagine the existence of other language games, 308 so there must be some familiarities 
even between different language games. If we discuss Wittgenstein's original thought, 
this would be an arguable point, especially as regards the notion of family resemblance 
in language games. However, in Lyotard's application, the stress is laid on whether or 
not a meta-language game, which absolutely and equally resolves problems of different 
language games, is possible. At, the beginning of Differend, he mentions this point: 
306 Lyotard (1984, p. 10). 
307 William James explains this incommensurability as follows: 'By incommensurability 
Lyotard means that there is no common set of rules, norms and values between games. ' 
He also illustrates the incommensurability between different language games with the 
metaphor of the city. (1998, pp. 27-28). 
308 1 assume that in order to understand another language game, there must be some 
similarities between two groups such as their thinking style, the manner of life, and so 
on. If those matterssuch factors are completely different between parties, they would 
be incomprehensible each other. I understand Wittgenstein's following sentence as 
indicating this incommensurability: 'If a lion could talk, we could not understand him' 
(1963,223e). 
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As distinguished ftom a litigation, a differend (diffirend] would be a case of conflict, bctwccn 
(at least) two parties, that cannot be equitably resolved for lack of a rule of judgement 
applicable to both arguments. One side's legitimacy does not imply tile other's lack of 
legitimacy. However, applying a single rule of judgement to both in order to settle their 
differend as though it were merely a litigation would wrong (at least) one of thCM. 
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Incommensurability in this case is used in order to question the legitimacy of iu ging 
different parties by a single rule. It thus belongs to the establishment of a grand 
narrative, and Lyotard seeks another standpoint that does not require the setting of a 
meta-position. This is his interpretation of the uniqueness of language games, and the 
incommensurability of plural parties'rules. 310 
The Criticism against the Enlightenment in Postmodern Hew 
The postmodem. thus understood does not attempt to achieve the modem Ideas by 
making up for their shortcomings. This is, as Cahoone points out, one of the common 
features of the postmodern: 'something about recent society or thought in the 
"advanced" societies since ... the 1960s, reveals a discontinuity with earlier phases of 
the modem period. ' This interruption is sometimes expressed as a criticism of the 
Enlightenment as the movement which gives birth to modem thought. Cahoone also 
claims in this respect that 'postmodemism is the latest wave in the critique of the 
Enlightenment, the criticism of the principles characteristic of modem Western 
society'. 311 If the Enlightenment is influential enough to characterise the modem in 
309 Ibid., p. xi. 
310 Hayden White's analysis of Foucault may help to understand the notion of differend: 'Wherever Foucault looks, he finds nothing but discourse; and wherever discourse 
arises, he finds a struggle between those groups that claim the "righe' to discourse and those groups that are denied the right to their own discourse' (1987,114). 
311 Cahoone (2003, p. 2). 
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Western culture, the analysis of that idea would be useful in distinguishing the features 
of the modem. 
On the one hand, the Enlightenment, which advocates liberation from religious 
superstition and from the old authority of politics, has grounded the ideal that society 
will advance and morality will improve through the acquisition of human reason. The 
Enlightenment locates the human race as the master of nature through its scientific and 
logical thought. This is the positive side of this project. It has a great influence on our 
understanding of a person even today, and certainly it renders remarkable services to 
society. Nevertheless, it also possesses a negative side, and we shall discuss this aspect 
of the Enlightenment as an example of why the modem ideal is thought to be 
insufficient in postmodern discussions. 
The Enlightenment is often exposed to censure for its being the symbol of the 
modem, and in this regard Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adomo keenly disclose 
the limit of its doctrine in their joint work Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical 
Fragments. They do not use the terni 'postmodern' in their writing, but I propose that it 
is full of suggestions of this thought. The two authors' theme is epitomised in the 
question 'why humanity, instead of entering a truly human state, is sinking into a new 
kind of barbarism'. 312 They first define enlightenment's program as aiming to expel any 
irrational belief from the status of knowledge, such as belief in myth, the occult, or 
fantasy. On this view, civilised is considered to be equal to enlightened, and 
312 Horkheimer and Adorno (2002, p. xiv). 
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313 disenchantment with the world is a transition from myth to rational i sation. They do 
not criticise this transition itself and understand its necessity for establishing freedom in 
society, but ask if enlightenment absorbs the destructive side of its project. 314 Ille 
Western tradition, without reviewing the validity of its ideal, is a target for their 
criticism, since it will fall into the self-destruction of enlightenment. 
Enlightenment on Horkheimer and Adomo's understanding is the plan which 
attempts to control society by the principle of reason. It impels rationalisation of 
everything to excess, so its ideal world is dominated by uniformity in which people 
become functions of their reason. This means that people are not masters of reason in 
practicing their free will, but that reason is given priority as a necessary condition of 
organising the social system accurately. People are, in a sense, identified as servants of 
reason. In this situation, outstanding individuality becomes an obstacle to managing the 
social system due to the difficulty of predicting action, so people are compelled to be 
one of the mass, in which they are standardised, and in which it is easier to calculate the 
outcome of their lives. 315 Enlightenment in this process does not, in opposition to its 
initial ideal, make human beings masters of the world but makes them controllable tools 
of the system. Horkheimer and Aclorno argue that if enlightenment only pays attention 
to the propulsion of its project and does not reflect on its drawbacks, it will lead to 
another barbarism in which the 'weakness of contemporary theoretical understanding' is 
revealed, or in other words, the belief in a connection between reason and progress is 
313Horkheimer and Adorno use 'enlightenment' to mean the idea that'has always 
aimed at liberating human beings from fear and installing them as masters'in a wide 
sense. 'The Enlightenment, 'written with a capital letter, refers to a historical 
movement in Western societies. Thus, when I refer to their discussion, I follow their 
usage. 
314 Ibid., p. xvi. 
315 Ibid., 23. 
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thrown into disorder. 
That Enlightenment can be regarded as the gist of modem Western thought that 
also penetrates common sense, and the postmodern brings about questioning of this 
presupposition. I do not simply say that all achievements of the modem are wrong, but 
claim that it neglects things that stray too far from its framework. In terms of personal 
identity, incoherent aspects of a person, which were examined as the residues of 
narrative in chapter two, have not been given enough positive attention in the modem 
discussion: These are often thought to be infant elements that should be overcome by 
the modem, ripe thought. I believe that the postmodern discussion of identity partly 
arises from frustration with this modem view of a person, and as Horkheimer and 
Adomo assert the necessity of reflecting upon the ideas of enlightemnent, I also want to 
review the concept of personal identity in modem thought from the postmodern 
perspective. 
In relation to Horkheimer and Adomo on the failings of the modem, I mention 
Lyotard's discussion of names. He asks 'whether this failing could be connected to a 
resistance on the part of what I shall call the multiplicity of worlds of names, the 
insurmountable diversity of cultures. ' Names in this context correlate with unique 
proper nouns which are learnt not independently but in the context of their own local 
narratives. Through involvement in a specific event, names obtain their singularities, 
and Lyotard indicates that this system of names is opposed to that by which the modem 
Ideas direct their course. The grand narratives 'involve precisely an "overcoming" 
[depassement] of a particular cultural identity in favour of a universal civic identity'. 316 
Here, we find resonances of Horkheimer and Adorno, who also claim that the loss of 
316 Lyotard (1992, pp. 44-45). 
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names becomes a reality through enlightenment's project. The extinction of names is 
the modem aim for the sake of founding universal history, because specificity shows is 
related to belonging to a particular community's history. 
3 18 Lyotard's answer to tile 
elimination of the locality of names by the modem is: 'let us activate the differends and 
save the honour of the name'. 319 That which escapes from the totality of the modem is 
the postmodern, and Lyotard takes part in this conflict with un versa ity. 
We have seen the discontinuity between the modem and the postmodern, and the 
manner in which the postmodern criticises the modem. However, the postmodern is not 
only a criticism of the modem establishment but its essence resides in the ability to open 
a new discourse. In order to examine this characteristic, considering the status of 
science in Lyotard's thought will be helpful. He mentions 'postmodern science' as one 
of the postmodem discourses which is distinguished from modem scientific knowledge 
because of its potentiality to open new discussions. 
Postmodern Discourse in the Case of Science 
Modem science is defined by Lyotard as aiming to establish a stable theory and system 
by which phenomena in the universe can be estimated accurately. 320 It is conducive to 
317 'If unitary knowledge is the only norm which theory has left, praxis must be handed 
over to the unfettered operation of world history ... The oldest fear, that of losing one's 
own name, is being fulfilled'(Horkheimer and Adorno, 2002, pp. 23-24). 
318 The name of a hero in a particular community is respected as that of a great person 
for its members, but in universal history, the significance of the name in that 
community is reduced and the hero is regarded not as a particular member of that 
community but as a member of the whole class of human beings. 
319 Lyotard (1992, p. 25). 
320 This modern science is the science that was mentioned in chapter two. To make 
clear the difference, I will call itmodern science'and science which tries to make a new 
paradigm is called 'p ostmodern science' afterwards. 
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the reinforcement of its theory for the sake of the improvement of its performance, so an 
act, which maintains its field, is understood to strengthen the paradigm of the study. 321 
In modem science, uncertain experimental elements are sometimes treated as 
irregularities or errors in the theory. The discovery of the universal theory by which a 
law of the universe can be explained is an ambition of modem science. Such an ideal 
has been pursued in, for example, Francis Bacon's idea of I one universal science' and in 
Einstein's dream of founding a unified field theory to encompass the electromagnetic 
322 field and gravitational field. 
In contrast, postmodern science is interpreted as pursuing a new form of discourse 
that is not represented by modem theory. 323 If the aim of modem science is to maintain 
its paradigm, postmodern science is the attempt to include extraordinary within a theory. 
It actively acknowledges the possibility that its theory might consist of contradictory 
elements, and it tries to include them rather than remove them. Due to these 
characteristics, Lyotard inlcudes postmodem science in the list of little narratives that do 
not have an authorised and fixed position but can expand their discussion all around. 324 
321 The use of 'paradigm' is owed to Thomas Kuhn. 'Normal science, 'which corresponds 
to modern science in Lyotard's thought, is the science that establishes its ground in 
which theory develops, so it acquires its own paradigm. It generally rejects anomalies, 
though if they are too significant, a new paradigm may be required (Kuhn, 1970). 
322 As a case of modern science, Lyotard cites the theory of thermodynamics whichis in 
theory always calculable, between heat and work, hot source and cold source, input and 
output. 'It is essential for modern science to improve performance, and that 
performativity is reduced to a system of input (energy which is expended in the 
process) and output (results which are brought about by the operation) (1984, pp. 47- 
55). 
323 'Postmodern science'is a risky word to use, because some scientists may rebut it as 
postmodernist irreverence. I only use this term in order to characterise Lyotard's 
thought, and I believe that the term is helpful within this scope. However, I do not 
intend to discuss its definition farther. For more criticism of this use, see, e, g., Alan 
Sokal and Jean Bricmont (1998). 
324 'We no longer have recourse to the grand narratives ... as a validation for postmodern 
scientific discourse. But ... the little narrative 
[petit r6cit] remains the quintessential 
form of imaginative invention, most particularly in science' (Lyotard, 1984., p. 60). 
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Thus, postmodem science is described as the quest for a resolution of tile crisis of 
determinism, which is defined as the 'hypothesis upon which legitimation by 
performativity is based. 025 The study of G6del's theorem, part of dynamics, quantum 
mechanics, and atomic physics are enumerated as varieties of postmodern science in 
which the scope of knowledge can be illuminated by a new vision. Lyotard does not 
intend to examine the scientific accuracy of these theories but he uses them to explain 
his notion of postmodem narratives. The status of observation is detennined according 
to the particular conditions of its process, and the outcome is unsta e in t lis situation. 
'Mis instability can be an essential factor for postmodern science, because it has the 
potential to produce an unexpected shift in theory. 326 If reference to Kuhn's thought is 
allowed, Lyotard's intention can be described as directed towards the moment at which 
a new paradigm arises through the verification of anomalies. Not for strengthening the 
paradigm but as the creation of another paradigm, is what Lyotard illustrates as 
postmodern science and the activity of little naffatives. 
If we apply these different manners of science to the case of personal identity, it 
can be said that its traditional theories are influenced by the principle of modem science 
by which any phenomenon can be explained logically. It is a hope that the universe can 
be governed by scientific knowledge through the development of human reason, as 
exemplified in Newton's law of universal gravitation and Leibniz' monadology. Nature 
could be explicated scientifically and such a theory is applicable under any 
circumstance. I assume that the expansion of the modem concept of personal identity is 
325 Ibid., 53-4. 
326 Lyotard calls the act which makes a new move 'paralogy. The postmodern science is 
not in the'expert's homology'which reconciles differences between language games, but 
in the'inventor's paralogy'which pursues the method for establishing a new paradigm 
(1984, p. xxv). 
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partly owed to this idea of science, in which the fundamental nature of human beings is 
though to be universal. On another understanding, human beings may be thought to 
possess so-called perfect identity, that is, an entire entity that is not transformable. This 
is a negative of scientific understanding, but not be involved in postmodern discussion. 
On the other hand, the multiplicity of postmodem science may correspond to the 
dissolution of identity. This is another way to describe a person not as a highly 
individual and unified existence but as a more fluid and momentary one. We need 
further consideration to grasp this view, so I will focus upon this point in the next 
section. 
Postmodem science for Lyotard is the activity that is against the principle of 
performance, which manages a system for the purpose of gaining time. Good 
performance is the modem principle, and 'good' means how much we can save time for 
making more products. Things that are not calculable are unpredictable in tenns of their 
outcome, 'so they are not 'good' for performance. However, Lyotard evaluates them as a 
way to evade the modem Ideas. This is the gist of postmodem thought represented in 
terms of the doubt of the modem, through which Lyotard tries to sketch out the 
transfonnations of social status in the postmodern age. 
4.5. The Linkage of Phrases and the Concept of Personal Identity 
In Lyotard's discussion, 'narrative' is an essential concept, but later he is interested 
rather in elements of narratives; what he calls 4phrases'. Although narrative is still a 
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central conception in his arguments, he also reflects on his works and says that he 
'exaggerated the importance to be given the narrative genre, ' and appeals to the 
necessity of considering the distinction 'between different regimes of phrases and 
different genres of discourse'. 327 This notion is particularly disclosed in The Differend, 
in which the phrase and the linkage of phrases are the main theme. Although this topic 
is mentioned in chapter two, it is worth re-examining in the context of the postmodern. 
The matter of a phrase outlines bounds of narrative and leaves clues to the concept of 
personal identity, so we shall observe the role of phrases, mainly referring to The 
Differend. 
Linkage is defined as an unavoidable condition of phrases. A phrase links to 
another phrase in any circumstances, because to make a phrase is to connect it with 
prior and later phrases. A doubt or rejection of a phrase also takes the form of a phrase, 
and even silence is interpreted as an expression in the context of discourse. Therefore, 
according to Lyotard, all issues are reduced to the way in which one phrase links to 
another. If there is a phrase that takes a question form and there are other phrases that 
can be linked to that, to choose one phrase is to choose the genre of discourse in which 
the phrases are understood. 328 Imagine there is a phrase and that we need to decide our 
attitude towards it. Whatever it is, positive, negative, or ambivalent, to choose the 
phrase that links with another is to detennine the genre of discourse, or so to speak, a 
sort of a language game. If there is a phrase 'Would you like fish?, ' another phrase that 
links to it might be, for example, 'I prefer meat, ' 'I am very worried about marine 
327 Lyotard (1992, p. 3 1). 
328 See, for example, Wittgenstein on propositions: 'A proposition is a sign in a system of 
signs. It is one combination of signs among a number of possible ones, and as opposed 
to other possible ones. As it were one position of an indicator as opposed to other 
possible ones'(1974, p. 131). 
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pollution, and the govcmments must takc action against it, ' or 'I actually havc a big fish 
tank in which various tropical fishes are kept. 'Mey arc more beautiful than gcnisl'I'his 
is very simple case, but is an example of the way in which the sequence of phrases 
forms the pattem of discourse. 
Lyotard sees that narrative is a relatively consistent fonn. When phrases arc put 
into narrative structure, they are given certain roles and suitable positions in the story, so 
it offers stability to phrases. Wherever the narration stops, it makes the end of the story 
from which we retroactively reorganise it and give order and meaning to its cvcnts. I'lic 
end suppresses the conflict between events in the story by providing an interpretation of 
it as if there were a great conclusion of acts. T'lius, to put phrases in a narrative form is 
to give a certain plot to them in which the beginning and the cnd of the story arc derined. 
Even an interrupted or unfinished story has an end, in that the story stops, and we j udge 
the whole story by looking over it from beginning to end. The narrative which makes 
phrases homogenous is described as follows: 
The vicus, the home, the Heim is a zone in which the diffcrcnd between genres of discourse is 
suspended. An "internal" peace is brought at the price of perpetual diffcrcnds on the outskirts. 
(The same arrangement goes for the ego, that of scif-idcritification. ) This internal peace is 
made through narratives that accredit the community of proper namcs as they accredit 
themselves. The TbIk shuts itself up in the Heim, and it identifies itself through narratives 
attached to names, narrative that fail before the occurrence and before the differends born 
from the occurrence. 329 
The internal peace of society is compared to self-identification in this paragraph, and 
narrative gives calm and repose to both. The work of narrative is understood as locating 
329 Lyotard (1988, p. 151). 
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phrases where they should be, so narrative tames war bctwccil the phrases in its 
framework. 
In contrast to the internal peace, the border zone of narrative is sct as a batticricid 
of phrases and discourses: 'A phrase, which links and which is to be linked, is always a 
pagus, a border zone where genres of discourse enter into conflict ovcr the modc of 
linking ... [P]agani waging war among the genres of discoursc., 
330 I'lle rule of linkage of 
phrases is determined in the secure place, but heretical thoughts are expelled from the 
inner place. They must seek new phrases because they do not rind a proper place in that 
narrative. Hence, it is a struggle to find an expression for a not-yct-rcaliscd idea. 11is is 
the place for little narratives which do not belong to a complete and stable story but go 
in quest for a new way of linkage. This view of phrases reveals the minimum of the 
narrative form, in which there are always residues that are not dissolvcd in the nctwork 
of coherent phrases. 
The unity of a person is compared to the unity of narrative in the first half of 
chapter two, so personal identity in this case is also supposed to be consistent and 
continuous. However, a person tends to be described as a mote fluid and unstable 
existence in postmodern thought, in which a person is reduced to transient actions at a 
particular time rather than the subject that undertakes the whole life story. I assumc that 
the concept of identity on this understanding is more compatible with a link of phrascs 
than with the unity of narrative. 
An instance that plainly depicts the dispersion of a person can be represented by a 
series of Cindy Sherman's photographs. In each shot, a woman appears in different hair 
styles, clothes, fashion, make-up, and situations. Although these are the same person, 
W Ibid., 
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Cindy Sherman, we have an illusion that the persons in the photographs arc diffcrctit. 
She directs herself in diverse modes. Her work looks like a collection or actress' 
photographs, comprised of various film stills, though her photographs do not belong to 
any specific story. When people see her products, they may be drivcn to ask which 
shows the real her, or at least is the closest image of tile everyday Cindy Sherman. I'his 
will be an empty question to her, because every character just performs momentary 
roles on each occasion. Craig Owens sees tile insecurity of identity in Shmnan's work: 
'while we can presume to recognize the same person, we arc forced at the same time to 
recognize a trembling around the edges of that identity., 331 It can be said that we can 
catch a glimpse of the act in a series of her photographs that attempts to fasten hcrsclf 
together just for an instant. 
Shermans's early work, in which her fashions evoke in readers some typical 
female fashions in monochrome films, television programs, or male magazincs, can 
imply the lack of reality of those characters and the existence only of acts (1995,2003, 
Lisa Philips, 2004). 1 stress that her works are, nonetheless, not an insistence that 
individuals are reduced to a set of roles in society, as Erving Goffinan asserts. 332 To play 
roles for Goffman is to take up positions which are socially required, but in Shcrrnan's 
work the social meaning is also lost. David Harvey analyses hcr activity as sparate 
from existing institutions: 'The interest of Cindy Slicrman's, photographs ... is that tllcy 
focus on masks without commenting directly on social meanings other than on the 
activity of masking itself. 033 Her performance is recorded in stills from non-cxistcnt 
films that do not connect with each other, so there is no nieta-story that unifics the stills. 
331 Owens (1987, p. 75). 
332 Goffman (1956). 
333 Harvey (1989, p. 10 1). 
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The roles that she plays are mostly produced in accordance with her imagination, so it is 
not necessary to understand them in association with social requirements. 
This does not mean that people completely abandon flicir rolcs and tasks in socicty 
and only live as imaginary characters, though that disposition seems to have increased 
in the present era. In the age in which the worth of the experiences of the former 
generation decline sharply, the firm meaning of a role, which must be secured by society, 
also faces its collapse. The concept of the sense of reality needs to be questioned in this 
situation, and the meaning of identity is also reconsidered. 
We establish the consistency of life through a connection between experiences by 
a narrative approach which gives 'intemal peace" to phrases. Nonetheless, tlicrc is also 
dissolution that cannot be located in the unity of narrative but always goes beyond its 
boundary. Ibis can be contrasted with those phrases which cnter conflicts in ordcr to 
create their own discourses. I do not deny the role of narrative understanding in making 
the context of our experiences, but insist that inconsistent elements, which arc usually 
ignored as surplus or heresy, are also unavoidable aspects in our formation. 
11iis is the outline of what I call 'postmodern identitY'that breaks up the unity of a 
person which is cultivated by the modem. I will examine more closely, particularly in 
relation to the present media, but before we become fully involved in that topic, we 
shall discuss other features of the postmodem. We have not yet cxamincd scmal 
aspects, one of them being the notion of the 'classic'. Lyotard stresses locality in his 
discussion of little narratives, but it is not tile same as the locality that is grounded on 
the immediate connection between narratives and communities. Participation in little 
narratives is not the return to the pre-modem situation, so we should tnakc c1car their 
differences. Therefore, I will next look at tile notion of the classic in Lyotard's 
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discussion and then move to the non-chronological understanding or the postmodcrn, 
the modem, and the classic. 
4.6. Traditional Knowledge in the Classic 
Grand narratives represent the modem, little narratives charactcrisc the postmodcm, and 
one more term which is compared to these is the classic. We examined different types of 
identity in the former chapter, in which the rise of modem personal identity as located in 
the era of the medium of printing. The media of oral communication and hand writing 
were defined as characterising the period in which the concept of personal idcntity was 
indicated but not yet realised. In the ages of those media, people are supposed to put 
their sympathy into collective identity within the community. I locate the period of the 
classic in the era in which a tight relation between members of a community is kcpt, and 
in which lives are not widely separate from narratives. Although Lyotard does not linlit 
the classic to oral and writing cultures, I assume that they can be compared with those 
societies that are involved in traditional narratives. 
The classic is characterised in relation to knowledge in general. Knowledge in 
generall involves numerous criteria of judgement in ordinary life, so it must be 
applicable to miscellaneous conditions in response to circumstanccs. 334 It is not only 
used for acquiring a definite answer based on evidence, but also for taking proper steps 
334 This knowledge 'includes notions of "know-how, " "knowing-how to live, ""how to 
listen, " etc. Knowledge, then, is a question Of Competence that goes beyond the simple 
determination and application of the criterion of truth'(1984, p. xx). 
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to meet a particular situation. Knowledge in general, or as I shall call it 'traditional 
narratives, ' is characterised by Lyotard in terms of four points. First, it indicates basic 
rules through the actions and outcomes of characters in the stories of n community. 
There is a hero, a heroine, trials, and a great purpose in a story, and charactcrs' 
successes or failures teach what is evaluated or prohibited in the community. Second, it 
allows for a multiplicity of statements. It is natural for traditional narratives to include 
plural discourses which belong to different categories in modern scientific knowledge. 
In modem science, for example, we do not mention any admonition of human arrogance 
in a biological description of a species, but myth can contain these diffcrcnt catcgorics 
in a story; as for example the reason why the spider was created and why people must 
not take an overbearing attitude. 335 
Third, these narratives do not only convey inforniation in their contents, but also 
imply the tacit understandings of a community. Through participation in storytelling. 
people learn the proper attitudes of storyteller and audience, and learn what 
qualifications are necessary to be a storyteller and audience. Ilicse arc not dircctly 
mentioned in a story, but are woven into the rule of storytelling. Finally, they do not 
need require meta-narratives in order to prove tlicir legitimacy. Culture is already 
authorised in its origin, and in the same way traditional narratives are also self- 
legitimated. TIle issue of legitimacy will be considered further in a later section. 
Traditional narratives are comprised of particular names and events in a culture. 
The case of the Cashinahua Indian in South America is often referred to by Lyotard 
when he explains his notion of a traditional community. Ilic narratives of the 
335 For instance, a Greek myth explains why the goddess created thespider (the 
mythical origin of the spider), due to the haughtiness of one girl (the admonition of 
arrogance). Biological explanations of the origin of the spider today never include ally 
moral element. 
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Cashinahua are important only for the members of tile community, and the community 
is the only world for them: 'The bond woven around "Cashinalitia" names by theses 
narratives procures an identity that is solely "Cashinalma" . '336 Ilicy do not havc any 
intention of extending their narratives in terms of involving othcr cointnunitics outsidc 
of their society. The community of Cashinaliua is the universe for its members, so cvcn 
though they may have the concept of 'others' for the people who live outside their 
community, these people's names would generally not appear in their narrativcs. The 
Cashinahua's narratives contain only Cashinahua people, and there is no objective to 
make universal history over 'other' people. 
Lyotard evaluates the capacity of traditional narratives to hold a diversity of plural 
statements, but is also conscious of the limitation of this method. Traditional narratives 
are flexible within the framework of the belonging community, but they do not reach 
outside the community. These narratives can escape from the decline of grand 
narratives, because they are formed by different legitimacies from the grand 
narratives. 337 The traditional narratives do not need to confimi tlicir privilcgcd status 
since they are already authorised in the community. However, they have at any rate lost 
their domination through being attacked by modem science as superstition and not the 
centre of the world but one of many local narratives. 
In addition, the classic is also dissolved by the postmodern, becausc it breaks the 
boundary of the community by which tile domination of traditional narratives is 
preserved. These are the characterisitcs of traditional narratives, and although they can 
offer us a different view from that of the grand narratives, we who have undergone the 
33G Lyotard (1988, p. 155). 
337 Lyotard (1992, p. 31). 
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postmodem criticism of etlmocentrism cannot live in peace in the position of the classic. 
The differences between the three terms are also represented by ideas of idcntity 
found in each view. The modem is represented by belief in the dcvcloptncnt of 
humanity by the use of reason. The modem concept of personal idcritity is bascd oil the 
ideal that the unity of actions makes continuity of identity of a person through life. The 
concept of the identity in postmodem thought is concerned with the denial of the above 
views and disperses unification. Features of the classic reside in the close connection 
between narratives and the members of a community, because they arc assumed to 
identify themselves through collective identity more than personal identity. Although 
the postmodern and the classic might be thought to be similar in that both of them 
refuse to accept the universal idea, the reason is different; whether the local is thought to 
be the whole world or not. Traditional narratives do not need to acquire universality. 
Since their authority is already established in the community, they do not regard 
themselves as local. Locality in postmodern narratives contains, before everything else, 
ascent from the abandonment of the meta aspect, so it is not unconscious of its 
peculiarity but dares to stay in that position. 
The discussion until now has allowed us to interpret the characteristics of cach 
term in relation to the chronological understanding, but Lyotard Icans toward dcnying 
that understanding, especially in his later texts. We need to examine this non- 
chronological view in Lyotard's work as well, or we may miss the essence of his notion 
of the postmodern. 
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4.7. The Modern and the Postmodern as Movements 
The postmodem is defined not only as a period in time but also as a niovcmcnt of 
thought, art, literature, politics, and so on. This non-chronological division in Lyotard's 
thought is specifically analysed in the article 'Answer to the Qucstion: What is 
Postmodern? ' in relation to features of art. 338 Lyotard does not use a generally accepted 
categorisation of postmodem and modem art in this article, but expresses his o%%m 
classification of them. His answer to the question, 'what is the condition of postmodcrn 
artT is surnmarised in this passage: 'What then is the postmodcm? ... It is undoubtedly 
part of the modem ... A work can become modem only if it is first postmodem. '339 
work of art is, for him, the attempt to create a new field through criticising 
predecessors' achievements. If it is successful in establishing its own field, this field 
will then be challenged by the next generation as the existing authority. In this manncr, 
every art work first occurs as the postmodem (challenging to find a new cxprcssion), 
and then becomes the modem (already possessing the method of expression). Anything 
which was once received, Lyotard insists, must be rcconsidcrcd as the ground its 
successors, and this is one understanding of the difference between the postmodern and 
the modem. 
To grasp the postmodcm as a movement of thought is to understand art works not 
in fixed positions in art history but in flexible positions that are interpreted in relation to 
other works. In this context the postmodern is regarded not as the cnd of the modem but 
338 This article is consciously written to respond to Ilabermag's criticism of the 
postmodern in which modernity is explained in relation to aesthetics. Thus, 4, otard 
also examines the status of art in the modern and postmodern movements. 
339 Ibid., pp. 21-22. 
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as a modem 'nascent state, and this state is recurrent. 
340 Every innovative work first 
appears as the postmodem, and then becomes the modem. T'his is one explanation of the 
non-chronological division between the postniodern and the modern. Lyotard is, 
nonetheless, not completely satisfied with this answer, which seems to him too 
automatic and mechanistic to produce postmodern, thought, and he analyses ftirthcr the 
characteristic of the postmodem. 
A postmodern attitude for him is more a lively action than a systcniatic operation 
which brings postmodem movements to the former position of the tnodcrn. tic grasps it 
as the struggle to embody something that cannot be expressed in the existing framework. 
The newness of the presentation is supposed to give unpleasantness to people rather 
than comfort; the work has not been previously known, and people are not yet prcparcd 
to accept it. Relief and repose are offered by the alreadyý-known, and this is regarded as 
the work of modem art. The work of postmodem art does not follow existing rules but 
creates them by itself, and this is understood to be tile role of philosophy as well: 
The postmodern artist or writer is in the position of a philosophcr: the text he %NTitcs or the 
work he creates is not in principle governed by prc-establishcd rulcs and cannot bc judgcd 
according to a determinant judgement, by the application of given categories to this text or 
work. Such rules and categories are what the work or text is invcstigating. I'lic artists and the 
writer therefore work without rules, and in order to establish the rules for %Nhat is-III hmv becti 
Made. 341 
Ile insists that those who seek better presentation for something which is utiprcscntable 
are engaged in a philosophical task. In The Differend we see the same idea about 
philosophy: 'What is at stake in a literature, in a philosophy, in a politics perhaps, is to 
w Ibid., p. 22. 
341 Ibid., p. 24. 
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bear witness to differends by finding idioms for thcin, ' for the phrases which have 
sought 'new rules for forming and linking. 
042 Somcthing which cannot bc collcctcd by 
the modem system is left as the excess of society that must bc released, and to give a 
presentation of the unpresentable is understood as tile work of the postmodcm. Ilius, 
the postmodern. as a movement is concerned with producing not consolation but tile 
unearthly. I believe that this understanding of the postmodcrn offers the opportunity to 
take notice of the strange in our identity. 343 
This is the approach by which the discontinuity between the modem and 
postmodem. is explained as a matter of different modes. Brian McIlalc skctclics their 
differences in a discussion of fiction: 'tile dominant of modernist fiction is 
epistemological, ' while 'the dominant of postmodernist fiction is ontological". Mcilaic 
analyses the mode of fiction in each movement in terms of which question is asked in 
each: The modernist's question is thought to be concerned with how T can intcrprct and 
record the world in which I am located. The postmodemist's question is more 'post- 
cognitive'; what kind of the worlds (or selves) they arc. 344 Although Mcl lale does not 
insist on the necessity of a non-chronological view for comprehending these terms, his 
thought helps us to grasp the manner of depicting them by dif'fcrcnt modes. 
In relation to the issue of identity, the best way to grasp the modem and 
postmodem as different movements is to make clear the conflict between them. 
Postmodem identity is not a mere idea that comes after the modem concept of personal 
identity, but it works to disclose the shortcomings of the modem one. This is thc reason 
that I would like to examine the postmodem not only in chronological terms but also as 
342 Lyotard (1988, p. 13). 
343'They [postmodern artists and writers] "bear witness" to the unpresentable rather 
than trying to hide from it in a false nostalgia'(Sim, 1996, p. 48). 
344 AIcHale (1989, pp. 9*10). 
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a movement. Moreover, if the modem and postmodern can be described as movements, 
they might coexist as different manners of thought. In the same way, I infcr, both 
modem and postmodern identity can be possessed by a person. We arc usually not 
completely segmented existences but tell stories about ourselves. Ilius, a sense of unity 
is left intact; while we also become the diffusion of unity. 
The modem ideal has worked to make tile concept of a pcrson as an intc1ligcnt 
and progressing existence through consensus. It is natural for us to regard the proper 
concept of a person as that of unified and rational existences to the extent that we treat 
inconsistent elements of ourselves negatively. 345 However and tlicrcforc, the matter of 
diffusion has arisen in terms of seeking the means of making differences in i entity, 
because these are also elements of which we consist. I interpret the following quotation 
from Lyotard in this manner: 
Postmodern does not signify recent. It signifies how writing, in the broadest scnsc or thought 
and action, is situated after it has succumbed to the contagion of modemity and has tried to 
cure itself of it. Now, modernity is not recent either. It is not even an epoch. It is another state 
of writing, in the broad sense of the word'. 346 
Because we have experienced and were affected by the modem movement, the 
reconsideration of it is necessary if we endeavour to develop a critical view of ourselves. 
This is a reason for understanding these two as different IIIOVenlCntS, 110t thoughts 
successive in history. Therefore, it can be said that we today havc lived in postmodern 
34.5 As an example of a discussion of the modern rejection of inconsistency of a person, I 
cite the research of madness by Michel Foucault. He depicts the way to expel uncanny 
things from society, and argues that the definition of madness can change in different 
periods of time. (1989). 
346 Lyotard (1997, pp. 95-96). 
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times, but that the modem and the classic are not exterminated; these thrce have 
contended with each other. I define the present situation as the tinic in which an 
inclination towaras the postmodem has intensified in various arcas, and thc mcaning of 
the modem and the classic have been reconsidercd from the postmodern pcrspcctivc. 
This is my view of the postmodern, and the matter of identity today will be more 
understandable if we examine it in the light of the postmodern. 
Lastly in this chapter, I shall examine two topics that are concerned with the 
non-chronological view of the postmodem, modem, and classic. If we rcad Lyotard's 
texts bearing in mind this understanding, some of his notions become more transparent. 
One is the different way in which each is legitimiscd, and tile other is the qucstion of 
whether or not the 'breaking up of grand narratives' is merely another grand narrativc. 
The former relates to the status of identity in pre-modem, modem, and postmodern 
narratives, and the second will help for us to grasp more fimily the condition of the 
postmodem. 
4.8. The Legitimacy Problem and the Status of Little Narratives 
We have seen some of the particularities of the classic, modern, and postmodcrn, and 
this section will centre upon the scope within which they settle the legitimacy of tlicir 
narratives. Lyotard compares the legitimacy of the modern and that of the classic in 
order to reveal the points at which the authority of cach is located, so wc start our 
discussion with the legitimacies of these two. 'nie narrative of cniancipation givcs Was 
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to people that have not yet been actualiscd, so people arc expected to devote tliciiisclvcs 
to the forthcoming future: 'Unlike myths, however, they [grand narratives] look for 
legitimacy not in an original founding act but in a future to be acconiplislicd, that is, hi 
an Idea to be realised. This Idea ... has 
legitimating value because it is univcrsal. 347 A 
meta-narrative promises to bring the Idea to fruition, and people promote the narrative 
in the belief that the promise will turn into reality. Thus, the legitimacy of mcta- 
narratives is a matter of the time to come, and their authority is not already founded in 
its origin but is always under construction. 
In contrast with the meta-narratives, traditional narratives have lcgitirnacy in tlicir 
origin. Traditional narratives are a part of culture that consists of the manners, morals, 
and knowledge of a certain society. If there is such a thing as the legitimacy of culture, 
it is to be found in its history, that is, in its having been established and accepted for a 
long time and having constructed the basis of a community. 348, n, C same rule can be 
applied to the legitimacy of the classic, because it is inseparably connected to culture. 
The classic does not need to confirm its legitimacy by relying on the promised future, 
but the fact that it tightly relates to the history of the community gives it authority, so 
traditional narratives are already legitimated in their nature. 349 
In the narrative which is inseparable from its locality, tile question of the 
continuity of a person as an independent and individual does not arise natumlly, as I 
have repeatedly mentioned before. Collective identity is fostered in this circumstance. 
In contrast, the narrative that sets its realisation in the future can systcniatisc pcople in a 
347 Lyotard (1992, pp. 29-30). 
348 Lyotard describes the way in which traditional narratives 'define what has the right 
to be said and done in the culture in question, and since they are themselves a part of 
that culture, they are legitimated by the simple fact that they do what they do'(198-1, p. 
23). 
349 Ibid., pp. 18-23. 
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way that reaches beyond their localities, because they are lcfl in a situation in which 
every one is equal in respect of waiting for the achievement of the narrative. Any person 
can participate in that narrative if they believe in it, and this is the reason that grand 
narratives can be universal. 
In addition, this type of narrative requires awareness of independence from 
traditional restrictions, because a participant must make a decision and devote 
themselves to the narrative beyond regional boundaries. Mentioning the case of religion, 
free participation is a necessary condition of being a universal religion, so for example, 
Christianity accepts its believers irrespective of culture, region, and race. On the other 
hand, indigenous religions often only include those people who live in a particular 
region. Although there are numerous sorts of local religions, they usually conticct to 
ancestors and rigidly regulate the life of the community. They exclude those people 
exterior to the region, and because of this restriction, the security of the interior is 
maintained. 
Tbus, the legitimacy of the little narratives is also founded upon a different 
position from that of traditional and modem narratives. Postmodem science is an 
example appropriate to the clarification of this point. I'lie role of postmodern science is 
to produce 'not the known, but unknown, ' so it acts not to maintain existing theory but 
to find explanations for the unintelligible. 350 Its legitimacy is neither rooted in the origin 
of narratives nor promises to bring a better future, but pursues discoveries that may 
transform the basis of the existing style of knowledge. If postmodern science can be 
verified in its performance, it would be in the activity of producing various sorts of 
discourses: 'The only legitimation that can make this kind of request admissible is that 
350 Ibid., p. 60. 
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it will generate ideas, in other words, new statements. 351 The work of invcnting anothcr 
move for players sustains the exercise of postmodern narratives, so they locate their 
legitimacy not in the past or future, but in the process of seeking new ideas. 
This legitimacy is set against both the classic and the niodcrn. It works as a 
disturbance of the closed microcosm as well as the utmost quality of cosmopolitan 
view. It pays attention to the movement at a particular moment rather than in the distant 
past or future. As to the aspect of identity, collective identity is authoriscd by the culture 
to which it belongs from its beginning. Modem personal identity on this undcrstan ing 
is an aim that must be achieved, so the concept of a person is always on the way to 
being developed. If there is an unusual aspect of one's behaviour in general 
circumstances, it must be due to immaturity. Postmodem identity is featured as making 
narrative peace disintegrate. It reveals a side that is not evaluated by modern identity, 
and seeks a way to include residues, differences, or fragmentation of a person in its 
range. 
Therefore, the legitimacy of each of the three terms is set in a different 
perspective; in the past, in the promised future, and in the present action. As we can see 
in the beginning of The Postmodern Condition, Lyotard mentions the chronological 
description of the postmodern. 352 However, in later writing, lie is more involved in 
another way of distinguishing these three temis in which they are dealt with as modes of 
thought, as described above. The postmodern and modern in the previous section are 
presented not in terms of a chronological distinction that positions the postmodem after 
351 Ibid., p. 65. 
352 For example, in the following sentence he adopts the chronological division. 'Our 
working hypothesis is that the status of knowledge is altered as societies enter what is 
known as the postindustrial age and cultures enter what is known as the postmodern 
age'(Ibid., p. 3). 
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the modem, but are counted as different movements Of thoUght. 
353 If tjlC modcm was 
not understood historically, it would be defined by its legitimacy, and it is one of the 
ideas that Lyotard tries to confirm by the introduction of the non-chronological division. 
One more example that will characterise this non-chronological understanding Is 
the status of the breaking up of grand narratives. This issue does not directly comiccted 
to the study of identity, but it can be considered as long as tile status of the postmodcrn 
is the matter of discussion. A response to the question, whether the denial of grand 
narratives is also a grand narrative or not, is to some extent a matter of opinion, bccausc 
0 354 it is determined by what attitude people take towards the fall of grand narratives. For 
instance, a narrative of the breaking up of the grand narratives, which I shortcn to the 
4narrative of the ending, ' can be thought of as one of the nicta-discourscs in the 
following cases. When we face the narrative of the ending, we might be porificd by a 
picture which depicts conflicts rather than agreement, fragmentation rather than 
unification. It brings about a disunity of things that is not easy for us to accept, because 
it relates to dissimilar, unfamiliar, and strange matters. As Iforkheinicr and Adomo 
indicate, 'Humans believe themselves ftee of fear when thcrc is no longer anything 
unknown'. 355 We feel relieved when heterodoxy, the stranger, or dissonance is exiled 
from our habitat, so removal of the unknown is the general desire of most societies. 
353 Lyotard, for example, understands that Augustine's thought shows characteristics of 
the modern in his writing style as well as in his emphasis on eschatology, which 
arranges the denouncement of human beings and recovery from evil and sin at the end 
of the Christian narrative (1992, pp. 35-36, p. 54,1997, p. 96). 
354 For example, J. M. Bernstein says that to tell of the end of ideas is also to indicate 
the establishment of one Idea: 'even the deracinated social world of capital, governed, 
tendentially, by temporary contracts, is still a world, social and historical in its roots; 
and so inevitably legitimates itself through grand narratives repeatingly telling tile 
story of the end of grand narrative, the end of ideology, the end of metaphysics from 
Descartes to Lyotard'(1991, p. 110). 
W 13 Horkheimer and Adorno (2002, p. 11). 
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However, if there is no meta-rule which has the legitimacy to expel difTerciiccs, 
and this is the case for postmodem narratives, it would bring dread to us. We in these 
circumstances might wish to cling to the breaking up of grand narratives as the last 
grand narrative which gives us relief and stability. Whatever its contents, dcrinitivc 
thought can offer a sense of security to people who want to rely on a firni bclicf. If 
people accepted the narrative of the ending as their absolute principle, they would 
exhaust themselves by sticking to the principle. This may lead to futile nihilism which 
implies the worthlessness of all value and the nullity of all acts. I'lic namtivc of the 
ending would be one of the grand narratives if people comprchend it in this manncr. 
On another occasion on which the narrative of tile ending is counted as a nicta- 
narrative, people might choose a return to religious consolation instead of participating 
in the postmodem situation. 356 They might declare that grand narrativcs arc 
untrustworthy, so we must re-establish the reliable narrative that sheds light on the 
return to the origin, to religion. People who hold this opinion take advantage of the 
narrative of the ending in terms of its scaring people with the image that the narrative 
presents. Thus, it is used to appeal to the legitimacy of the restoration of religion. It is 
the trend in which people want to revert to religion in order to recstablish a trustworthy 
narrative by which they will give order to a chaotic situation. Daniel Bell stresses the 
power of religion to recover the consistency of society that returns 'us to the existential 
predicaments which are the ground of humanity and care for others. ' In his opinion, the 
reconsideration of the value of religion is a necessary condition for regaining morality 
336'Many believe this is the moment for religion, a moment to rebuild a credible 
narration where the wounds of this fin-de-si6cle will be recounted, where they will be 
healed ... 
But this course of action, it seems to me, is far from being j'ust'(4-otad, 1992, 
p. 4 1). 
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today. 
357 
If the narrative of the ending only led to the above attitudes, it would not escapc 
from the shadow of the meta-narratives. Nonetheless, it can also be describcd diffcrcntly, 
and in order to discuss this point we will consider whether or not the characteristics of 
the narrative of the ending coincide with those of grand narrativcs. First of all, we 
should reiterate that the narrative of the ending only implies the situation in which mcta- 
narratives have lost their legitimacy. It does not suggest any future emancipation by 
means of distrust of the modem Ideas. Future or hope is not the matter of the narrative 
of the ending, because 'Hope is what belongs to a subject of history who prorniscs 
him/berself-or to whom has been promised-a final perfection'. 358 The narrative of 
ending is concerned with neither the final narrative nor the perfect conclusion, but rather 
incites reconsideration of the existing authority. 
Furthermore, if the narrative of the ending is lacking in the hope of emancipation, 
the legitimacy of this narrative cannot be found in the future. It highlights the situation 
in which the validity of the desire for universal history is doubtcd, but does not hold tip 
any ideal by which it takes up the position that was occupied by the modern Ideas. If 
people question the role of this narrative, the answer would be that it is a movement that 
incites pictures of the world which cannot be drawn by the modern. Ilius, it tells of no 
release, no definitive future, and no final narratives. These characteristics belong to little 
narratives, not to meta-narratives. Hence, the 'breaking up of the grand narratives' is not 
a kind of meta-discourse due to the lack of any intention of establishing any univcrsal 
ideal. It joins in the work of producing a new discourse, so I place it in the category of 
357 Bell (1976). 
m Lyotard (1997, p. 99). 
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the little narratives. 
Lyotard himself recognises the possibility that the narrative of the ending is 
accepted as one of the grand narratives, and suggests that the collapse of authority has 
already been pointed out: 'the grand narrative of decadence was already in place at tile 
beginning of Western thought, in Hesiod and Plato. It follows the narrative of 
emancipation like a shadow. 359 People have always talked about the end of a great ideal, 
so if the postmodern and the modem were taken as movements, the narrative of the 
ending would not be a novel idea. It has been frequently proposed by people who 
deplore the dusk of grand value. Nonetheless, if there is a particularity of the 
postmodern movement in this age, it is self-awareness and resolution of the necessity of 
avoiding returning to mcta-discourscs. 
The postmodem. is the attempt to rely on neither local authority nor universal Ideas, 
but on finding another discourse. Besides, although it may not be absolutely novel, tile 
spread of this notion can be regarded as a feature of this era. If we try to adopt an 
attitude which does not fall into decadence or emancipation, we need to barc in nlind tile 
suggestions of the little narratives. This is the direction postniodem identity faces, and 
the narrative of the ending on this understanding is not one of tile incta-naffativcs. I treat 
the question of whether the narrative of the ending is a grand narrative or not in this 
manner. 360 Hence, the classic, modem, and postmodern are used in two different ways; 
one follows the chronological division and tile other treats them as movements or 
thought. I do not consider there to be a clear-cut choice between two nitcnintives, but 
359 Lyotard (1992, pp. 40-41). The same notion is seen in his article'Anima Minima'as 
well (1997, pp. 235-236). 
W Bill Readings also asks himself, 'Is there a grand narrative of the failure of meta- 
narratives? 'The answer can be both positive and negative, but he leans towards the 
opinion that the narrative of the ending is not a grand narrative (1991, p. 85). 
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depending on the issue we can use different approaches. As an historical occurrence, the 
postmodem has flourished from around the latter half of tile twentieth century, and as a 
movement, it can be found at any time in tile conflict between the modem and the 
postmodern, though it has been specifically popularised in this age. 
To conclude, the postmodem is defined as a form of serious doubt of tile 1llodcm Ideas. 
Whichever the modem belongs to, to a period of time or to a niovcnicnt of thought, its 
ideology was certainly cffective in promoting people as existences responsible for their 
actions. Nevertheless, it is also true that it cannot inflnitcly expand its range. I'lic 
postmodem exposes this limit of the modem Ideas, and this is the meaning of Lyotard's 
use of the term the 'breaking up of grand narratives'. In opposition to grand narratives, 
he introduces little narratives that represent a variety of postmodem discourses. Ilic 
instability which is due to the possibility of opening new discourses is the essence of the 
postmodem, and without that feature, it might turn to one of the grand narratives. 
It is the condition by which we are surrounded today, and to give its outline in 
the name of 'postmodem' is the purpose of this chapter. By the introduction of this 
conflict between the modem and postmodem, I expect that the distinctive features of the 
concept of personal identity in each thought becomes clearer. In the case of narrative, 
modem narratives try to eliminate locality as the obstacles which prevent tlic 
establishing of universal history. I'liese narratives work to keep the inner peace of 
society as well as that of a person, or in other words, the security of identity is protected 
through involvement in a firm narrative structure. On the other side, there is the excess 
which does not have any place in the existing narrative form, because it makes the inner 
peace unstable and is excluded from there because of its heterogeneity. I'lic excess 
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embodies the fact that there is something which is not assimilatcd by the systcni of 
narratives. 36 1 This is the significance of postmodem identity that we have discussed and 
will examine more in the next chapter concerned with the role of phrases. I'lic 
consistency of a person and of identity has been discussed in the modem study or 
personal identity, and I would like to leave this issue to rcscarclicrs, in that tradition. I 
attempt rather to consider an inconsistent side of identity in my discussion. 
361'The sacrifice recognizes the differend which is not digested by the narration and 
acquits itself of it'(1988, p. 155). 
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6 
Chapter 5 
DIFFERENCES 
The Fragmentation of Identity in the Postmodern Age 
5.1. The Impact of Electronic Media 
An old man opened a window, outside of which there was an immense church outlincd 
against the starry sky. He gazed at it for a while in silence, and then held out his right 
hand towards a printed book and his left hand towards Notre Dame. He sorrowfully 
moved his eyes from the book to the church, and grieved. 'This will kill that. '- T'his is a 
scene in Notre-Dame de Paris, 1482 by Victor Hugo, in which the archdeacon's nliscry 
and fear of the new technology, printing, is fully exprcsscd. Hugo givcs two 
explanations of this fear: One is fear of the collapse of the authority of church. Control 
over doctrine supports the church's government of ordinary people, but it now faces 
decline due to the popularisation of printing. People can come into contact with it 
through books. 
The other, Hugo claims, is concerned not only with the priesthood but also with 
the wider class of people including the savant and the artist: 'human thought, in 
changing its form, was about to change its mode of expression; that the dominant idea 
of each generation would no longer be written with the same matta, and in the same 
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manner. ' Hugo insists that architecture and its decorations havc been a 'great book' that 
have expressed human thought and intelligence at least until the end of the rMccrith 
century, but this 'so solid and so durable book' is replaced with the printed book which 
is 'not only more durable and more resisting than architecture, but still inorc simple and 
easy. 062 TjliS change in the method of storing knowledge affects tile form of thinking, 
so the advent of printing technology is described as the greatest invention in the history 
of human intelligence. 
363 
Although this domination of printing has continued for hundreds of years, we now 
face another transition period, which is the shift from printing to clcctric and/or 
electronic media. In these recent media, the mode of communication is greatly different 
from printing. According to Hugo, printing gains its premier position in the storage of 
intelligence through the sturdiness and stability of infortnation. Tlicsc characteristics arc 
not those of the electric and/or electronic media. They transform the style of information 
from material to immaterial, solid to fluid, as we examined in the last part of chaptcr 
three. Due to this dissimilarity from the former media, the electric and/or clcctronic 
media can be another style of information. This change is not the replacement of one 
medium by another, but the transition is accumulative. 364 -nIC invention of writing did 
not eliminate oral communication, and in the same way, printing will not totally 
3G2The idea that the Church is a book is a common metaphor today, so, e. g., James 
Burke mentions: 'Biblical tales glowed from the stained-glass windows. Gothic 
cathedrals have been called "encyclopedias in stone and glass'(2003,75). 
3G31t is a very tiny case, but Hugo's novel can be seen as an instance of this case. I 
quote sentences of Notre-Dame de Paris, 1482 from an electronic text (Huge, 200 1). 
Due to this, I cannot cite the page number, because the page is not the same depending 
on the software in which the text is read. We can however easily find the place of the 
quotation by using a search function. This deviation from the traditional format of 
quotation is small, but it might be one of the factors which bring great changes to our 
form of thought. 
3UPoster (1990, p. 6). 
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disappear in the age of electronic media, but its status must change because of the powcr 
of the latest media. I will examine particularities of our conccpt of idcntity in thc Op or 
this new mode of information in this chapter. I thus ccntralisc in the work of the nlcdia 
in this chapter, though I do not insist there is only a single factor that carrics prcsctit 
somewhat particular features of a person. A number of occurrences have acted on 
characterising the understanding of a person such as the crossing of diverse different 
cultures, economic globalisation, and the end and beginning of sonic intcrnational 
disputes. The electronic media are part of those trends, and I spccifically pick up the 
media as an effective sphere so as to present the features of a person at present. 1lic 
media carry human communication with their own influences, and I will cxatninc the 
role and power of this interaction between the media and the concept of personal 
identity. 
In our discussion, first we will reconsider if all media can be thought as mcdiatcd 
methods of communication or not. We specifically pay attention to the work of 
electronic media here, so their particularities will be next examined. In the electronic 
media, one of the significant characteristics is the immateriality in which uscrs'physical 
factors are usually invisible. I will highlight this aspect from several angles such as the 
correspondence between names and their subjects, the distinction between an author and 
a reader, and the comparison between a link of phrases and the concept of a person. I try 
to depict the discordance between a concept of a person that is established bascd on 
modem ideal and that in postmodern discussions. 
The above arguments are thus an assortment of positive views at the point that 
postmodern. thought may affect our concept of identity, but there arc criticisms of that 
understanding. One of the arguments shall be the manner by which we organisc our 
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view of a life apart from the consistency of identity. This issue leads to the qucstion of 
how we can possess a sense of ethics if a life is not unified. We will treat this sort of 
argument in reference to Parfit's opinion of what is the matter of our survival. In thc crid, 
we will consider again the meaning to apply postmodern thought to the study of idcntity, 
within the context of Lyotard's discussion of technology. Tbcsc are the gist of this 
chapter. 
5.2. Postmodern Thought and the Status of the Media 
There is one point that I should mention in relation to discussions of the media in 
postmodem thought. We have treated the media as methods of storing and cxchanging 
infonnation until now, but I want to consider this presupposition again in order to 
reconfirm the status of the media. The reason is that the media, cspecially oral nicdia, 
might be regarded not as methods through which inforniation is cxpanded but as the 
direct expression of the self. I would like to refer to Jacques Dcrrida's thought in this 
regard. 
Deffida criticises the tradition of metaphysics as logoccntrism that tctlds to give 
priority to speech: We first acquire speech, and writing is invented to aid speech. 
Writing has its roots in the early period of Western philosophy as we observed before in 
Plato's rejection of writing. Deffida takes up this point, for example, r6ming to Jcan- 
Jacques Rousseau's discussion. The superiority of spcccl, over writing is nianirestcd in 
Rousseau's thought: 'Languages are made to be spoken, writing scrvcs only as a 
225 
supplement to speech ... Speech represents thought by conventional signs, and writing 
represents the same with regard to speech. Ilius tile art of writing is nothing but a 
mediated representation of thought., 365 In that Western tradition, Rousscau locatcs 
writing as the supplement and imitation of speech. Derrida cornnictits on this 
phonocentrism from Plato to Rousseau and to Levi-Straus, and shows that a clear 
boundary between writing and speech cannot be made. Ilierc is no dichotomy bctwccn 
the two but they interact with each other. This notion also leads to the impossibility of 
the direct presence of the origin of the self. He unfolds a magnificent discussion around 
this idea, but we do not have enough space here to cxamine his thoughts. To simplify 
somewhat, the thought that Derrida depicts by the use of his own terms such as 'archi. 
writing, ' 'diff6rance, ' 'trace, ' and 'supplement' suggests tile impossibility of 
representing the origin. Speech and writing are comprehended as signs in his t1lought 
that imply the absence of an origin, because signs arc not flic origin itself but its 
supplement. 
366 
The rejection of the superiority of speech does not mean locating writing abovc 
speech. Neither speech nor writing is given a superior position, but all things that are 
shown by us are always already mediated. For this reason, I suggest that speech and 
writing are methods of representation, so they are the media. Ilicir act can be regarded 
as the search for the origin of the self but that effort only reaches at its suppicnictit, so 
always embodies not the origin but the loss of it. The more this act multiplies its traccs, 
the more it recedes from what it wants to express, so it heads towards making 
differences, not making identity. To examine this aspect of tile media is onc of the main 
365 Derrida (1974, cited in p. 144, p. 295, and p. 303). 
366 Derrida (1974,1987). 
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themes of this chapter. 
in postmodem thought, the boundary of a person is assumed to be looser, and 
the relation between the concept of identity and its representation is sonictinics rc- 
assessed. As the media that reflect that tendency particularly clearly, I will refcr to 
digital communication. One of its prominent features is the invisibility of otlicrs. It is 
common for its users to become familiar with others without knowing their conditions 
in the actual world, and this tendency is assumed to influence our sciisc of 
communication. The use of names specifically discloses the uniqueness of the tilcdia, so 
the relation between a name and its demonstrative subject will be discussed. In 
consideration of this notion, the status of a writer of a message is questioned, and I deal 
with this matter by examining the distinction between writers and readers. Ilic 
ambiguity of this distinction is pointed out in a number of recent works; Gilles Delcuze 
and Fdlix Guattari's collaborative work intentionally represents this matter in which 
they demonstrate the point at which the question 'who which' becomes insignificant; 
Roland Barthes expresses this author-reader problem through his declaration of the 
'death of the author'; Lyotard describe people as spaces that rcceivc and send 
information. The notion of differences, that are not consistent with flicir sourcc, is 
considered in those various studies, and I want to discuss that idea in relation to thc 
concept of personal. identity. I will compare these thoughts and attempt to charactcrisc 
the concept of identity and differences in postmodern discussions. 
Moreover, I will also ask why the concept of personal identity is supposcd to be 
necessary. This question is interpreted in terms of what probimes there would be if wc 
did not have that concept. I pursue this question in reference to the study of personal 
identity by Derek Parfit, who radically asserts the exclusion of the 'personal' aspcct 
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from the study of the continuity of a person over time. Finally, I will review the 
influence and role of technology referring to Lyotard's discussion of two different typcs 
of 'inhumanity'. As to the concept of identity at different stages (the prc-modcrn, flic 
modem, and the postmodem), I concentrate on its particularities in postrnodcm thought 
in this chapter. It is summarised as the search for a method of depicting the rclation 
between experiences without - as far as possible - setting a mcta-position. The notion 
of phrases is used to describe that idea. One of the main topics in this chapter is the way 
in which a phrase links to another for making a new discourse, so I also try to make 
links across several researchers' thoughts where possible. I hope there will be some 
links that support the depiction of differences in a person in this highly mcdiatcd 
genera ion. 
5.3. The Invisibility of Computer Mediated Communication 
The electronic media have been widespread in the last several decades, firstly in 
Western countries and then around the world. In this category of communication I 
include all methods which use a computer to exchange infortnation, for example, web- 
sites, electronic mail, online-meetings, electronic bulletin boards, chat roorns, and so on. 
Any infon-nation in these media is converted from analog data to digital signals 
consisting of binary code, so whatever information takes shape on the computcr screcn, 
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it is reduced to a sequence of Os and ls, and is then encoded. Hence, this is a highly 
abstract communication style in which users receive multiply-mcdiatcd data. 1'his 
indirectness is prominent in these media, and we will first observe this point. I focus on 
368 
Intemet communication as a typical example of these digital media. 
The invisibility of others is a general condition for communication oil the lntcmct. 
Most infon-nation is grounded on self-reports there, and users generally have no way of 
verifying the truth of other users' statements. It is true that not all users wcar false 
personas, and some personas are easily exposed because of their unnaturalness. 
However, the possibility that users' self-reports might be a complete invention is an 
unavoidable condition of this type of communication. 
369 
The ftagility of mutual trust in Internet communication is a popular theme today. 
The more users have experiences of untrustworthy self-reports, the more they may learn 
to keep some distance from information. We may take two extreme attitudes in rclation 
to the insecurity of this communication. One such attitude is that in which uscrs 
cynically accept that any relationship had on the Internet is in essence a fable, so they 
wear false personas themselves and have invented interaction with others. Others may 
insist that they can expose their 'real' selves only in cyber space, because they are 
hindered by physical constraints in the actual world. Prejudice that comes from physical 
factors is strong in the actual world, so they can disclose their true mind only when they 
can escape from these factors. Various versions of the second attitude arc observed in 
3G7Friedrich Mttler keenly examines the relation between computer system and their 
users in a philosophical context in various articles (1997). 
3r-8 Although the Internet is full of letters, sound, voices, pictures, movies and 
animations, I regard writing as the main method of communication there that conveys 
detailed information, so written text on the Internet is the target of our discussion. 
369 A typical instance of pretence is seen in the case of a male psychiatrist in Now York 
who pretended to be a female neuropsychologistJoaW on a network group (Lindsy. 
1996, 'The Strange Case of the Electronic Lover, 'Rheingold, 2000). 
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computer mediated communication. 
370 Nevertheless, I do not seriously take either of 
them as a factor by which the work of postmodem identity and differcnccs arc 
characterised. We shall see the reason in the following example that gives us a clue of 
the second attitude. 
A striking case of the second attitude is observed in involvcmcnt in multi-uscr 
computer games. 371 They are games that are played through access to the Internet. I'lic 
uniqueness of this type of game compared to off-line games lies in intcraction with 
other players. A player may cooperate with others and complete a mission, fall in love 
with another, or have a wedding ceremony with other players' blessings. T'hings, that can 
happen in the actual world are traced there, and things that cannot happen in the actual 
world can be played as well. Sherry Turkle reports this phenomenon in its relativcly 
early stages. Turkle cites player's words in her writing, 'This is more real than my real 
life, ' which express how seriously players feel about chamcters in the game world. 372 
Some players think that they can behave in the game world better than in the actual 
world,, so their online self is closer to their ideal self-image. 
Turkle discusses that through online interaction, people may obtain a monicrit at 
which they find another self, and at which they develop tile idea that tlicir idcntity can 
be multiple on the Internet ? 73 A particularity of this involvement compared to othcr 
computer mediated communications is found in the creation of a certain character which 
370 For example, Horn (1998), Rheingold (1993, especially chapter five 'Multi-uscr 
Dungeons and Alternate Identities'). 
371 It is often called MUD, which stands for Multi-User Domains or Multi-User 
Dungeons, though there are other popular names for this kind of game, such ns MOO 
(MUD Object Oriented), on-line games, or net-games. Some of them require the use of 
particular software, and some of them can be entered into only by connection to n web 
site. 
372 Turkle (1997, p. 10). 
373 Ibid., p. 260. 
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is not exactly the same as the user but can be fully cmpathiscd with as part of the self. 374 
Through those acts, a user can make a narrative involving the character, morc so than 
when using other modes of electronic communication, and this is a reason why some or 
those who research electronic media specifically pay attention to this niedium. 
There are both criticisms and vindications of people who are gravely addicted to 
Internet communication, but we will not get involved in that issue. It sliall be cnotigh for 
us to indicate that in either case, whether cynical about or more SyMpatlictic towards 
cyber space than towards the actual world, users separate the 'true scir and the 
'transient and false self'. Whichever users emphasise, the actual world or the digital 
world, it only strengthens the unity of the 'true self' in opposition to the 'false scir. 
Therefore, although these attitudes can imply the separation of selves to sonic extent, 
they do not present the conditions well that I want to depict. 17hey presuppose the 
existence of a true self behind the persona with which the continuity of their existence is 
securely identified. However, I insist that the significance of comptitcr-bascd 
communication is found in the complete absence of the 'true self', wlicrc thcrc arc only 
links between phrases. 
In this type of communication, the backgrounds of users do not become cssctitial 
factors, because we cannot touch them but only know the message. Tlius, a nicssagc on 
the Internet is not necessarily grasped as part of a long narrative, but should bc 
understood through a link to other phrases at that moment. There is no centre or origin 
of phrases in the links, but the present links are all there are. I'llis is my fundamental 
view of Internet communication, but the following criticism may arise; nevcrtlicicss, 
there is a user who writes a message, so there should be no doubt that would gct in the 
374 Ibid., p. 153. 
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way of regarding the user as the writer of the message. In order to address this issue, it 
will be effective to examine the relation between names used in messages and persons 
who use the names in electronic media. 
5.4. The Correspondence hetween Names and Suhjects 
When we access the Internet, log into an electronic mail box, or enter a special database, 
we are required to fill in a user name. On an electronic bulletin board or in a chat room, 
a message is usually accompanied by a user's name. The users' name circulatcs as a 
pass permit, so without names we cannot join in with a variety of communicative 
activities in the electronic world. Although the importance of names is seen in the actual 
world as well, I say that in electronic media the temporal and abstract aspect of its use is 
emphasised. 
375 
Due to our tradition, we tend to think that plural statements that arc written by the 
same name are managed by the same user. There is, nonetheless, no guarantce that one 
name is used by one fixed user. It may happen that a user borrows another user's name 
to cheat others; a user uses several names as if there are several different users; plural 
users share one name. The belief that one name correspon. ds to one fixed uscr does not 
stand up in this situation. Not all people, of course, behave in such knotty ways in which 
reliance upon names collapse, or at least do not act with malicious intent. Howcvcr, 
375 Throughout this writing I use the term'name'in its ordinary use, that is, I Use it as 
a sign that distinguishes its target from others. I do not enter into the discussion of the 
properties of a name so prominent in analytic philosophy, but appeal to its more 
common sense. 
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there is always the suspicion that a name might not belong to the same tiscr as beforc, 
and awareness of this possibility should have an effect on uscrs' thoughts about 
relationships on the Internet. 
In these circumstances, it is sometimes difficult to detennine the cxact subicct of a 
phrase, when there are only phrases and responses to the phrases. In nddition, the 
Internet has no focal point but expands all around, so there is. no fundamental phrase 
according to which other responses develop. This image, which does not have a 
transcendental position but is always in the process of propagation, evokes to me Gilles 
376 
Deleuze and Felix Guattari's idea of the rhizome. At the beginning of thcirjoint work, 
A Thousand Plateaus, they demonstrate their writing style: 
The two of us wrote Anti-Oedipus together. Since each of us was several, thcre was already 
quite a crowd ... We have assigned clever pseudonyms to prevent recognition. Why 
havc %%V 
kept our own names? Out of habit, purely out of habit. To make ourselves unrecognizable in 
turn. To render imperceptible, not ourselves, but what makes us act, fccl, and think... To reach, 
not the point where one no longer says 1, but the point where it is no longer of any importancc 
whether one says I. We are no longer ourselves. Each will know his own. We havc bccn aided, 
377 
inspired, multiplied . 
The boundary of a person, which is thought to be firm in modem thought, becomcs 
ambiguous in this notion. Deleuze and Guattari attempt to manifest flic point at which 
the domain of T does not possess a special meaning. Their argument brings us to a 
376 A rhizome is contrasted to the tree and tree-structures that have a centre from 
which discussion develops. A rhizome hasno beginning or end; it is always in the 
middle, between things, interbeing, intermezzo. The tree is filiation, but the rhizome is 
alliance, uniquely alliance. The tree imposes the verb "to be, " but the fabric of the 
rhizome is the conjunction, "and... and ... and... " This conjunction carries enough force to 
shake and uproot the verb "to be"' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, pp. 6-7). 
377 Deleuze and Guattari (1987, p. 3). 
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radical view of self on which a person as a single and organiscd subject is dissolvcd? 
78 
This contains a criticism of the theory in which a subject is located at the focus of 
discussion as a solid and rational existence. I suggest that division and rccouncction arc 
also the characteristics of messages on the Internet. The importance of a unificd pcrson 
fades but there are numerous links between phrases. Although users are usually not 
conscious of the danger involved in their acts, by which they open up the possibility of 
attacking the modem ideal of a person, digital communication may givc a hint of the 
way to perform without any centre. 
By that view, I do not suggest that there is always a definite connection bctwccn 
the tendency of the digital media and the present understanding of a person. If I insist 
that a medium at all times alters the other and vice versa, it would be too simplirtcd and 
tough. However, it is my opinion that there can be a loose interchange between them, so 
their relation is not a mere metaphor or an adventitious resemblance. We considered this 
relation by the reference to historical changes of the concept of a person and identity in 
chapter three, and based on that view we have examined the influences of today's media 
on the concept of a person. If this point is acceptable, we shall return to tile use of tile 
name on the digital media. 
A name that is attached to a message might be used by another user in differcrit 
circumstances, so it is argued that the connection between a name and a message is 
effective only at that time. Hence, 'once-ness' is an important feature of names in the 
media, but we also should not forget another aspect of name. This is the plural use of 
name. If a name cannot be repeatedly used, it is not a name in its essence. Even if n 
name is actually used just one time, it must theoretically include the potcntial to 
378 Deleuze and Guattari (1983). 
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withstand plural use. A name which is used by a person at one time must be repcatabic 
on another occasion, though it may happen that a person who uses the name latcr is not 
the same as the former user. Therefore, a name includes two different characteristics; it 
is effective at one time only but possesses the potentiality of repetition. 
379 
The once-ness and repetition of names will be made more intelligible if we 
compare it to Benjamin's notion of the reproduction of art in modem technology. Ille 
authority of oneness in art has weakened due to the advent of modem technology, which 
replicates products in large quantitieS. 
380 To make replicas is not itself nc%v, and replicas 
have been produced as practice for pupils, for popularising productions by artists, or by 
third parties for profit. Replicas are accepted as a part of artistic activity and practice. 
Nonetheless, Benjamin insists that modem technological reproductions of artworks arc 
different from replicas made in traditionally. In the conventional sense, replicas are only 
replicas of something, and their value relies on the existence of an original: 'In evcn the 
most perfect reproduction, one thing is lacking: the here and now of the work of art - 
its unique existence in a particular place. ' 38 1 This singularity, this limitation of an object 
qualifies its status as a unique work. He claims that the original possesses tile 'aura, ' 
which is the authenticity of things that makes it impossible to reproduce the same work. 
However, Benjamin warns that this distinction between the original and the 
replica has been demolished by the appearance of technological reproduction in which 
the existence of an original is not always necessary. Can we say which is original or 
replica in the case of three artistic photographs from the same frame? No one was madc 
379 This understanding of a name is influenced by Derrida's discussion of the role of a 
signature (1982, pp. 307-330). 
380'By replicating the work many times over, it substitutes a mass existence for n 
unique existence' (Benjamin, 2002,104. ) 
381 Benjamin (2002, pp. 102-103). 
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from an imitation of another but their quality is technologically equal. In the casc of 
digital music, often there is no original but each part is individually produced and Own 
combined. Any difference cannot be found between the originally sold digital codc and 
a copy of that. For this reason, some creators in electronic media patent flicir products 
for the protection of copyright. A product can be regarded as an original in law in that 
way, but this does not mean that the original has the 'aura' and the copies do not, 
because there is theoretically no difference between them. The question Wictlicr 
something is an original or a replica does not make sense in these cases, and 
consequently, things reproduced by modem technology possess the capacity to void the 
authority of the aura. 
382 
If we applied the characteristics of a name to the transformations of the status of 
art works, the stage at which art works possess their aura would correspond to the 
thought that a name connects to only one subject and is not exchangeable with anybody. 
However, as Benjamin discussed in the case of reproduction, a name on the Intcmct can 
multiply without there being an original. The authority of the name has faced collapse in 
this computer-mediated communication, and names have tended to be thought of as 
tentative and temporal destinations of messages. A name with a phrase is cffective only 
at one time in one link, but the same name can be technologically reproduced without 
origina - 
383 
382 Ibid., p. 105. 
3831 do not insist that this characteristic of a name only belongs to digital media, since 
it can also be seen in the actual world, but insist that those media easily disclose this 
aspect. 
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5.5. Once-ness and Repetition of Differences 
Wlien I examine the characteristics of a narne, once-ncss and multiple use in rcrcrcncc 
to tile Intemet, I feel the temptation to rcfcr to Fricdrich Nictzsclic's thought in ordcr to 
exemplify the works of differences. I am conscious of a great gap bowccii thc 
circumstances of the electronic media and Nictzsche's conccrns. Nevcrtliclcss, the idea 
that a name is effectual only once but that the sanic nanic will rclurn rcminds me of his 
notion of 'etcmal rcturn'. This association is indebted to Delctizc's undcrstanding or 
Nietzsche. T'he eternal return in Nietzsche's discussion is the idea that exactly the sanic 
evcnts, pcopic, things that occurrcd in the past will conic again in flic futurc pcrpctually, 
and nothing can escape from this sequence. On Dclcuzc's interpretation, differences arc 
seen as a driving force of etcmal return. 384 1 want to consider this interpretation in 
relation to the concept of differences in this section. 
We shall first follow DeleLizc's coninicritary on two distinct types that do not 
survive the revolution of the ctcrnal rctum. 'Ilicy arc the 'passive small man or last man' 
and the 'great licroic active man'. 7lic fornicr conception is called by Nictzschc 'a slavc 
or a camcl, ' who does not accept the ctcmal return and only takes a negative attitude to 
that notion. The sccond typc wants to confront the ncgativc as a licro, or n lion. Ilis 
type is identical to that which will be a bridge for the coming ftiturc, a bridge between 
people and super humans. Ilic second arc somcwhat active bcings, but they arc still not 
conccmcd with the work of any crcation, bccausc dicy arc a ncgation of the slavish 
situation and to not hatch an affinnation. Delcuzc dcrincs this as an analoguc or 
384 All quotations of Delouze without notes are from the text (Delouze, 199-1 , 'That 
which does not return' in'Conclusion'). 
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sameness that is stagnant in the same place. 
Dclcuze commcnts that tile ctcmal return does not make cvcrything rctum, but that 
it is a test, in that it will destroy anything that cannot withstand the trial. On his 
understanding, neither any negation nor any sameness, identity, or rcscmblancc survives 
this rcturn, but only the third stage (of Nietzsche's three metamorphoscs; the first is the 
slave and the second the hero) will rctum. It is the stage of the child, or as Dclcuzc calls 
it, the 'affinnation' or 'diffcrcnccs': 'Only affirmation returns - in other words, the 
Different, the Dissimilar. ' Affirmation is the affirmation of the ctcmal return, and since 
the negative and analogue do not survive the movement of the ctcmal return, only 
'dissemblancc' and 'disparatcness' can rcturn. 
To summarisc this vic%v, the etcmal rctum is thought to bc thc movcnicnt that 
shakes off things which cannot face the conclusion that everything will rcturn eternally 
in the same sequence. Mat are not shaken off by tile movement are, in Dcleuze's 
opinion, differences: 'Repetition in flic eternal return appears ... as the peculiar power of 
difference. ' Acceptance of the disparateness of things outlives repetition, and the reason 
for this is that it does not follow the ncgation of or the idcntirication with things but 
includes the affirmation of making differences. Tlius, in his thought, only in the work of 
aflinnation can things survivc the etcmal rcturn. On this undcrstanding, difTcrcnccs arc 
a kcy conccpt in Delcuze's interprctation of Nictzsclic's thought. 
A name in the digital media cannot be directly compared with the ctcrnal return, 
because it probably does not possess the power to afflirm flic eternal return. It sccrns to 
bc morc likcly that tlic use of a nanic in the digital world may fall into nihilism by 
means of the apparent thinness of reality in abstract cornmunicatioll ra, ther than that it 
acquires the strength to conquer thc nothingness of nihilism. However. if 
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communication by electronic media is reduced to links between phrases, this act might 
be at least a suggestion of a situation in which differences arc not expelled to establish 
consistent communication but are accepted positively. Differences can be a mobile 
power that makes a new move, and the deliberation as to which phrase we make a link 
with might be concerned with the move of overcoming nothingneSS. 385 'niercforc, 
although I never claim that the Internet is a place on which Nietzsche's idea is 
significantly actualised, it can be a vast experimental device by which we to some 
extent shape characteristics of differences that escape from the organisation of identity. 
To return to Deleuze's discussion, to accept the aff"innation of differences is 
analysed as the system of the eternal return: 'Systems in which different relates to 
different through difference itself are systems of simulacra. 386 'Simulacra' in his view 
indicates the situation in which the distinction between the identity of a model (namely, 
the original) and the resemblance of a copy (reproduction from the original) is lost. In 
his theory, the idea of the superiority of the model over the copy began with Plato's 
discussion of ideas in which the copy is a mere reproduction of the model. Deleuze, 
however, insists that in the movement of the eternal return everything becomes 
simulacra, which need neither the model nor the copy for their existence. Apart ftom the 
necessity of settling the original or copy, simulacra are 'constituted by differences, and 
communicate with the others through differences of differences'. 387 Simulacra are not 
copies of a copy or inferior copies, but arc the affirmation that attacks the dual 
conception of the original and the copy, the model and the reproduction. This 
disappearance of the boundary between the two implies tile method by which we should 
385 '[Ilnvention is always born of dissension! (Lyotard, 1984, p. xxv). 
386 Deleuze (1994, p. 277). 
387 Ibid., p. 278. 
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withstand the fear of differences, because there is no absolute position from which a 
copy is made but only differences. 
The idea of multiplication of pieces which have no original is seen in a nuinbcr of 
recent discussions of reality, self, and identity. Jean Baudrillard also analyses the 
collapse of the distinction between original and copy, using his idea of 'siniulation, ' or 
Gsimulacrums'. Although the word is the same as Delcuze's, Baudrillard uscs it 
particularly in order to express the performance of the media in the society. In this 
consumer society, things are counted as simulacrums; the media sell concepts of things 
and people touch commodities through mediated images. Images precede things in the 
'simulation society' that has no reality that corresponds to simulacrurns. This society is 
directed by the accumulation of reproductions, in which the confrontation between real 
and simulacrus becomes meaningless but codes of reproductions overflow. 11is loss of 
reality is termed 'hypeffealism, 'which is not set up beyond or underlying the real world 
but is the spot at which the difference between real and liypcffcal vanislics. 388 In 
common understanding, 'simulation' is an instance or representation of the original, but 
this is not reflected in Daudrillard's use of this. tic presented it as an indcpendcnt act 
that increases the reproduction of reproductions, and this can work apart from rdwing 
to the sourec. 
Everything can be put in the operation of simulation, so the reality of the real is 
swallowed in the interaction between simulacrunis. 11is is flic ultimatc situation which 
is drawn out from the simulation-socicty. Baudrillard clainis that this is not mcrc 
hypothesis, but that it has happened to us: 'toda), reatitj, Itsey* is h)perrealist ... reality 
W Baudrillard depicts 'the collapse of reality into hyperrealistn'thus: 7hrough 
reproduction from one medium into another the real becomes volatile, it becomes tile 
allegory of death, but it also draws strength from its own destruction. becoming tile 
real for its own sake ... : tile 
hyperreal'(Baudrillnrd, 1993, pp. 71-72). 
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has already incorporated the hyperrealist dimension of simulation so that we are now 
living entirely within the 'aesthetic' hallucination of reality. ' 389 We today live in this 
hyperreal world in which our existences are dissolved in the oPeration of simulation, 
which presents us as simulacrums. 
This operation, in my understanding, has a point in common with that which we 
have called differences. In tenns of differences, the original of a piece is not sought for 
anymore, but pieces themselves perform, which I describe as the act of phrases which 
link and are linked with others. This is not only the outcome of electronic media, but 
they possess the potential to present this characteristic to us most forcefully. I suggest 
that we obtain more chances to see the generation of differences through the expansion 
of high-technology, because electronic media are effective in expanding simulacrums 
and disarranging our sense of reality. That is why I have discussed the effects of the 
digital media so far, and we will consider their prominence more in the next section. In 
postmodern thought, this diffusion is sometimes illustrated as the forfeiture of the 
authority of a writer. The ideal of a person, who has their own unique inner self which is 
worth confessing, has faded, and the boundary between writers and readers has become 
fainter today. 
5.6. Instability of the Distinction between an Author and a Reader 
We have focused on the moment from which differences arise in a person, and observed 
389 Ibid, p. 74. 
241 
the way in which the recent media demonstrate the aspect of differences. Can the 
identity of a person be kept in this diffusion of a person? My answer is that even if it 
was possible to have a sense of identity, it would not be the same as the modem concept 
of personal identity. It is the identity after it has undergone tile doubt involved in tile 
postmodem. I assume that if there is a framework of a person in postmodern thought, it 
would be depicted as a space through which information is passed. We will consider this 
notion of a person as a space in this section. As an opening gambit, I will examine 
Roland Barthes's analysis of the author and the reader. 
The author is, Barthes asserts, a modem product which arose when society, in this 
context Western society, outgrew the Middle Ages and entered the modem time. 
'90 111c 
same opinion is seen in Benjamin's discussion in which the discovery of the author of a 
novel was attributed to modem consciousness. In both ideas, the advent of the author 
who personally writes texts is supposed to have had a great impact on establishing the 
sense of individuality, especially in printing culture. Authors acquire their sense of 
themselves as individuals through expressing their interiority, and even if rcaders do not 
write a text by themselves, they touch upon the acquisition of the interior through 
reading the text. 
The credibility of this view of the author has been, as is the case for other modem 
thoughts, questioned during the latter half of the twentieth century. Barthes takes part in 
this questioning and attacks the literary critics who give 'tile greatest importance to the 
"person" of the author, ' because they give the privilege of an author to his or her text, 
but the author is 'never more than the instance writing, just as I is nothing other than the 
390 All quotations from Roland Barthes are taken from the following text (Barthes, 1977, 
pp. 142-148). 
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instance saying F. There is no preceding or exceeding authority of tile author in his or 
her writing, but the author only works to 'make language "hold together. " ' He expcis 
the author from the position of god of the text, so the author is no longer the master of 
writing but is given a role to fill in the spaces of writing. 
The author falls from the throne of writing, and Barthes proposes another idea in 
which writing is gathered and interpreted. This is the place of reading. T'he multiplicity 
of writing is, he asserts, left to the reader, because the reader is described as the space 
'on which all the quotations that make up a writing are inscribed without any of them 
being lost; a text's unity lies not in its origin but in its destination. ' Writing is an 
enumeration of words which are given meanings through the act of reading, so the place 
in which writing survives does not reside in the author as the origin of the text but in 
readers as its destination. 391 Furthermore, Barthes does not insist that a reader is thc 
unity of a person, but a reader is only a location in which writing is assembled and 
mixed. A reader is not a particular person but a space 'without history, biography, 
psychology; he is simply that sonieone who holds together in a single field all the traces 
by which the written text is constituted. ' Readers are anonymous; they transmit 
information but do not acquire specific names, as authors' names are divested of this 
privilege by Barthes. The reader becomes the function of receiving and reproducing 
writing through reading, and the matter of the author who wrote it is a lesser problem. 
Readers are thus the point at which texts melt into each other, and the superior 
position of writing disappears in Barthes's thought. Barthes declares the death of the 
author, and instead of the author lie spotlights the role of the reader. The decline of the 
391 Barthes's thought is described as structuralism in the modern theory of literature. 
As an introductory text of literary theory, I cite Eagleton's one (1983). 
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role of author is a noteworthy idea, but I suggest that the author still keeps the posittim 
of writing a text in his thought. Barthes's theme is literature, so even though the death of 
the author is announced, it is natural that a specialisation in tcmis of who writes and 
who reads would remain in his discussion. However, if 'writing' is given its more 
ordinary usage, we would say that that specialisation becomes less today. 
To explain this notion, we shall refer to the status of writing and reading on the 
Internet. To send information in public is incomparably easier in electronic media than 
in former media. It is true that there are methods of spreading information for ordinary 
people apart from the latest electronic technology such as private publishing or amateur 
radio operators, but this is sometimes expensive or needs special skills, and it is not easy 
to put infonnation into wide circulation. Today, to send information on tile Intcmct, 
which is literally open to the world, is not very difficult, and there are indecd a huge 
number of web sites that are privately organised. Writing and presenting this writing to 
the public are not only for professionals in this mcdium. 
The Decline of the Boundary between A uthor and Reader 
The boundary between the sender of infort-nation and its receiver is weakened in 
electronic media. The death of the author who has the privilege of synthesising all texts 
under his or her name was foretold by Barthes. I suppose that tile shift of eniphasis from 
author to the reader may have been radical once, but its significancc scems to dccliiie 
today. Both the author and the reader become anonymous in digital communication, 
because their differences are relatively insignificant in the situation in which everyone 
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can be both a writer and a reader. 
People may say that digital media, for example the electronic bulletin board or the 
chat room, are often used as a communication space and that users usually do not rcalisc 
the author-reader problem. However, as long as there are acts of reading and writing, I 
insist that this issue is unavoidable. There are, many boundary cases in which it is 
difficult to determine who is the writer of the sentence, on the tradition understanding of 
that term: There are books that are collections taken from the records of electronic 
bulletin boards. They were published not by users of these boards but by a third party. In 
this case, who can be said to be the real author of the books? Legally, we can define an 
editor who takes the profit and has responsibility for publishing, but as for tile act of 
writing, this instance poses a question. 393 In another example, there are a number of 
joint works on the Internet, such as encyclopaedia, dictionaries, bibliographies, novels, 
or newsletters. In some works, any user can add information to tile text, so such 
electronic texts have numerous writers and have not stopped incrcasing. 
394 
As an early experimental attempt at multiple participation, I sliall cite an 
exhibition 'Les Immatdriaux' directed by Lyotard at the Centre Georges Pompidou in 
France in 1984-5.395 The location, the fifth floor of the museum, is divided into sixty- 
one sites, and 'For the most part the sites consisted of small installations of various 
cultural artifacts; technological representations and electronic devices. 
396 In one site, 
392Bolter (1991, p. 222). 
3931bid., pp. 153-155. 
394The concept of'Wiki'or'WikiWikAVeb'is a typical example. This is soft ware by 
which users can create an open web site that usually allows anyone to add information 
to the contents and to edit previously existing content as well. NVikis are often used to 
make databases such as on-line encyclopedia, dictionaries, and the collection of news. 
For more information, see <http: //en. wikipedia. org/wikiAViki>. 
395 For an aesthetic judgement, see Crowther (1992). 
396, Rajchman (199 1. p. 105). 
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there is an exhibition that is a collection of definitions by people from various ficids. 
They are asked to make short comments on a selected fifly words. Each dcf"inition is 
saved in the database, and the writers can access the database and add commmits on any 
other's remarks. This exhibition demonstrated the possibilities of clectronic texts to 
expand and diversify, though its shortfall is indicated by Dcrrida; the definitions still 
required author's names. Poster supports Derrida's opinion and states that if the multiple 
definitions of the tenns, which were responses to responses, were written without 
author's names, it 'would constitute itself in anonymity, working, as Lyotard hoped, to 
destabilize language, reforming it in an incessantly provisional play of terms'. 397 Today, 
works similar to this collection of definitions can be easily found on the Intcmct, and in 
these works, authorship is open to question. The function of 'hypcrtext' helps to 
describe these sorts of works. This is defined as a network of information in which 
nodes and links are made. It is 'non-sequential writing' and rcadcrs can go from one 
point to another in their own order. 398 It is frequently used to make links to other 
information. 399 
That exhibition was a reflection of Lyotard's understanding of the postmodem. lie 
depicts people as spaces, in which a phrase links to other phrases, in which the meaning 
of phrases are transformed, and from which they are dispatched again. I'his place is not 
non-resistant to information but intervenes in it, so the flowing of information is 
interrupted and delayed there. This space is interpreted by Lyotard as 'nodal points' or 
the 'post' in the network of communication: 
397 Poster (1990,115). 
398 Nelson (1981). 
399 As an experimental novel, Michael Joyce's Afternoon, a Storj , 
is also this kind of 
project. Readers are given a choice of sentences and structure a story by their choices, 
so there is no fixed plot but the novel unfolds multiply. 
24G 
A seydoes not amount to much, but no self is an island; each exists in a fabric of relations 
that is now more complex and mobile than ever before. Young or old, man or woman. rich or 
poor, a person is always located at "nodal points" of specific communication circuits, 
however tiny these may be. Or better: one is always located at a post through which various 
kinds of messages pass. No one, not even the least privileged among us, is ever entirely 
powerless over the messages that traverse and position him at the post of sender, addressee, or 
referent. 400 
There are numerous points in the ocean of data, and they accept, stagnate, change, add, 
reduce, and dispatch signs to others. This 'post' does not necessarily know from where 
information comes and to where it goes, but passes on incoming messages with sonic 
alterations. We are more or less factors that change received inforrnation on this thought, 
and in the act of changing we are also transformed by information. 
It will help to grasp this view if we compare the above mentioned idea with the 
narrative form, as discussed in former chapters. The narrative forrn, more or less, shows 
the linear line of a story, so the meaning of an experience usually becomes 
comprehensible when the experience is placed in the context of the narrative. This is the 
manner of making a consistent view of oneself over time. In that manner, a person is not 
regarded as a mere point to which information comes and goes, but regarded as 
occupying a more meta-position from which experiences are organised and a certain 
naffative is made. Nevertheless, the idea, which has been and will be discusscd in this 
chapter, treats people as more fragmented beings. It does not insist the neccssity of 
consistency of a story that the narrative approach requires, but it focuses on a transient 
link between experiences, focuses on how a phrase connects to another at that time. In 
400 Lyotard (1984, p. 15). 
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this respect, people are grasped as transient existences more than the narrativc account 
in which a link is made between phrases, and the work, by which a personal history is 
structured by the reference to a large amount of past episodes, is not placed in an 
essential position. In this intention, the consistency of a person becomes weak but 
differences of phrases and their links are more prominent. I emphasise that this issue is, 
as we saw in the discussion of the narrative forni in chapter two, the matter of 
understanding as to how we grasp our existences. The subject that I attempt to depict in 
this thesis is this mode of the understanding of a person. 
I have refeffed to Barthes and Deleuze as implying that the framework of a 
person - in their analysis it often appears as the boundary between author and reader - 
melts. Since 'the author of a novel' is a prominent example of tile establishment of the 
modem type of identity, the fading of its remarkableness can be seen to be a clue, to the 
fall of the modem ideal. Instead of this, I depict a person as a space. When a message 
comes into the space, the network of information is made in order to respond to the 
message. This network is not definite but transformable, and information is linked to 
others as factors of the network. This is an identification process by which the relation 
between phrases is given at a particular time. If there is postmodern identity, this 
relation is it. 
401 
A question may arise as to whether or not we can treat the problem of identity 
without mentioning the 'personal' on the modem understanding. Tlie postmodern 
questions the idea that a person must be unified. It is a mission of the present age to 
investigate the point at which the unity of identity does not function, but this mission 
401 As to the status of information, I mention that incoming information may not 
always arrive in the form that its sender intends. This problem is keenly analysed in 
Jacques Derrida's discussion of Jacques Lacan's article'Seminar on The Purloined 
Letter'(Lacan, 1988; Derrida, 1987). 
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does not necessarily end in a total mess. I will examine this issue in the ncxt scction in 
terms of the question of whether the concept of personal identity is really necessary for 
our survival. 
5.7. The Necessity of Personal Identity 
We have so far looked at ideas that indicate the decline of the notion that a person must 
be making a consistent narrative in accordance with their experiences. T'his is certainly 
an idea that I have attempted to advance throughout the discussion, but I now want to 
think again about the account we have dealt with. Even though I insist that the conccpt 
of a person as a unified existence has been called into question today, people may say 
that this is too abstract an opinion that does not coincide with their reality. 
Doubt of postmodem thought is expressed sarcastically by Terry Eagicton who 
condernns postmodernism for advocating a 'decentred' life 'without ends or grounds or 
origins, ' whilst 'Those who celebrate the discontinuous subject ... would no doubt be as 
perturbed as the rest of us if their children failed to recognize them from week to week, 
or if their philosophically minded bank manager refused them the money they had 
deposited six months ago on the grounds that it could no longer be said to be tlicirs'. 402 
This is, as he himself says, a caricature of postmodemism. Ilowcvcr, the question of 
how postmodern thought corresponds to social situations should not be neglected, and I 
have attempted to depict it by referring to our way of interacting with othcr pcoplc. We 
402 Eagleton (1996, p. 64). 
249 
shall now turn our eyes to the question of wlictlicr or not the conccpt of pcrsomil 
identity is indispensable to our existence. 
Ille necessity of personal identity can be converted to the question of what would 
be the most significant problem if there were no personal identity. If we can offer a way 
of managing some problems without mentioning personal identity, it would imply that 
the unity of a person is not always necessary for our survival. I should say right away 
that this is, nevertheless, not the suggestion that we can imagine a world in which 
people are always confused about the subjects of actions. There is no human community 
which does not have any rules for its members, but whatever they are, manners arc 
necessary for communal living. As long as there are rules in a community (taboos, 
0 reward and punishment, the right of succession, the regulation of marriage, the way to 
share food, and so on), there are people to whom the rules apply. People need to be 
initiated into and to follow the rules as members of the community (though whether a 
community member is a personally consistent existence or not is irrelevant to this 
regulation). 
Therefore, by the above question, I do not mean to create the vision of another 
world in which there is no sense of identity at all. What I want to investigate is the 
question of whether or not we can discuss the matter of our existence without 
mentioning the unity of a person. 403 1 assume that one of the main problems brought 
about by the absence of the unity of a person is the principle according to which pcopic 
keep within the restrictions of society: If people focus on the temporal connection of 
phrases more than on making a consistent life story, why do they need to take care of 
403Bolter indicates a similar issue in relation to electronic writing: 'Elements in the 
electronic writing space are not simply chaotic; they arc instead in a perpetual state of 
reorganization. They form patterns, constellations, which are in constant danger of 
breaking down and combining into new patterns'(1991,9). 
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the social order? This question is concerned with the problem of what kind of vicw such 
people have of their actions and future, and I would like to analyse this issue from the 
perspective of morality. I propose that if we can discuss this problem without using the 
unity of a person, it would show that there is at least one example that proves that the 
disintegration of identity is not a nonsensical notion. The most radical view of this topic 
is, in my opinion, offered by Derek Parfit. He denies the idea that personal idcntity is a 
necessary condition of our lives. This leads to a discussion of the way to describe 
identity 'impersonally'. 
Parfit discusses branch-line cases in depth in order to analyse the criterion of 
personal identity. These branch-line cases arc thought experiments that offer situations 
in which there are plural existences all of which are derived from one person: If our 
brain was divided into two parts and put in separate bodies, or if our replicas were made, 
what would happen to our understanding of personal identity? Aflcr discussing a 
number of proposed solutions to the branch-line cases, fie announces that personal 
identity is not what matters, but that what matters is Relation R, which consists of 
'psychological connectedness and/or continuity with the right kind of cause'. 
Psychological conncctcdness is 'thc holding of particular dircct psychological 
connectedness, ' in which if person Pi at present has partly the sanic memory as P2 
twenty years ago, there is psychological connectedness between Pi and P2. 
Psychological continuity is 'the holding of overlapping chains of strong connectedness. ' 
If there are 'enough' direct connections between temporally separated existcnccs. Parrit 
regards it as 'strong connectedness'. 404 He also declares that 'In an account of what 
404The precise definition of 'enough' direct connections is not given. Parfit thinks it is 
not possible (and not meaningful) to determine the amount, but r mentions that the 
951 
matters, the right kind of cause could be any cause'. 405 nIUS' the continuity of our 
existence in his theory is reduced to Relation R in which sonic psychological 
connections between existences are kept. 
Therefore, even if there are plural replicas which are produced by, so to speak, 
some science fictional technology, we would not need to ask if one of them, all of thcm, 
or none of them, keeps personal identity which continues from the original. In place of 
that question, we should ask if it can possess Relation R to others. Parfit refuses to be 
involved in the search for the criterion of personal identity, because he regards it as an 
empty question, to which we can give some answers, but any answer is arbitrary, 
pointless, or misleading. 406 This view is not to be confused with the idea that there is no 
personal identity, but lie suggests that it is futile to seek answers to such empty 
questions. In his opinion, the understanding of life as self-containcd and linear is not a 
suitable one with which to describe ourselves, but it is important whether or not thcre is 
any existence that has Relation R to the present self. i 
Based on this thought, Parfit asks if we can establish a sense of morality in 
accordance with Relation R. I'llis leads to several questions, one being what kind of 
relation we have to future generations. In outline, he argues that there may be some 
existences in the future that somehow relate to the present us: Tlierc will be some 
memories of our lives, will be thoughts that are influenced by our works, or will be 
things that are influenced by us. 407 They are not the same existences as the present 
selves exactly, but the relation between us and the future generation can be kept. T'hus, 
number of direct connections is 'at least halfthe number that hold, over every day, 'it 
would be regarded as'enough. (1984, p. 206) 
405 Ibid., pp. 206-215. 
40G Ibid., p. 260. 
407 Ibid., p. 281. 
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to be considerate towards the future generation is not absurd but understandable if wc 
believe in the Relation R. 
Parfit asserts that those related in Relation R are not restricted only to the 
continuation of their particular personalities, and 'our reasons for acting should become 
more impersonal' . 
408The 'personal' is the idea that 'our continued existence is a deep 
further fact, distinct from physical and psychological continuity, and a fact that must be 
all-or-nothing'. 409 The 'personal' is dealt with as a kind of metaphysical entity in that 
notion. Our death on that view is our end and there is an insuperable gap between our 
lives and those of others. 410 To be impersonal is to describe our death in this way: 
'There will be no future experiences that will be related, in certain ways, to these 
present experiences. 411 Parfit confesses that having obtained this view, lie regards his 
death less negatively, because now he can believe that there will be some experiences in 
the future that relate to his present experiences, even though the relation is indirect. 
Therefore, it is not meaningless for us to take care of future generations if we accept 
Relation R. Besides, to he impersonal is to give the opportunity to open a new view of 
our sense of morality, he insists. 
I want to emphasise the point that even if personal identity is not important for our 
lives, responsibility for others is still kept. A person is not treated as a closed existence 
but as exposed to various relations to experiences in his thought, so it can be said that 
this is also consistent with the idea of the decline of a person as a soic and firm 
existence. It is true that we cannot simply apply his theory to our discussion of 
408 Ibid., p. 443. 
40D Ibid., p. 281. 
410 Parfit categorises researchers who take the view that our existences contain a 
'further fact'such as the continuity of soul into Non-Reductionist, which involves from 
Cartesian Pure Ego to Butler and Reid's, discussion of personal identity. 
411 Ibid., 
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differences, and Parfit indeed does not take a position that puslics alicad with 
consideration of postmodernism. However, it will be beneficial for us to examine what 
kind of relation a linkage of phrases can have towards the future. A link betwccil phrascs, 
always happens at a particular moment, so if it means that it is enough for us to pay 
attention to the current link, we would not need to think about future generations. For a 
consciousness which emerges and vanishes immediately, it counts for nothing to be 
burdened with obligations towards prospective groups of people. 
However, although it is certain that links between phrases Jay emphasis on the 
present, phrases will never stop making links, so links include the potential for future 
expansion. The postmodern was described in chapter four as the movement that 
attempts to bring forward something that has not yet been represented. A linkage of 
phrases on this notion should not be rashly made, but we need to ask what discourse the 
phrases may form. To make a link thus includes consideration of what comes after, 
though it is often no more than a premonition. 412 
Parfit also pushes for a movement that endeavours to produce a system which has 
not yet existed, a system based not on personal identity but on Relation R. Ile is 
conscious of the fact that his notion threatens people with its unfamiliarity when lie 
refuses the necessity of personal identity but centres on Relation R. This is the search 
for a new attitude to present social conditions, and Parrit depicts it as being more 
'impersonal' than 'personal'. I understand that it is a matter of attitude, because Parfit's 
conclusion is given in terms of how we ought to behave to others more than as the result 
of logical dcduction. Parfit's thcory is not countcd as postmodern thought, but both of 
them investigate what sort of relation can be described as holding between people 
412 Lyotard (1988, p. xiO. 
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without instituting the unity of the subject. Therefore, I insist that even if the unity of n 
person is dispersed into phrases, we should not necessarily abandon care for others as 
long as the link matters to us. This is my answer to the question of why the postrnodcrn 
concept of identity is not nonsense but an urgent matter for survival in the age, in which 
we cannot unconditionally rely on modem achievements. 
To be more impersonal is Parfit's suggestion, in order to reconsider what kind of 
morality can be establisbed today. The term, impersonal, is used to criticise the prcscnt 
ideal of a person. Lyotard adapts the term 'inhuman' in criticism of the social system 
that makes its member's future measurable. It throws up the question of what is thought 
to be humanity, and shows Lyotard's understanding of the relation between people and 
technology. 
5.8. The Two Different Types of Inhumanities 
In the discussion of inhumanity, Lyotard sets up two different sorts of inhumanities, and 
contends that it is imperative to keep them separate: The one is the inhumanity of the 
system and the other is the inhumanity of resistance to definitive control by the system. 
Their differences are caused by the understanding of what we regard as tile humanity, 
and he explains them by the example of education. 111rough education, especially 
learning a language, people overcome their nature, including infancy's cotiffision, desire, 
and irrationality, and through that learning they participate in communal life as adults. 
This is the inhumanity of the system, and the reason why it is called the 'inhuman' 
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resides in the second view of inhumanity. 17he second view Iiighlights residues that are 
not sublimated by the system of education. Criticism of and escape from institutions arc 
assumed to be the sort of residues of the system that do not fit into that order, and on 
this understanding, education is condemned as 'inhuman'. I shall call the second notion 
the 'inhumanity of differences'. 
The inhumanity of the system is inconsistent with the inhumanity of differcnccs, 
but their stances toward each other are not the same. The inhumanity of the system 'has 
it., 413 the consequence of causing the forgetting of what escapes T'hings which arc 
regarded as meaningless by the system are at best exiled from that system, or merely 
treated as if they did not exist. Ilis intensifies the view that valuable elements are those 
that are held by that system, and this is, for example, found when we use Internet search 
engines. Cyber space is a melting pot of information but not all information is stored 
there. Users know this fact, but they have an inclination to think that data that cannot bc 
found on the Internet might not exist or be less important. The film, The Net, plainly 
shows this idea that a person whose existence is not recorded anywhere is thought not to 
exist! 14 In the story, a heroine is unconsciously involved in a conspiracy, and as a result 
her existence is informationally replaced with another person. She is deprived of her job, 
property, and all identifications, and forced to be another person, who is a drug addicted 
criminal, through rewriting her records in the database. 
The theme of the film itself is not new but appears as an old fear that one day a 
person suddenly finds that nobody remembers who lie or she is. I'lie fear implies that 
our notion of 'who we are' is partly influenced by the behaviour of other people and 
413 All quotations without references in this section are taken from the following text 
(Lyotard, 199 1, pp. 1-7). 
414 The Net (1995). 
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recorded data. Thus, the film repeats a familiar topic, but shows that it is easY to make 
the situation real with electronic media by means of which a person takes the place of 
another person. It is not easy to replace information manually or to include in the 
conspiracy all people who are concerned with the deceived person, so vast stage settings 
must be prepared even in fiction. The electronic media nonetheless have a mighty power 
of persuasion to bring about these circumstances compared to other methods. I think, 
therefore, that the more information-orientation advances, the more the tendency 
increases; to be left out of a list is to be regarded as not being in existcncc. In contrast to 
the inhumanity of the system, the inhumanity of differences does not take the attitude of 
forgetfulness of the other, but revolts against oblivion. It makes us consider the 
problems of the existing system. 
Lyotard also exemplifies these two inhumanities in terms of 'rapid reading' and 
'writing and reading, ' the second is namely thinking. Rapid reading is beneficial for 
saving time, because 'to go fast is to forget fast, to retain only the information that is 
useful afterwards'. It is profitable for the system in order to increase productivity. 
However, writing and reading take time, because they incite people to pause to think! " 
The latter is not concerned with the forgetfulness of the system but often concerned with 
making criticisms of the system. These different approaches to time keep the two 
inhumanities separate, and Lyotard deems that the disparity between them has tended to 
widen with the development of technology. In relation to 'postmodem, ' lie owns that his 
intention in using that tenn is to indicate the transfomiation of technology and its 
415 The irony of'saving time'is often found in Lyotard's writing. In Differend, lie writes, 
cynically: 'Reflection is not thrust aside today because it is dangerous or upsetting, but 
simply because it is a waste of time. It is "good for nothing. " it is not good for gaining 
time. For success is gaining time. A book, for example, is a success if its first printing is 
rapidly sold out'(1988, p. xv). 
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influence on the understanding of those inhumanities: 'We havc to try to undcrstand this 
transformation, without pathos but also without negligencc... The term postmodcrn has 
been used, badly rather than well if I judge by the results, to designate sonictliing of this 
transformation. 14 16 In his thought, being more inhuman on the second meaning is the 
task for us in this techno-industrialised socicty, in terms of cscaping from the 
forgetfulness of something that is not represented within that organisation. 
Therefore, Lyotard's attitude toward technology is ambivalent. As regards the 
inhumanity of the system, he wams that people are reduced to computerised codes, 
which are ordered and systernatised. Seemingly, he is suspicious of the result that 
computer technology may bring rather than simply evaluating these results. Ile 
expresses a negative opinion of making a person connect with computer systcms and the 
separation of thought from the bod Y. 417 He considers that the 'rewriting' of information 
occurs in these media by which any mode of information is transformed into a 
calculable unit. To convert expressions to digital signs is to erase 'all traces lcft in a text 
of unexpected and 'fantasy' association' . 
418 'Mings that have errors or that cannot be 
reduced to an On-and-Off system are rejected by this technology. Only a correctly 
written program can run in computer based communication. This is his caution with 
regards to the computerised world, and I also understand it as a warning of the 
dangerous aspect of these media. Information which has previously belonged to 
different classes such as the visual, musical, written, economic, and political is now 
being transformed into the same sort of digital code. If this technology is employed as 
the ultimate method of storing information, things that are not suitable to this method 
416 Lyotard (1991, p. 5). 
417 See, Lyotard, (1997, 'Can Thought go on without a Body?, '). 
418 Lyotard (1991, p. 35). 
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might suffer fundamental changes or be ignored, forgotten, or climinatcd. 71iis 
technology thus may work to promote standardisation of things in digital code. 
However, when I think about the interaction between technology and our physical 
conditions today, I feel that the role of technology can be thought about more Nxibly. 
In relation to the combination of the inhumanity of differences and technology, Stuart 
Sim mentions Dana Haraway's 'cyborg', a representative of the second inhumanity. For 
Haraway, the cyborg, which is a hybrid of machine and organism, provides a powcrftil 
image to promote a different style of living. Haraway proclaims that 'a cyborg world 
might be about lived social and bodily realities in which people arc not afraid of their 
joint kinship with animals and machines, not afraid of permanently partial identities and 
contradictory standpoints'. 4 19 Tile estem tradition has provided certain distinctions 
between human beings and animals, humans and machines, within the social system. 
Haraway criticises the traditional structure and attempts to disturb the boundaries of this 
structure in terms of her feminist theory. She proposes the concept of a cyborg as an 
idea that demolishes that boundary and that crystallises the gender-problem as well. 420 
In the concept of a cyborg, dualisms of mind and body, of animal and machine, 
and of idealism and materialism are attacked, and the distinction between the thought as 
an organic work and the machine as an inorganic tool is disturbed. 11is deep 
involvement in technology as a self-conscious strategy to be used against the cxisting, 
system opens the way for the idea that the inhumanity of differences can be positively 
highlighted through technology. Haraway's discussion is founded in her study of 
feminism. Lyotard places his stress on the deviation from the system, but lie appears not 
419 Haraway (1991, p. 154). 
420 For more detailed examples, Haraway proposes a list of the trans figu rations from 
the old hierarchical dominations to new networks of information technology (Ibid., p. 
161). 
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to consider the discussion of differences in feminism so much. 42 1 Although we do not 
have the space for more discussion of this point, I would like to leave this as a hint of 
further study of the concept of identity at present. It might offer a cliancc to depict this 
issue from a new angle, along with the critique of traditional Western thought. We do 
not dominate machines and machines do not dominate us, but they are already part of 
our daily life. Cyborg imagery is concerned not with tile re-production of universal 
theory but rather with its dissolution. I suggest that it is of value to discuss the status of 
technology by means of which we acquire the opportunity to view the foundations of 
our society in a new ligbt. 
422 
To sum up, the dissolution of identity is a prevalent topic in postmodcm thought, 
and it is sometimes criticised as leading to the renunciation of liability for and lack of 
concern for others. I do not agree with these opinions, and have tried to demonstrate that 
postmodern discourse as a manner of thought does not need to locate the unity of a 
subject at the centre of discussions. Moreover, even if postmodern thought related to tile 
dissolution of a person more than to its unity, it would not necessarily imply aloofficss 
with regards to the future. Through being more 'impersonal, ' we will be able to reduce 
the height of the fence between ourselves and others. it will show us a different style of 
morality, especially with regards to future generations. 
In addition, although I pick up teclmology as a significant factor that madc the 
dissolution of a person accelerated, technology is concerned with both the acccptancc 
and denial of differences. The discrimination between tile inhumanity of thc system and 
the inhumanity of differences is necessary for us to sharpen our sense of the different 
421 For example, Fraser and Nicholson (1988, pp. 373-394), Poster (1990, p. 145). 
422Haraway's idea is, of course, not the only way to treat this issue. For a caution 
against too much involvement in this type of feminism, see Gillis (2004), Andermahr, I, ovell, and Wolkowitz (2000). 
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activities performed under the name of technology and science. I'liese prospects can be 
considered without establishing the concept of personal identity, or as I would rather say, 
they are seeking a way to go as far as possible from the modern conccpt of personal 
identity. This in an answer to the question of whether or not the postmodcm can be 
actively concerned with the present social system and human actions, and my answer to 
this question is positive. The media in which we are involved today have made weak the 
borderline between simulation and reality, in our sense. The concept of personal identity 
cannot be irrelevant to this movement, and I suggest that we now face the dissolution of 
the concept of a person that has been thought as a unified being. To depict this feature 
was the main topic of this chapter. Although the idea that different media have different 
influences on people is already stressed by MacLuhan, his discussion does not go far 
enough to emphasise the impact of electronic media. He presents transformations of 
human perception brought about by the media, but the unity of a person as tile subject 
that supervises perception is not questioned enough in his thought. Thus, we need to go 
further than his argument in order to characterise transformations of the concept of 
personal identity at present. 
We have referred to behaviours, which are typical to computer mcdiated communication, 
as examples, that show the dissolution of identity. Tile computer mediatcd 
communication is effective in showing the estrangement between phrases and their 
subjects, and we shall review this point. It is oflen mentioned by recent writers, for 
instance, Slavoj Z'ilek eagerly discusses the influence of the media on tile forms of 
human thought. He indicates that because everyone knows that phrases on the Internet 
are not believed entirely, we can express our minds freely, as a patient can say anything 
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to a psychotherapist. The patient knows that the psychotherapist does not get angry in 
the session, because the psychotherapist does not react to the conversation as his or her 
personal matter. Communication in the digital media is compared to that idea, in order 
to examine the relation between the subject of desire and its object, examine the concept 
of a person at present. 423 1 interpret this as referring to the moment at which we are 
spread about into phrases, and at which differences in a person reveal themselves. We at 
present should reconsider the meaning of identity and differences if we are not to return 
to the modem or the classic. In this regard, I insist that computer based communication 
has the potential to be an interesting experimental medium for examining the 
phenomenon of the diffused self in the postmodern age. 
Moreover, if the Internet has any significance in its use, it is also in the method of 
making a link: Lyotard asks that 'From the different phrases which are actually possible, 
one will be actualised; and the actual question is: which oneT Until a link is made, a 
phrase is open to opportunities in multiple discourses, so it can be a weighty task to 
decide on a phrase to link with. The description of the fall of, or memory of, modem 
Ideas will not help to answer the question, 'which one?, ' because it does not then 
become a question. The decision as to which genre a phrase has to belong, is already 
provided to the modem Ideas, because they hold up the ideals which will be achieved in 
the future, and any phrase must follow that ideal. Indeed, Lyotard claims that 'this is 
, 424 why the word postmodernity is able to embrace such conflicting perspectives . If the 
modem promotes fixed links that bring about its ideal in the goal, the postmodem would 
have no fixed purpose but would attempt to produce an unknown presentation. If there 
423 2iZ'ek (1996). 
424 Lyotard (1992, p. 41). 
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is any possibility that computer based communication could contribute to research into 
the concept of identity in the postmodern, it would be in its activity as an experimental 
device through which users adopt unpredictable styles of discourse in the digital world. 
In my discussion, I should make clear a point in order to avoid misunderstanding: 
The electronic media are an interesting place to practice postmodcrn thought, but we 
should not regard them as the ideal media for the realisation of the postmodern 
movement. On one view, it is an appealing experimental device to delineate links 
between phrases, but on another view it strengthens the system that reduces persons to 
digital records. A positive side of electronic media can be described thus: 'computer 
writing is the quintessential postmodern linguistic activity. With its dispersal of the 
subject in nonlinear spatio-temporality, its immateriality, its disruption of stable identity, 
computer writing institutes a factory of postmodem subjectivity, a machine for 
constituting non-identical subjects. 425 However, if the systematic side of the media rose 
to predominance, a person would be reduced to pieces of data on records such as date of 
birth, gender, nationality, address, job, bank account number, or family structure. These 
data are often accepted as more credible information than that which states who we are. 
This systematic understanding produces routine links that are content with the existing 
system, and Lyotard rejects this as the inhumanity of the system. Even though the 
electronic media possess the potential to betoken postmodern thought, we should be 
careful of their negative aspect of impairing differences. 
In conclusion, I regard the present age as the time in which the matters of 
differences are paid more attention than before. In the modem era, the establishment of 
identity was focused upon for the development of society, and residues were those 
425 Poster (1990, p. 128). 
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things that had to be removed for the sake of preserving the stability of the systcm. I do 
not deny the achievement of the modem in giving us an opportunity to liberate our livcs 
0 more than before, but it is also true that we cannot now simply follow the modcrn 
project without reviewing it. Differences become an issue in this rcconsidcration, nnd 
we need a new perspective to discuss this idea. Even if identity and dillcmiccs are not 
separate groups of thought but corresponded to each other, differences would not be 
grasped on the same basis as is identity. We can use the term 'personal idcntity' %vlicn 
we ask about the continuity of a person over time, but we cannot, correspondingly, say 
'personal differences, because differences have no subject with which they can bc 
identified in the sphere of a person. They lack the origin which makcs subjccts of 
identity unified, and this absence is a way to allow phrases to survive not as picccs of 
the unity but as differences themselves. 
If I can be allowed to mention Michel Foucault's thought, I would say that the 
concept of personal identity today is not a deterrninate issue through all spat i o-twuporal 
conditions, but that it is a periodical notion that arose in early modern times in NVcstcrn 
traditions. Therefore, it is possible that this concept is attacked when anotlicr notion has 
gained power: 'As the archaeology of our thought easily shows, man is an inmition of 
recent date ... If those arrangements were to disappear as they appeared, ... man would be 
erased, like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea. "" T11c understanding or a 
person in modem thought was once effective, but it may have arrivcd at its boundary 
and face the time of reconsidering its credibility. I"his is rny basic argumcnt in the study 
of personal identity, and I have undertaken to depict this idca from scvcral angics, 
concerned with memory, narrative, media history, and the postmodcrn. To predict the 
426 Foucault (1970, p. 387). 
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future is beyond my capacity, so I have tried to depict the present situation, what is 
happening to us, and using this picture I have also attempted to describe the necessity of 
reassessing our understanding of the concept of personal identity in this century. 
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CONCLUSION 
Personal Identity, Memory, and Narrative 
We asked one question throughout this thesis; what is personal identity for us? 17his 
leads firstly to the discussion of the way in which we form our concept of personal 
identity, and we pursue it in the work of the reconstruction of memory. That issue then 
unfolds a further question of whether or not there are elements that cannot be resolved 
in this way. This question is considered by examining the status of the identity in the 
postmodem age. Here, we shall restate the points that we have dealt with in this thesis, 
and will discuss the concept of identity and differences a little more. I defined personal 
identity as a network of memory that arises when we grasp experiences from our own 
perspective. In this network, even if each episode were not exactly the same, it would be 
regarded as a factor that consists of the concept of personal identity. 11iis is called the 
unity relation by Perry, and we apply it to the reconstruction of memory with the 
modification that memories are organised not from a neutral position but from a 
person's particular perspective. 
This account of personal identity is compared to the narrative form, which works 
to provide a proper explanation of an action in accordance with the longer-context of a 
personal history. Thus, even if there are great gaps between temporally separate 
descriptions, they would be regarded as belonging to the same person as long as we can 
find an adequate relation between them. In MacIntyre's example, even though the 
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description 'The prisoner of the Chateau d'If" and 'T'he Count of Monte Cristo' do not 
show any immediate similarity, we would not hesitate to regard them as tile same person 
in the context of that man's history. Personal identity is, MacIntyre claims, the identity 
that corresponds to the unity of one's character that is disclosed by the unity of 
427 narrative. In this regard, the narrative understanding through which a plausible 
relation is made between episodes is crucial in terms of forming the concept of personal 
identity. 
However, although the narrative form plays an important role for organising the 
concept of personal identity, I also insist that that form is not necessary to cover the 
whole of life from its beginning to end. The narrative form concerned with the concept 
of personal identity in this thesis is defined as the method that bridges temporally 
distant episodes in the framework of a person, and that is all. We thus separate from 
MacIntyre's discussion at this point. In his thought, the unity of narrative is inseparable 
from the achievement of virtue in life, so it includes the evaluation of lifestyle; narrative 
consistency is important to establish a virtuous life. That evaluation is, nevertheless, not 
brought in our discussion, so the necessityof a life story fitting in with long-term 
intentions can be avoided with regard to the reconstruction of memory. 
This point is mentioned by Galen Strawson as different types of narration in his 
discussion of the self. He asserts that some people may be good at remembering 
personal history, and others may have poor memory of that - not only this, but such 
people may not be seriously affected by their past experiences when they think about 
the future. He suggests that those differences influence the way in which people grasp 
and envisage their lives. 
427 MacIntyre (1984, pp. 217-218). 
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Some people live deeply in narrative mode: they experience their lives in terms of something 
that has shape and story, narrative trajectory. Some of them are sclf-narrators in a strongcr 
sense ... and knit up their lives with longer term projects. 
Others arc quite differcnt. Tlicy have 
no early ambition, no later sense of vocation ... no tendency to see their life in narrative tcnns 
or as constituting a story ... They live life in a picarcsque or episodic fashion. 
428 
Strawson does not judge which narrative style is more adequate for our existence, 
though he is basically more eager to attack the notion that the consistency of narrative is 
necessary for the organisation, of a good life. His opinion is that long-tenn continuity is 
not a necessary condition for making the sense of the self, but that we can still have that 
sense even within the episodic fonn of life. He criticises recent studies that stress the 
importance of narrative consistency for our lives, and insists that that consistency is not 
indispensable to the analysis of human experiences. 429 1 do not intend to abandon the 
work of narrative completely, since it is certainly effective in making sense of our past. 
However, I also accept his idea that neither the evaluation nor the long-term intention is 
necessary for depicting our experiences. 
That is a brief overview of the relation between the narrative form and life in 
chapter two. In later chapters, we then moved on to seek the minimum of this approach 
for analysing the concept of personal identity. This takes the form of a criticism of the 
idea of the stability of identity, especially that associated with the modem ideal of a 
person and identity. This was specifically considered in relation to niedia history. 
Printing Technology and the Modern 
428 Strawson (2003, p. 353). 
429 Strawson (2004, p. 1). 
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In order to clarify the character of the concept of personal identity at present, I paid 
attention to features of that concept in different ages, as characterised by different media. 
Poster also focuses on media history in order to depict how a person is charactcrised in 
different modes of information. He divides media history into three stages; tile oral, 
printing, and electronic. In the oral, he suggests that 'the self is constituted as a position 
of enunciation through its embeddedness in a totality of face-to-face relations' . 
430 1 
include the medium of oral and of hand writing in this notion, and depict this stage as 
that in which people rely on collective identity that is strongly associated with their own 
community. 
In the age of printing, Poster holds that 'the self is constructed as an agent centrcd 
in rational/imaginary autonomy'. 43' The acts of writing and reading are notably changed 
by the rise of printing technology. They acquired great popularity in comparison to the 
Middle Ages, and individual thought obtained a place to be expressed through the 
development of that medium. I count those as necessary changes for founding the 
modem concept of personal identity. Poster; s third stage is represented by electronic 
technology, in which 'the self is decentered, dispersed, and multiplied in continuous 
instability'. 432 This is what I regard as the peculiarity of the postmodern age, in which 
the traditional view of identity is questioned, and the dissolution of the unity of a person 
is discussed more than before. 
I insisted that in media history printing plays a great part in the modemisation of 
our thinking style. It plays an important role in founding the modem idea of an 
individual, in which rationality and the abstract sense have been strengthened. For 
430 Poster (1990, p. 6). 
431 Ibid., 
432 Ibid., 
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instance, when we at present study philosophy, to tackle an issue by oneself silently is 
usual, though oral discussion is also greatly valued. Our style of studying, leaming, and 
thinking, are deeply involved with silent reading today, and this would not be actualised 
if books had not become objects of mass-production by means of the developmcnt of 
printing. Elizabeth Eisenstein asserts the power of printing for changing the 
circumstances of religion: 'Intellectual and spiritual life were profoundly transformed 
by the multiplication of new tools for duplicating books in fifteenth-century Europc., 433 
Narasimhan also mentions that printing contributes to the transformation of Western 
cultures, and he counts it as one of three factors that alter the role of literacy 
conceptually and socially. 434 Printing technology, which started with Gutenberg's 
invention, has been very much bound up with the intellectual life of Western society. 
The concept of personal identity is cultivated in this tradition, in which a person is 
regarded as an independent agent who takes responsibility for his or her own action by 
the use of rationality. 
This concept is however attacked by the postmodern as a monochromatic and 
authorised view of a person. I examine this issue in its relation to the electronic media. 
This latest communication technology contfibutes to changing the sense of space and 
distance through the immediate connection to others. 435 Nonetheless, some people may 
ask if they are really worth considering, and assert that the influence of computer 
mediated communication may be overestimated today. I also disagree with seeing 
cyberspace as ari ideal tool that can resolve many problems. However, I still find 
433 Eisenstein (1979, p. 704). 
434 Others show 'Concern with the interpretation assignment process that is involved 
in assigning meaning to a texe and'Concern with schooling and the instructional 
process'. (Narasimhan, 1991) 
43,1 Hetherington (1988), Morley and Robins (1995). 
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remarkableness in it as a manifestation of the postmodem tendency, and insist that 
electronic media deserve to be discussed for the sake of understanding our present 
communication style. The observation of human behaviour in cyberspace can be 
0 436 effective for depicting how the concept of a person and identity is grasped in this cra. 
It is the discontinuity between the modem and the postmodem, which is stressed 
in chapter four. In relation to this issue, it is worthwhile to mention the following point: 
As is generally known, modernism firstly appeared as defiance against the existing 
system. According to Fredric Jameson, early modernism was 'an oppositional art; it 
emerged within the business society of the gilded age as scandalous and offensive to the 
middle-class public - ugly, dissonant, bohemian, sexually shocking... an offence to good 
taste and to common sense'. 437 Modernism struck the former generation as shocking, 
and 'decorous' people frowned on its newness. It was thus once intended to be a revolt 
against authority. Nevertheless, from the postmodem viewpoint, the radicalness of 
modernism is hushed and modernism is counted as another form of authority over 
others. Hence, modernism seems to have lost its air of danger to the existing order in 
society. 
The above view of modernism is specifically observed in the case of art in modem 
times, which occurred as a reaction against Victorian 'polite society, ' as Jameson claims. 
Our discussion of the modem covers a wider range than that, but in relation to this point, 
modernism not as radical any more but as warranted, can be accepted as its conimon 
436Gordon Graham criticises the Internet as beneficial but having no impact in order to 
truly transform human nature and condition. His caution is partly directed towards 
those who devote themselves to it as a dream invention through which diverse 
problems can be resolved (1999). 1 agree with him in that sense, but still insist that it 
can influence our concept of personal identity and a person. For further discussion, see 
chapter five. 
437Fredric Jameson (1987, pp. 123-124). 
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feature. The modem becomes popularised in culture to the degree that people almost 
forget its radical side, and I assume that this is one of the reasons why the postmodem 
has arisen as a criticism of the modem. Some researchers may pursue the modem 
ideology as far as it can be carried, but Lyotard writes that the moumitig process for tile 
modem has been completed. We do not need to start it all over again, and Miat is what 
the postmodern world is all about. Many people have lost tile nostalgia for the lost 
narrative'. 438 The postmodern does not participate in retrospect or tile re-establishment 
of the lost narrative, or in the return to the classic. We do not need to restore the modcm 
Ideas in the manner in which people once tried to do, but it will be necessary for us to 
find the method by which we will survive following present-day scepticism of modem 
achievements. 
Lyotard calls the act of seeking the postmodem discourse 'rewriting modernity' in 
one article. It is not a matter of revealing the failure of the modem and coffecting it. If 
'rewriting modernity' was understood in this way, it would be merely 'writing again, 
439 
and making real, modernity itself'. We must not be led into repeating the same error 
when we rewrite modemity, so the postmodern is not ascertaining the track of the 
modem, but resisting being interpreted as the complement of the modem. 
The Status of Differences in Postmodern Thought 
I symbolise postmodern thought concerned with identity by the term 'differences'. In 
the case of the modem, the concept of identity is thought to be a matter of synthesis, and 
it works to make our experiences understandable. In the case of the postmodern, I 
438 Lyotarcl (1984, p. 41). 
439 Lyotard (1991, p. 28). 
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consider the limitation of that modem idea, because that explanation cannot include 
elements that stray from its system. I wanted to consider something that is regarded as 
needless for that system, needless for the establishment of a universal idea. Some recent 
arguments that do not belong to this seeking for the unity of identity seem to advocate 
this point in their own ways. They represent the search not for the way that things arc 
identified with their origin or subject, but for the way that differences can be traced. 
Among them, for instance, I think Foucalut's discussion of 'archives' may be 
comparable with the 'differences' discussed in this thesis. 
The archive is not a real collection of things but is defined as the law of 
statements; there are conditions in which statements can be made to appear, and tile 
archive is the system that makes the statements and discourses (which are a set of 
statements) possible. For instance, Cervantes's Don Quixote is written as the negative of 
the chivalry of the Renaissance. In order to generate that type of story, there must be an 
agreement as to what chivalry is, and there must be a tendency to regard it as out-of- 
date. I also include the condition that the chivalry story would not be innocently 
narrated after Cervantes, and that is how Don Qubcote is accepted in the context of 
literary history (it is counted as the indication of modem literature in Western tradition). 
There is a web of thoughts from which a unique event arises, and that is the function of 
the archive. It cannot be reduced to the accumulation of sentences, cultural conditions, 
or the movement of the period itself, but is the system that produces particular events in 
a particular period of time. This notion of the archive is used in relation to the idea that 
any description (the self, history, reason, and so on) is one of many possible variations 
that can be realised, so the description is not an absolute establishment but is founded in 
differences of discourses. Thus, Foucault's archive multiplies differences rather than 
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forming identity: 
[I]t deprives us of I our continuities... In this sense, the diagnosis does not establish the fact of 
our identity by the play of distinctions. It establishes that we are differences, that our reason is 
the difference of discourses, our history the difference of times, our selves the difference of 
masks. That difference, far from being the forgotten and recovered origin, is this dispersion 
that we are and makc. 440 
On this notion, the establishment of the synthesis or the unifying function of a subject is 
denied, but the dispersion of a person is stressed. Foucault does not consider history as a 
linear sequence of events but sees the discontinuity in it. I assume that this idea marks a 
similarity to our discussion in that I depict a person as a temporal existence to which 
phrases come and go, and through that interaction the framework of tile existence can bc 
modified. The web of phrases and discourses is not identified with their source or origin, 
but expands in diverse ways through seeking another condition of linkage. 
I insist that narrative consistency and phrases, or the unity of identity and 
differences, are irreconcilable thoughts, but not that one has to be conquered by the 
other. As the concept of identity discloses the shortcomings in order to grasp our 
experiences fully, so differences are not enough for us. We tend to make order out of 
experiences, and this organisation is partly effective to our comprehension of ourselves. 
However, there are always frayed parts in that organisation, and the endeavour to trace 
the differences is the main topic of our later discussion. If I can compare the frayed, the 
differences, to Kakuzo Okakura's study of aesthetics, the act of differences arc, 
metaphorically, symbolised: 'In leaving something unsaid the beholder is given a 
chance to complete the idea and thus a great masterpiece irresistibly rivets your 
440 Foucault (1989, p. 13 1). 
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attention until you seem to become actually a part of it., 
441 Since there is an incompletc 
part of the work, there is a space for imagination that people complete by themselves. It 
is the quest for the representation of something that has not yet been expressed, and how 
to accept it positively is an issue concerned with the matter of differences. 
This is the postmodern. explanation of identity and difference. Although I have 
argued for the collapse of the modem concept of personal identity, I do not wish to bc 
entirely involved in talking about something's end. The end of modem ideologies has 
already been strongly asserted by researchers. 
442 In place of taking part in discussing 
this supposed end, I would like to turn our attention to the act of opening. Research into 
differences in identity may provide the opportunity to reconsider the concept of personal 
identity from a different angle. The question of what attitude we should take to new 
technology is always a pressing issue for us. I have considered the method by which we 
grasp our discontinuity within the excesses of our information society. To track the 
mutability of our status was the theme here, and the concept of personal identity was the 
central topic of this consideration. 
441 Okakura (1919). 
442 For example, Fukuyama (1992), Bloom (1987), Lyotard (1984). 
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